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I AM CERTAINLY NOT AN ADVOCATE FOR FREQUENT AND 
UNTRIED CHANGES IN LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS. I THINK 
MODERATE IMPERFECTIONS HAD BETTER BE BORNE WITH; 
BECAUSE, WHEN ONCE KNOWN, WE ACCOMMODATE 
OURSELVES TO THEM, AND FIND PRACTICAL MEANS OF 
CORRECTING THEIR ILL EFFECTS. BUT I KNOW ALSO, 
THAT LAWS AND INSTITUTIONS MUST GO HAND IN HAND 
WITH THE PROGRESS OF THE HUMAN MIND. AS THAT 
BECOMES MORE DEVELOPED, MORE ENLIGHTENED, AS NEW 
DISCOVERIES ARE MADE, NEW TRUTHS DISCLOSED, AND 
MANNERS AND OPINIONS CHANGE WITH THE CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES, INSTITUTIONS MUST ADVANCE ALSO, AND 
KEEP PACE WITH THE TIMES. WE MIGHT AS WELL REQUIRE 
A MAN TO WEAR STILL THE COAT WHICH FITTED HIM WHEN 
A BOY, AS CIVILIZED SOCIETY TO REMAIN EVER UNDER THE 
REGIMEN OF THEIR BARBAROUS ANCESTORS. 
 
~ THOMAS JEFFERSON~ 
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SUMMARY 
There are thousands of desperate people globally who need a kidney for 
transplantation. The number of people who require a kidney transplant continues to 
escalate faster than the number of kidneys available for a transplant. The aim of this 
dissertation is to examine and analyse the judicial framework pertaining to kidney 
transplants in South Africa. The examination is conducted within the framework of the 
South African Constitution and the National Health Act 61 of 2003. The specific focus of 
this dissertation is to determine whether the payment of kidney donors could be 
regarded as constitutionally acceptable. A comparative study is undertaken, with 
Singapore and Iran as a background against which recommendations for the South 
African regulatory framework are made. The most important finding is that people should 
at least be granted the choice whether they would prefer to receive payment for their 
kidney donations or not.  
 
Key terms: kidney donation; organ sales; Constitution; human life; human dignity; self-
determination; privacy; healthcare; living donor; autonomy. 
 
 
vii 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT ........................................................................................................ iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................... iv 
SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... vii 
 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1 
1.1  BACKGROUND ....................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 Introductory remarks ................................................................................. 1 
1.1.2 The history of kidney transplants .............................................................. 3 
1.1.2.1 International history of kidney transplants ................................................. 3 
1.1.2.2 South African kidney transplant history and transplant legislation timeline 
…………… ................................................................................................ 4 
1.1.3 Current regulation of kidney transplants in South Africa ........................... 7 
1.1.4 Medical law and kidney transplants .......................................................... 9 
1.1.4.1 The link between the law and kidney transplants ..................................... 9 
1.1.4.2 The public and private healthcare sector in South Africa ........................ 11 
1.2  PURPOSE AND PROBLEM STATEMENT ............................................ 14 
1.3 CHOICE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS ............................................................ 16 
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY ................................ 16 
1.4.1 Explanatory notes on source referencing and bibliography .................... 17 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS .................................................................. 18 
1.6 POINT OF DEPATURE, ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS ............. 20 
1.7  VALUE CONTRIBUTION ....................................................................... 20 
1.8 MOTIVATION ......................................................................................... 20 
 
CHAPTER 2 – HUMAN RIGHTS AND KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS ...................... 23 
2.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 23 
2.2 SECTION 36 OF THE CONSTITUTION: LIMITATION OF RIGTHS ...... 26 
2.3 THE RIGHT TO LIFE .............................................................................. 27 
viii 
 
2.3.1 International and regional human rights instruments .............................. 27 
2.3.2 The Constitution ..................................................................................... 29 
2.3.3 The right to life and kidney transplants ................................................... 30 
2.4 THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY......................................................... 34 
2.4.1  International and regional human rights instruments .............................. 34 
2.4.2 The Constitution ..................................................................................... 36 
2.4.3 The right to human dignity and kidney transplants ................................. 37 
2.5 THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION ............................................. 41 
2.5.1 International and regional human rights instruments .............................. 41 
2.5.2 The Constitution ..................................................................................... 43 
2.5.3 The right to self-determination and kidney transplants ........................... 44 
2.6 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY……………….……………………………..……47 
2.6.1  International and regional human rights instruments .............................. 47 
2.6.2 The Constitution ..................................................................................... 48 
2.6.3 The right to privacy and kidney transplants ............................................ 49 
2.7 THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE ............................................. …………  51 
2.7.1 International and regional human rights instruments .............................. 51 
2.7.2 The Constitution ..................................................................................... 53 
2.7.3 The right to health and kidney transplants .............................................. 58 
2.8 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 62 
 
CHAPTER 3 – SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPLANT LEGISLATION ..................... 64 
3.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 64 
3.2 THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAWFUL KIDNEY TRANSPLANT ....... 64 
3.2.1 The Human Tissue Act ........................................................................... 64 
3.2.1.1 Deceased kidney donors ........................................................................ 65 
3.2.1.2 Living kidney donors ............................................................................... 66 
3.2.2 The National Health Act .......................................................................... 67 
3.2.2.1 Deceased kidney donors ........................................................................ 67 
3.2.2.2 Living kidney donors ............................................................................... 71 
3.3 THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS REGARDING KIDNEY DONATIONS . 73 
ix 
 
3.3.1 The criteria for deceased-donor kidney transplantation .......................... 74 
3.3.2 The criteria for living-donor kidney transplantation ................................. 75 
3.3.2.1 The assessment of related living kidney donors ..................................... 75 
3.3.2.2 The assessment of unrelated living kidney donors ................................. 75 
3.4 SHORTCOMINGS IN SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPLANT LEGISLATION . 
…………………………………………………………………………………..77 
3.5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 79 
 
CHAPTER 4 – BIOETHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS .. 81 
4.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS .................................................... 81 
4.2 AUTONOMY AND THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT .......... 82 
4.3 NON-MALEFICENCE AND BENEFICENCE ......................................... 87 
4.3.1 Non-Maleficence ..................................................................................... 88 
4.3.2 Beneficence ............................................................................................ 90 
4.3.3 The Doctrine of double effect .................................................................. 93 
4.4 JUSTICE .......................................................................................... … .94 
4.5 CONCLUSON ........................................................................................ 98 
 
CHAPTER 5 – TO SELL A KIDNEY OR NOT: ARGUMENTS FOR AND 
AGAINST THE SELLING OF HUMAN KIDNEYS ...................... 99 
5.1  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 99 
5.2 ARGUMENTS THAT OPPOSE THE SELLING OF DONOR KIDNEYS..
 ............................................................................................................. 100 
5.2.1 Exploitation of the poor by the rich would occur ................................... 100 
5.2.2 Informed consent cannot exist where payment is an undue 
inducement…………………………………………………………………...101 
5.2.3 Selling a kidney is an affront to human dignity ...................................... 102 
5.2.4 Poor people will undergo risky procedures out of financial desperation 103 
5.2.5 Public opinion ....................................................................................... 103 
5.3 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF SELLING KIDNEYS…………………...104 
x 
 
5.3.1 A competent person has the right to make informed decisions about their 
body parts. ............................................................................................ 104 
5.3.2 Permitting the selling of kidneys has a number of benefits ................... 105 
5.3.3 Society allows persons to make informed decisions about other risky 
activities ................................................................................................ 106 
5.3.4 The demand for a black market will be diminished ............................... 107 
5.4 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 107 
 
CHAPTER 6 – A MICRO-COMPARISON WITH THE TRANSPLANT 
LEGISLATION OF SINGAPORE AND IRAN……………………109 
6.1 INTRODUCTION……………………………………………….……………109 
6.2 SINGAPORE AND KIDNEY DONATIONS…………….…………………110 
6.2.1 The HOTA and presumed consent ………………………………………..111 
6.2.2 The HOTA and the reimbursement of living donors………………...…...112 
6.3 IRAN AND KIDNEY DONATIONS………………………………………...116 
6.3.1 The Iranian model of paid kidney donations……………………...………117 
6.3.2. Ethical issues pertaining to the Iranian model……………………...…….119 
6.3.2.1 Arguments supporting the Iranian model………………………………… 119 
6.3.2.2 Arguments against the Iranian model………………………...………..… 120 
6.4 CONCLUSION…………………………..……………………………….….121 
 
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 123 
 
REFERENCES…………………...……………………………………………………127 
BOOKS…………………….…………………………………………………………..127 
JOURNAL ARTICLES……………………………..……………………………...…129 
CASE LAW……………………………………….……………………………………132 
LEGISLATION ………………………………………………….…………………….133 
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS…………….……………..133 
INTERNET…………………………………….……………………………………….134 
 
xi 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
“Every man must decide whether he will walk in the light of creative altruism or in the 
darkness of destructive selfishness.”1 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
1.1.1 Introductory remarks  
At the back of the abdominal cavity, just above the waist of the human body, two 
extremely vital organs are located. These organs are approximately 10 to 13 cm long 
and about 5 to 8 cm wide. They represent only 0,5% of the body’s total weight, but 
together these two organs contain about 160 km of blood vessels that receive 20 to 
25% of all the blood pumped by the heart.2 The body’s total blood supply circulates 
through these organs about 12 times per day, and every hour they filter about 7,5 
litres of blood.3 These organs have the life-sustaining task of removing waste 
products and excess fluids from the body, and they will continue performing until they 
have lost 75 to 80% of their function.4 These organs are known as the kidneys, and 
although most of us are born with two kidneys, life with only one kidney is possible. If 
a person’s kidney does not perform its required function any more, he will have to 
undergo dialysis treatment until a kidney becomes available for transplantation. 
Haemodialysis is a treatment that removes the waste products and excess fluid 
gathered in the blood and body tissue as a result of kidney failure.5 The blood is 
filtered outside the body by means of a dialyser during two or three treatment 
sessions that can last between three and five hours each week.  
                                            
1  Martin Luther King, as quoted in his letter from Birmingham Jail. Dinar 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html (Date of use: 25 April 
2011). 
2  Kidney Health Australia (KHA) “Kidney Facts” http://www.kidney.org.au (Date of use: 25 April 
2011). 
3  KHA http://www.kidney.org.au (Date of use: 25 April 2011). 
4  KHA http://www.kidney.org.au (Date of use: 25 April 2011). 
5  Harillall B and Kasiram M “Exploring the bio-psychosocial effect of renal replacement therapy 
amongst patients in a state hospital in South Africa” 2011 (16) Health SA Gesondheid 5. 
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State facilities only offer dialysis to patients who are eligible for a kidney transplant.6 
The state facilities follow medical exclusion criteria, stating that a patient has to be 
eligible for a kidney transplant. Furthermore, the patient may not have an active, 
uncontrollable malignancy or short life expectancy or suffer from an advanced 
irreversible progressive disease of the vital organs such as cardiac, liver or lung 
disease.7 There are also psychological exclusion criteria: a person with any form of 
mental illness that has diminished capacity to take responsibility for his actions is 
excluded,8 as well as substance abusers (including tobacco users) and people who 
suffer from obesity.9 If one is accepted into a dialysis program, it is a time consuming 
and expensive experience.10 Dialysis also has physical and psychological 
disadvantages – patients complain of fatigue, headaches, pain, nausea, cramps, 
weight loss, depression, anxiety and loss of eyesight.11  
It is thus clear that a healthier option is a kidney transplant, since it reduces the 
dependence on dialysis treatment and allows a general improvement in a patients’ 
well-being. Sadly, only 18% per million of the population in South Africa receive 
kidney transplants due to the acute shortage of available kidneys.12 In the end, most 
patients waiting for a kidney transplant lose hope; they stop the dialysis programme 
and rather go home to die.  
Organ transplantation refers to a surgical operation where an organ is taken from one 
patient’s body (also known as the “organ donor”) and is placed into another patient’s 
body (known as the “organ recipient”). The objective of organ transplantation is to 
restore a happy and useful life to a patient who was doomed to a premature death 
                                            
6  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 CC (hereinafter the 
Soobramoney case). 
7  Department of Health South Africa (DOH) “Guidelines for chronic renal dialysis” 
http://www.doh.gov.za (Date of use: 16 August 2011). 
8  It should be noted that patients that have mental handicaps are excluded, but HIV and AIDS 
are not a medical exclusion criteria if the patient has access to a comprehensive AIDS 
treatment plan, including antiretroviral treatment for at least six months. DOH 
http:www.doh.gov.za (Date of use: 16 August 2011). 
9  DOH http:www.doh.gov.za (Date of use: 16 August 2011). 
10  Dialysis can cost up to R200 000 per annum per patient in the private sector. Discovery 
http://www.discovery.co.za (Date of use 16 August 2011). 
11  Harillall and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 5. 
12  Harillall and Kasiram2011 Health SA Gesondheid 2. 
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due to a fatal disease of a vital organ.13 Four classes of organ transplants exist. First 
there is an autograft. In this case, the donor and the recipient are the same 
individual,14 and one part of the body is transplanted to a different part of the same 
body, for instance a skin graft or tissue graft.15 Second there is an isograft – the 
donor and the recipient are genetically identical individuals of the same species,16 
such as with the first successful kidney transplant between twin brothers Ronald and 
Richard Herrick. Third and mostly done is an allograft, where the donor and the 
recipient are genetically dissimilar individuals of the same species,17 thus both are 
human but they are two different bodies (as is the case with most kidney transplants). 
The last class is a xenograft, where the donor and the recipient are individuals of 
different species,18 for example tissue transplanted from a pig to a human. The organ 
donor can be a person who has recently been declared brain dead19 or a living donor, 
as is the case with most kidney transplants.20 Other life-extending measures 
substantially lower the quality of life, while a successful organ transplant dramatically 
restores one’s health.  
1.1.2 The history of kidney transplants 
1.1.2.1 International history of kidney transplants 
Organ transplantation is probably one of the twentieth century’s most miraculous 
medical breakthroughs. Decades ago the thought of removing one patient’s kidney 
and placing it into another patients’ body, while keeping both patients alive, seemed 
                                            
13  Hakim NS (ed) Introduction to organ transplantation 2. 
14  Hakim (ed) Introduction to organ transplantation 1.  
15  A tissue graft can be a grafting of any of the following: bone, nerves, tendons, blood vessels or 
eye materials. Hakim (ed) Introduction to organ transplantation 1. 
16  Hakim (ed) Introduction to organ transplantation 1. 
17  Hakim (ed) Introduction to organ transplantation 1. 
18  Hakim (ed) Introduction to organ transplantation 1. 
19  For the purpose of this research, the criteria that a person has to be declared brain dead will 
not be discussed. It is worth mentioning, though, that in the National Health Act definitions 
“death” is defined as “brain death”. 
20  Most solid organs, such as the heart, lungs, liver, pancreas and kidneys, can be transplanted. 
For the purposes of this research I will only refer to kidney transplants, because kidney 
transplants are the only transplants that can take place between living people. Liver 
transplants from a living donor are still in a developing phase. Slabbert M and Oosthuizen H 
“Establishing a market for human organs in South Africa Part 2: Shortcomings in legislation 
and the current system of organ procurement 2007 (28) (2) Obiter 305. 
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almost impossible. In the early 1950s there were several experiments with organ 
transplants in Paris, France and Boston in the United States of America, but all of 
these experiments failed miserably due to the fact that no immunosuppressant21 was 
available.22 Yet, in 1954 a report by Dr Joseph Murray and Dr John Merrill at the Bent 
Brigham Hospital in Boston shocked the world when it documented the first 
successful kidney transplant between living identical twin brothers – Ronald and 
Richard Herrick.23 After countless failures, this procedure was a great success. The 
recipient of the kidney survived for eight years with no evidence of rejection. A clear 
lesson was learned: if surgeons could overcome the immunogenic barrier, a 
transplanted kidney could give new life to a dying patient. Today, kidney transplants 
have transformed from what was initially a clinical experiment to a routine and reliable 
practice that has saved thousands of lives.  
1.1.2.2 South African kidney transplant history and transplant legislation timeline 
While kidney transplants were already being done successfully in the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom, in the 1960s South Africa was not there yet. The 
first successful kidney transplant that took place in South Africa was performed by Dr 
Christiaan Barnard in October 1967, and two months later he performed the first heart 
transplant in the Groote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town.24 These transplants did not 
catch South African legislators totally unaware. Since 1952 the country has been 
legally prepared for transplants. In that year, the Post Mortem Examinations and 
Removal of Tissue Act 30 of 1952 saw the light. It was an advanced measure at the 
time, since the Act laid down a basis for all transplant procedures. In this regard 
South Africa was more advanced than some of more developed countries such as 
                                            
21  Immunosuppressant therapy works by curbing the production and activity of lymphocytes. It 
has been used since the middle of the previous century to prevent the human body from 
rejecting transplanted organs. Anti-immune drugs may raise the chances of survival of a 
transplanted organ, but they also render a patient more vulnerable to other infections. An 
organ can still be rejected in spite of immunosuppressive therapy. Norval S Defining moments: 
Marius Barnard – an autobiography 177. 
22  Norval Defining moments 177. 
23  Linden PK “History of solid organ transplantation and organ donation” 2009 (25) Critical Care 
Clinics 167. 
24  Cape Gateway “Chris Barnard performs world’s first heart transplant” 
http://www.westerncape.gov.za/eng/pubs/public_info/C/99478 (Date of use: 10 January 2012). 
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Belgium, Holland, Austria, Western Germany, Japan and Switzerland, which had no 
transplant legislation.25 South Africa, together with some of the American enactments 
and Italy, enjoyed the most sophisticated transplant legislation.26  
Since the first Act dealing with organ transplants (the Post Mortem and Removal of 
Tissue Act of 1952), South Africa has had three more major enacted statutes that 
specifically deal with the regulation of the anatomical removal of tissues.27 These 
statutes are the Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem Examinations Act 24 of 
1970, the Human Tissue Act 65 of 198328 and the National Health Act 61 of 2003.29 
Although not dealing directly with organ donation, there is also the Health Act 63 of 
1977. This Act was promulgated to provide inter alia for measures for the promotion 
of the health of the South African public. This Act mainly focuses on the preservation 
of tissue through protection against the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV 
and AIDS.30 The whole Health Act has been repealed by section 93 of the National 
Health Act. The healthiness of the donated tissue is of great importance, because if 
the recipient receives diseased tissue it could be useless.  
All the previous Acts had more or less the same purpose regarding organ transplants. 
The Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem Examinations Act came into force on 9 
March 1970 and repealed all previous legislation. This Act was the result of intensive 
study of legislation in other leading countries and it also considered South African 
practices and attitudes.31 The Act settled a number of issues at the time and had a 
broader scope, allowing for the donation of eye tissue (whereas the 1952 Act had 
strict provisions regarding this matter). The Act mainly provided for the donation of 
human bodies and tissue for therapeutic or scientific purposes, and for the removal of 
                                            
25  Strauss SA “The new legislation on tissue and organ transplantation” 1970 South African 
Medical Journal 803. 
26  Strauss 1970 South African Medical Journal 803. 
27  Fourie EJ An analysis of the doctrine of presumed consent and the principles of required 
response and required request in organ procurement (unpublished LLM Thesis University of 
Pretoria 2006) 111. 
28  Hereinafter referred to as the Human Tissue Act. 
29  Hereinafter referred to as the National Health Act. 
30  Fourie Organ procurement 111. 
31  Strauss 1970 South African Medical Journal 807. 
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such tissues and their use in living persons.32 The Act was framed to facilitate the 
acquisition and use of tissue, at the same time ensuring that the interests of the 
public are safeguarded. The Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem Examinations 
Act was later replaced by the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983. The Human Tissue Act 
provided a long-standing regulatory framework regarding organ transplants in the 
country. The National Health Act of 2003 repealed the Human Tissue Act and all 
other previous health-related legislation, and established a single framework for the 
regulation of organ procurement and transplantation.33  
The statutory provisions of the National Health Act relating to the removal and use of 
tissue of both living and cadaveric donors are almost identical to those of the Human 
Tissue Act. It should be noted, however, that all previous legislation only dealt with 
the removal and transplantation of tissue; no legislation provided for the allocation of 
organs harvested for a transplant.34 The National Health Act takes the extra step and 
explicitly facilitates allocation and use of human organs.35  
A few decades ago, South African transplant legislation could have been compared 
with other leading countries. Strauss even states that the Anatomical Donations and 
Post Mortem Examinations Act was rated as one of the most progressive measures 
of its kind in the world in 1970.36 This is no longer the case. After all these years, 
South African transplant legislation is still in a developing phase; the legislation has 
lost track of trends and the needs of the majority of the people.  
                                            
32  Cooper DKC et al. “Medical, legal and administrative aspects of cadaveric organ donations in 
the RSA” 1982 (62) South African Medical Journal 936. 
33  Chapter 8 of the National Health Act contains sections 53 to 68, which deal with the control of 
the use of blood, blood products, tissues and gametes in humans. Proclamation R11 
Government Gazette 35081. 
34  Fourie Organ procurement 139. 
35  Section 61(1) states that human organs obtained in terms of subsection (1) must be allocated 
in accordance with the prescribed procedures. This section looks promising at first glance. But 
these prescribed procedures only refer to section 68, which stipulates that the Minister of 
Health may make regulations pertaining to tissue, cells, organs, blood products and gametes. 
36  Strauss 1970 South African Medical Journal 803. 
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1.1.3 Current regulation of kidney transplants in South Africa 
Kidney transplants in South Africa are currently controlled by the following legislation: 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa ,199637 and the National Health Act of 
2003, as well as the Regulations in terms thereof.38 The system of organ 
procurement, as prescribed by these two Acts, could also play a role. 
Section 2 of the Constitution states: “The Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by 
it must be fulfilled.” Section 27(1) of the Constitution stipulates that everyone has the 
right to have access to healthcare services. Although this sounds very plausible, it 
should be noted that the abovementioned right to healthcare is internally limited by 
section 27(2), which stipulates that the state only has to take reasonable legislative 
and other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right.39 Other constitutional rights that also affect kidney transplants 
are the right to life (section 11), the right to human dignity (section 10), the right to 
privacy (section 14) and the right to self-determination (section 12). 
The National Health Act currently regulates kidney transplants in South Africa. This 
Act replaced the Human Tissue Act, which had its origin in the first successful heart 
transplant operation performed by Dr Barnard in 1967.40 The Act governs the removal 
of tissue, blood or gametes from the bodies of living and dead persons for therapeutic 
and other uses, as well as the donation of human bodies. The National Health Act’s 
draft regulations on organ transplants set out the approval criteria selecting donors for 
transplantation.41 A clear distinction is made between deceased and living donors, as 
well as related and unrelated living donors. The proposed assessment of donors will 
                                            
37  Hereinafter referred to as the Constitution. 
38  Currently, there are no specific regulations for transplants published, yet these regulations are 
still under discussion between role players such as the government and the South African 
Transplant Society. 
39  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 CC 
40  Strauss SA Doctor, patient and the law: A selection of practical issues 147. 
41  Draft Regulations of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 in Government Gazette 30828 of 7 
March 2008.  
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in future be to treat all donors equally. This is a very problematic area, due to the fact 
that it is very difficult to value one person’s life above another.42 
Internationally, two main organ procurement systems are acknowledged: an “opting-
in” system and an “opting-out” system. The opting-in system is a voluntary and 
altruistic system. According to this system a person has to give explicit informed 
consent before his death, confirming that he wants to donate his organs.43 Countries 
that follow the opting-in system include South Africa,44 Iran, the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America.45 In contrast with the opting-in procurement system is 
the opting-out system. According to this system everyone is a potential organ donor 
unless the person has registered before death that he does not want to be an organ 
donor.46 Countries that follow the opting-out system generally have a higher success 
rate. These countries include Singapore, Spain, Belgium and France.47  
The procurement system that is followed in a country plays a very vital role in that 
country’s success rate in acquiring organs for donation. Singapore has about nine 
deceased donors per million of the population,48 while Iran has 2.4 deceased49 
donors per million of the population.50 The method of acquiring donated organs could 
also be the reason why a country like Spain has approximately 34 deceased donors 
                                            
42  Slabbert M “One heart, two patients: Who gets a donor organ?” 2009 (1) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 136. 
43  Schicktanz S, Wiesermann C and Wöhlke S Teaching ethics in organ transplantation and 
tissue donation 6. 
44  If a person decides to become an organ donor in South Africa he is not placed on any list. A 
person can indicate his wish to become an organ donor to the Organ Donor Foundation. Once 
this is done, the donor will receive a card and two stickers for his identification document and 
driver’s licence, to indicate that he is a donor. Organ Donor Foundation http:www.odf.org.za 
(Date of use: 17 August 2011). 
45  Hartwell L “Global organ donation policies around the world” 
www.lorihartwell.com?GlobalOrganDonationPolices (Date of use: 18 August 2011). 
46  Schicktanz, Wiesermann and Wöhlke Organ transplantation and tissue donation 7.  
47 Hartwell www.lorihartwell.com?GlobalOrganDOantionPolices (Date of use: 18 August 2011). 
48  Kwek et al “The transplantable organ shortage in Singapore – Has implementation of 
presumed consent to organ donation made a difference?” 2009 (38) PubMed 346. 
49  It should be mentioned that even though Iran has a low deceased donor rate, they have a 
success rate of 26 per million of the population regarding renal transplants, and in 2009 
approximately 1 615 renal transplants took place. Horvat LD, Salimah SZ and Garg AX “Global 
trends in the rates of living kidney donation rates in living kidney donation” 2009 (75) Kidney 
International 1088. 
50  Thomas M and Klapdor M “The future of organ donation in Australia: Moving beyond the ‘gift of 
life’” http://aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2008-09/09rp11.htm (Date of use: 19 August 2011). 
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per million population,51 compared to South Africa with a disappointing 45 000 
registered organ donors, which is less than 0,1% of the population.52 It should be 
noted, though, that the South African statistics are estimates, since there is no 
national register where people indicate their willingness to donate organs. The 
registered donors referred to are only those people who have contacted the Organ 
Donor Foundation indicating that they are willing to donate their organs. There are no 
records of those who have indicated a willingness to donate and those who 
eventually do donate their organs.  
1.1.4 Medical law and kidney transplants 
1.1.4.1 The link between the law and kidney transplants 
Medical law truly exploded in the last few years. It is almost impossible to open any 
newspaper, magazine or web browser that does not have relevance to medical law. 
Medical law today is not only about medical negligence anymore; it has grown to 
include almost any issue that can constitute an interface between law and medicine. 
Examples of medical law in the media recently are cases like: “Prof charged after 
euthanasia of mom”:53 This article refers to Prof. Sean Davidson who was charged 
with attempted murder after giving his mother, who suffered from terminal cancer, a 
lethal dose of morphine. “R600m lawsuits against KZN Health Department”:54 This 
article focuses on the fact that the KwaZulu-Natal Health Department faces medical 
negligence claims totalling R600 million arising from obstetrics and gynaecology, 
paediatrics, orthopaedics, pharmacy, surgery and ophthalmology in the last 7 years. 
                                            
51  Wong G “Spain leads the way in organ donation” articles.cnn.com/2009-06-
17/health/organ.donation_1_organ-donation-donation-rates-number-of-organdonors?_s=PM: 
HEALTH (Date of use: 19 August 2011). 
52  Organ Donor Foundation www.odf.org.za (Date of use: 15 August 2011). 
53  Schoeman A “Prof. charged after euthanasia of mom” 
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Prof-charged-after-euthanasia-of-mom-20101010 
(Date of use: 20 September 2011). 
54  Regchand S “R600m lawsuits against KZN Health Dpt” http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
africa/kwazulu-natal/r600m-lawsuits-against-kzn-health-dpt-1.1146300 (Date of use: 20 
September 2011).  
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And of course, the groundbreaking news of “SA first with HIV kidney transplant”:55 
This article relates to how Dr Elmi Muller and her team pioneered a technique to 
transplant kidneys between HIV-positive donors and recipients.  
Except for the medicinal and law interface in these articles, it is also clear from the 
last article that technology regarding medicine keeps on developing, whereas 
legislation regarding medicine has almost stagnated.  
For the ordinary man on the street it would be difficult to understand how kidney 
transplants and the law have anything in common. Yet, in every aspect of our daily 
life we have to abide by certain laws; whether these regulate the manner in which we 
drive on the road or whether it regulates our daily conduct toward other human beings 
and their rights. Regulations also apply to everyone in the medical practice. The 
whole medical profession is regulated by the law.56 The main purpose of medical 
regulations is to protect the rights of patients and medical professionals, and to place 
an obligation on medical professionals. 
As everything in the medical world is regulated by laws, the same goes for kidney 
transplants. Kidney transplants are mainly regulated by chapter 8 of the National 
Heath Act. The law definitely plays a big role in the regulation of kidney transplants; 
and without regulations it will not be possible, as Crespi states:  
... (M)any deaths from organ failure are no longer the result of an 
inexorable fate that we must accept, but occur in the modern world only as 
the unintended consequence of a flawed regime that can be changed.57 
Only the law can help with the dire need concerning the availability of kidneys for 
transplants. Taking this a step further, the law can develop and make the accessibility 
of kidneys easier by allowing the buying and selling of kidneys in a regulated 
                                            
55  Erasmus J “SA first with HIV kidney transplant” http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica. 
com/index.php?option=com_content&view=artic le&id=1846:kidney-transplant-070710&catid 
=42:la nd news&Itemid=110 (Date of use: 20 September 2011).  
56  The Health Professions Act 56 of 1974. 
57  Slabbert M Handeldryf met menslike organs en weefsel vir oorplantingsdoeleindes 
(unpublished LLD Thesis University of the Free State 2002). 
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environment. If you can sell your own sperm,58 eggs59 and even breast milk,60 why 
not your kidneys? How can it be that one can sell the part of yourself that creates life 
but not a part that can maintain life?  
1.1.4.2 The public and private healthcare sector in South Africa 
The South African healthcare sector is divided into two sections – a public and private 
sector. The public sector is the largest and offers the most basic primary healthcare 
by the state.61 The public sector is mostly under-resourced and over-used. This 
sector is under pressure to deliver services to approximately 80% of the population.62 
A recent definition of public health defined it as follows: 
Public health is the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, 
promoting health through the organised efforts of society. Public health 
medicine is that branch of medicine which specialises in public health. Its 
chief responsibilities are the surveillance of the health of the population, 
the identification of its health needs, the fostering of policies which promote 
health and the evolution of health services.63 
The private sector is the complete opposite of the public sector. The reality of this 
difference is that only the employed and financially independent can afford access to 
private healthcare. This sector is much smaller than the public sector and can offer 
more specialised health services. The private sector includes all private health 
service providers (such as doctors and nurses), the institutions that represent health 
professionals, private health facilities and the funding mechanisms of private health 
services (medical schemes).64  
                                            
58  Spath A “(Sperm) Banking for life” http://www.yourparenting.co.za/fertility/treatment-
options/sperm-banking-for-life (Date of use: 24 October 2011). 
59  Egg Donation SA http://www.eggdonationsouthafrica.co.za (Date of use: 24 October 2011). 
60  South African Breastmilk Reserve http://www.sabr.org.za/members.html (Date of use: 24 
October 2011).  
61  The public health system is funded through taxation. Thom A “Is NHI feasible”  
http://www.health-e.org.za/news/articl.php?uid=20032957 (Date of use: 25 January 2012). 
62  SAinfo Reporter “Health care in South Africa” www.safrica.info/about/health/health.htm (Date 
of use: 11 January 2012). 
63  Nadasen S Public health law in South Africa 16. 
64  Hassim A, Heywood M and Berger J (eds) Health and democracy: A guide to human rights, 
health law and policy in post-apartheid South Africa 164. 
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The separation of the healthcare services is very problematic for the allocation of 
deceased-donor kidneys. Currently, South Africa has no specific legislation regarding 
the allocation of donor kidneys. In the National Health Act there are only two sections 
that mention allocation: section 61(2) states that “human organs obtained in terms of 
subsection (1) must be allocated in accordance with the prescribed procedures”;65 
and chapter 5 of the draft regulations66 mentions that the allocation of organs must be 
based solely on the clinical needs of the intended patient and that other factors may 
not be taken into account.67 These regulations envisage national control of a 
transplant database, but at this stage no national waiting list or controls exist.68  
At present, the process of organ allocation is based on an “agreement” between the 
public and private sector.69 According to this agreement, one available deceased 
kidney will go to the public sector and one to the private sector, according to the 
urgency of recipients.70 The relevant people working with kidney donations in these 
two sectors often consult each other to determine who has a patient with a more 
urgent need.71 There are private facilities that offer help to the public sector. For 
instance, the Netcare Transplant Division financially supports organ transplantation in 
the public sector by covering donor costs for all organs allocated to the public sector 
from the private sector.72  
                                            
65  The “prescribed procedures” fall within the discretion of the Minister of Health. 
66  These regulations will form a part of the new Act, which is not yet promulgated.  
67  Regulation 14: “Allocation of organs obtained from the body of a deceased person must be 
based purely on the clinical needs of the intended recipient and may not take into account the 
race, religious beliefs and political affiliation, culture, language or any aspect of the deceased 
person’s life that has no bearing on the physical state or quality of the tissue in question”. 
68  Slabbert 2009 Stellenbosch Law Review 136. 
69  According to Prof. RS Britz, the allocation system of 50:50 between the public and private 
sector was scrapped in 2010, and a point-based allocation system has taken its place. There 
is no clarity if this is only applicable to kidney transplant recipients in Johannesburg. According 
to Anette Otto, kidney allocation in Pretoria, Limpopo, North West and Mpumalanga is sill 
based on a 50:50 split, and an additional point-based system. It is mentioned that the public 
and private system have an integrated list. Information supplied by Prof. RS Britz 
(rsbritz@gmail.com) (12-15/01/2012). 
70  Slabbert 2009 Stellenbosch Law Review 136. 
71  Slabbert 2009 Stellenbosch Law Review 136. 
72  Netcare “Corporate social investment programmes” http://www.csi.netcare.co.za/live/index_ 
wider.php?cookie=k (Date of use: 12 January 2012). 
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It should be noted that the allocation process also occurs differently in the public and 
private sector. Kidney transplants in the public sector are more restricted because 
only a number of these transplants are performed per annum.73 A patient can only be 
referred based on the opinion of his doctor and the following factors74 are taken into 
account:  
• The patient should have the prospect of living at least another two years with 
the transplanted organ. 
• The patient must be younger than 60 years. 
• The patient should not suffer from cardiac, liver or lung disease or 
unresponsive infections like Hepatitis B and C.75  
In the private sector the process is more complicated. It can be summarised as 
follows:76 After being diagnosed, a patient is referred to the transplant consultancy of 
a transplant unit for assistance with the transplant preparatory process. At this point, 
the patient’s condition should have been stabilised.77 The patient is prepared mentally 
and also has to have the adequate support structures in place before and after the 
proposed transplant. This is only the preliminary screening process. Thereafter, the 
patient’s case is reviewed monthly by a transplant panel, during which the transplant 
surgeons, physicians and counsellors will consider whether to put or keep the patient 
on the transplant list.78 
                                            
73  Slabbert 2009 Stellenbosch Law Review 138. 
74  DOH http://www.doh.gov.za (Date of use: 12 January 2012). 
75  HIV and AIDS are no longer a medical exclusion criteria provided the patient has access to a 
comprehensive AIDS treatment plan and is stable for at least six months and other exclusion 
factors are absent. DOH http://www.doh.gov.za (Date of use: 2 September 2011). 
76  This process is only summarised, because there is no need to discuss the whole process in 
this dissertation. 
77  Slabbert 2009 Stellenbosch Law Review 135.  
78  Slabbert 2009 Stellenbosch Law Review 136.  
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1.2 PURPOSE AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There are thousands of desperate people globally who need a kidney for 
transplantation. The number of people who require a kidney transplant continues to 
escalate faster than the number of kidneys available for a transplant. Approximately 5 
000 people are waiting for organs in South Africa,79 and according to statistics only 
400 organ transplants occur each year. According to the Organ Donor Foundation,80 
at least 1 000 kidney transplants should take place each year. Sadly, not even a 
quarter of kidney transplants realise.81 In 2010, only 266 kidney transplants were 
performed in South Africa, and only 119 of these kidneys were donated by living 
donors.82 
The acute shortage of available kidneys can be ascribed to various social, political 
and moral factors; leading to a question whether allowing the buying and selling of 
human kidneys is not the right way to go. The National Health Act is a step in the right 
direction. Section 60(4)(a)83 of the National Health Act stipulates that a donor may be 
reimbursed for any reasonable costs that occurred during the organ donation, but 
neither the Act nor the draft regulations of the National Health Act stipulate who will 
be liable for the payment of these costs and what exactly “reasonable costs” entail.  
The question can therefore be asked whether the legislator should not go the whole 
way and legalise the buying and selling of kidneys. The solution is simple, affordable, 
respects personal autonomy and cuts out the organ broker in the current black 
                                            
79  There is no national waiting list in South Africa regarding organ donations; thus the amount 
referred to is only an estimate. Slabbert M and Oosthuizen H “Establishing a market for human 
organs in South Africa Part 1: A proposal” 2007 (28) (1) Obiter 53. 
80  The Organ Donor Foundation is a non-governmental organisation in South Africa. They have a 
number of objectives, namely to educate the public about organ donation, to significantly 
increase the number of organs donated in South Africa, to increase awareness about organ 
donation among medical and paramedical professions, and to improve the donor identification 
and organ procurement programmes. Organ Donor Foundation http://www.odf.org.za (Date of 
use: 6 May 2011). 
81  Organ Donor Foundation http://www.odf.org.za (Date of use: 25 April 2011). 
82  Organ Donor Foundation http://www.odf.org.za (Date of use: 25 April 2011). 
83  Section 60(4)(a) reads: It is an offence for a person who has donated tissue, a gamete, blood 
or blood product to receive any form of financial or other reward for such donation except for 
the reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred by him or her to provide such donation (own 
emphasis). 
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markets. Yet the question arises: will it be constitutionally acceptable in a country 
under the rule of law? 
This dissertation focuses on the obligations that the government has in terms of the 
Constitution, as well as the basic human rights each individual has and how the 
government must protect these rights in a transplant context. These obligations are 
analysed in terms of the right to life,84 the right to human dignity,85 the right to self-
determination,86 the right to privacy, 87 as well as the right of access to healthcare 
services.88 These rights will be evaluated against the proposal of buying and selling 
kidneys. Section 7(2) of the Constitution stipulates that “the state must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights”. Thus, if the government 
cannot fulfil these rights, it should be able to supply an alternative to improve the 
current kidney shortage. In addition to being constitutionally acceptable, the selling of 
kidneys must be bio-ethically justifiable as well. Therefore, kidney sales must also be 
tested against the four pillars of bio-ethics: respect for patient autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence and justice.89 
In 2010, kidneys were illegally bought from Brazilian and Romanian sellers and 
transplanted into Israeli patients at a Netcare facility in South Africa.90 These 
incidents made it clear once again that the trade of organs is happening; it is a reality. 
Where there is a demand there will always be a supply, whether legal or not. To 
legalise organ sales will decrease the success of the current black market regarding 
the trade of organs.91 
                                            
84  Section 11 of the Constitution. 
85  Section 10 of the Constitution. 
86  Section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution. 
87  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
88  Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
89  Moodley K “Respect for patient autonomy” in Moodley K (ed) Medical ethics, law and human 
rights: A South African Perspective 41. 
90  Barnard M “Kidney transplant scandal spreads” http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/ 
Kidney-transplant-scandal-spreads-20110228 (Date of use: 9 May 2011)  
91  Slabbert M “Combat organ trafficking – reward the donor or regulate sales?” 2008 (73) KOERS 
79. 
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1.3 CHOICE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 
The main focus of this dissertation will be South African legislation with regard to 
organ transplants. Special attention will be given to certain sections of the 
Constitution. Section 39(1) of the Constitution states that, when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, international law must be considered and foreign law may be considered. 
Making comparisons can also broaden the horizons for law reformers and legislators: 
it helps a person to see how legislation can make a difference in another country. 
Organ transplant legislation in Singapore and Iran will thus be analysed. Singapore’s 
Human Organ Transplant Act was chosen because of recent changes to this Act, 
which now allows the reimbursement of costs incurred by living donors in accordance 
with international and local ethical practices.92 Iran is the second choice, because this 
country has been following a system of paid and regulated living unrelated kidney 
donation since 1988.93 
Relevant South African legislation that governs organ transplantation is also 
discussed, namely the National Health Act. Mention will also be made of the recently 
repealed Human Tissue Act, since this Act established the system of organ 
procurement.  
Lastly, reference is made to a number of international documents in order to provide 
insight on an international level concerning kidney transplants, for example the 
Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism and the 
International Bill of Rights.  
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY  
The envisaged research is not of an empirical nature, but involves a literature study of 
books, journal articles, legislation, case law and interviews with experts in the field of 
organ transplants. The study is primarily a critical analysis of the relevant South 
                                            
92  Chew V “Human Organ Transplant Act (HOTA) http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1401_2009-
01-08.html  (Date of use: 2 August 2011). 
93  Ghods AJ and Savaj S “Iranian model of paid and regulated living-unrelated kidney donation” 
2006 (6) Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1136. 
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African literature and legislation. A brief comparative study on kidney transplants in 
Singapore and Iran will also be undertaken.  
1.4.1 Explanatory notes on source referencing and bibliography 
• The date of publication of textbooks is either referred to with reference the 
actual year of publication or to the number of the edition of the book.  
• Where a passage from a judgment or textbook is quoted and the quote itself 
contains references to other materials, the format of these references will not 
be altered to follow the format in the text of the thesis (on the basis that it is a 
quote and as such must remain unaltered). 
• References to case names appears in the main body of the text in italics, 
except when they are intended as references to the people themselves, in 
which case they will appear as regular text, for example Soobramoney means 
the case of Soobramoney v the Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal while 
Soobramoney means the applicant in that case. 
• With reference to sources, the citations are given as follows: 
• Journal article citation for the first time: Bagheri A “Compensated kidney 
donation: An ethical review of the Iranian model” 2006 (16) Kennedy Institute 
of Ethics Journal 270. The second citation:  Bagheri 2006 Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 270. 
• Textbook citation for the first time: Dugard J International law: A South African 
Perspective 114. The second citation Dugard International law: A South 
African Perspective 114. 
• Academic theses and dissertations – citation for the first time: Fourie EJ An 
analysis of the doctrine of presumed consent and the principles of required 
response and required request in organ procurement (unpublished LLM Thesis 
University of Pretoria 2006) 132. The second citation Fourie Organ 
procurement 132. Theses and dissertations are referenced to in the same 
manner as a book. 
• Publications / contributions in an edited book – citation for the first time: 
Moodley K “Respect for patient autonomy” in Moodley K (ed) Medical ethics, 
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law and human rights: A South African perspective 41. The second citation: 
Moodley in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human rights 41. 
• South African court cases – citation: Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
(Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 CC. 
• Websites – citation for the first time: Burger K “Netcare apologises again for 
organ scandal” http://www.mg.co.za?article/2010-11-15-netcare-apologises-
again-for-organ-scandal (Date of use: 23 August 2011). The second citation: 
Burger http:www.mg.co.za?articale/2010-11-15-netcare-apologises-again-for-
scandal (Date of use: 23 August 2011). 
• The style further does not cite pages with reference to the letter "p" but simply 
refers to the page number, for example 35. 
• Paragraphs in footnotes are cited as follows: para 26. 
 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
The dissertation will consist of seven chapters divided into various topics in the 
following manner: 
Chapter one is an introductory chapter wherein the nature, history and current 
shortages regarding kidney transplants are discussed. There is also a brief 
discussion of the current unsuccessful organ procurement system in South Africa, 
and on how selling and buying kidneys legally could be a practical solution. There is 
also a short discussion regarding the law and medical issues. Nys94 regards medical 
law as follows: 
Medical law is an area of law, medical law does not respect traditional 
compartments with which lawyers have become familiar, such as torts, 
contracts, criminal law, family law and public law. Instead, medical law cuts 
across these subjects and today must be regarded as a subject in its own 
right. We maintain that it is a discrete area concerned with the law 
governing the interactions between doctors and patients and the 
organisation of health care.  
                                            
94  Carstens PA and Pearmain DL Foundational principles of South African medical law 3. 
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Chapter two is a discussion of the Constitution and kidney transplants. The following 
rights are analysed in the context of kidney transplants: the right to life, the right to 
human dignity, the right to self-determination, the right to privacy, as well as the right 
of access to healthcare services. Case law regarding the above is also included. 
Chapter three of the dissertation looks at other South African legislation regarding 
kidney transplants. The Human Tissue Act (recently repealed) and the National 
Health Act are discussed, as well as the shortcomings of both these Acts. There is 
also a short discussion regarding the assessment of potential kidney donors and 
recipients.  
Bioethical perspectives on kidney transplants are discussed in Chapter four. 
Because the selling of kidneys could be a moral problem, it is of great importance that 
the proposal of selling kidneys should be tested against the four basic principles of 
bioethics, namely autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice.  
Chapter five focuses on the arguments in favour of and against the selling of 
kidneys.  
Chapter six is a micro-comparison of legislation and organ transplants in South 
Africa with other countries such as Singapore and Iran. In Singapore residents are 
not yet allowed to sell their kidneys, but reimbursement for kidney-donation-related 
expenses are allowed.95 However, in Iran, a regulated system of payment for kidneys 
was instituted in 1988, which eliminated the renal transplantation waiting list.96 
Chapter seven is a concluding section wherein the conclusion is drawn that the best 
possible solution regarding the current acute shortage of available kidneys, which will 
be constitutionally acceptable, is to legalise the buying and selling of kidneys.  
                                            
95  Leong S “10 apply to kidney live donor fund in first year” www.nuh.com.sg/news (Date of use: 
11 May 2011). 
96  Kleinsmidt A and Moosa MR “Organ transplant ethics” in Moodley K (ed) Medical ethics, law 
and human rights 282. 
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1.6 POINT OF DEPATURE, ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The point of departure of this dissertation is that there is a huge demand for 
transplantable kidneys in South Africa and the current system of procuring these 
desperately needed kidneys is failing the patients who are waiting for a kidney 
transplant. 
The state has a number of obligations that it should attend to in terms of the Bill of 
Rights. Yet, due to the lack of resources, among others, it cannot realise these rights 
for everyone in need. The state cannot even help all the patients in need of dialysis – 
not to mention help them with a transplant. An alternative, where the patient could 
help himself by buying a healthy kidney legally, is proposed as a solution. Such a 
proposal could withstand constitutional muster.  
1.7  VALUE CONTRIBUTION  
This dissertation focuses mainly on the acute shortage of available kidneys for 
transplantation and how ineffectively these transplants are regulated due to 
legislative shortcomings. It also focuses on the fact that there are available kidneys, 
but people are prohibited from selling their kidneys due to various limitations and 
penalties regarding payment of the kidney donor. Due to this fact, the research will 
focus on the Constitution and the obligations enforced therein on the government. 
Thus, if the government cannot fulfil these obligations they should be able to supply 
an alternative to improve the current kidney shortage. It is trusted that this 
dissertation will help propose a solution to the kidney shortage that will be 
constitutionally acceptable. 
1.8 MOTIVATION  
Almost every day there are various kinds of articles relating to organ transplants – in 
every newspaper, magazine and web page. For example, there is the article praising 
the miracle of organ donation and some organ recipients’ gratefulness for the 
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received organ: “I’m alive because of someone’s kindness”.97 The article speaks of a 
64-year old lady, Joan Bell, whose life was changed after she received a donated 
kidney. Then there is always the opposite: a shocking article ranting and raving about 
illegal organ trades: “Netcare apologises again for organ scandal”.98 This article 
articulates how Netcare was fined R7,8 million after they pleaded guilty to unlawful 
surgeries where illegal kidneys were acquired and transplanted. All of these articles 
shine a light on the dire need for available organs for transplant purposes. 
The problem here certainly is not that there are no kidneys available. At present, 
there are about 49 004 031 residents99 in South Africa, which means that more or 
less the same amount of kidneys are available. The problem is more related to the 
ineffectiveness of the present legislation. It is no secret that most people do not grasp 
the idea of altruism. In the world of today, few people would give something away 
without receiving something in return – much less so undergoing an operation (the 
organ donor has to pay all costs incurred himself) and giving away a part of oneself to 
a complete stranger for free. The previous Human Tissue Act made no provision for 
the reimbursement of an organ donor and clearly stated in section 28 that a payment 
in connection with the supply of tissue, blood, blood products or gametes is 
prohibited. The National Health Act stipulates in section 60(4)(a) that a donor may be 
reimbursed for any reasonable costs that occurred during the organ donation; 
however, there still is no clarity as to how this reimbursement may occur.  
This dissertation attempts to conduct a detailed and wide-ranging study of South 
African legislation regarding kidney transplants and to provide a manner in which 
more kidneys can be procured in a constitutionally acceptable way to the advantage 
of both the kidney donor and recipient. If more kidneys can be donated, less people 
would have to undergo the painful, often excruciating, process of dialysis. A kidney 
                                            
97  Hills M “I’m alive because of someone’s kindness” http://www.echo-
news.co.uk/news/local_news/92059551.I_m_alive_because_of_ someone’s_ kindness (Date 
of use: 22 August 2011). 
98  Burger K “Netcare apologises again for organ scandal” http://www.mg.co.za?article/2010-11-
15-netcare-apologises-again-for-organ-scandal (Date of use: 23 August 2011). 
99  South African Demographics http://www.indexmundi.com/south_africa/demographics 
profile.html (Date of use: 23 August 2011). 
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transplant is a more efficient life-extending measure, and research has shown that a 
living kidney transplant will probably be functioning at 95% two years after the 
transplant.100  
The more organs that are donated, the more lives are saved. One organ donor alone 
can save up to eight lives by donation all his organs. If kidney sales are regulated, 
even more lives can be saved because the donor is also “saved” in a way. The donor 
can be the provider of a family who needs the money to support his family, or a young 
aspiring intellectual who needs the funds for tertiary studies. Pope John Paul II 
recently remarked that the commercialisation of organs violates “the dignity of the 
human person”.101 How does leaving a person to die when the needed organs are 
available not violate not only human dignity but the right to life as well?  
                                            
100  The University of Texas Medical Branch “Kidney transplant success rate” 
http://www.utmb.edu/renaltx/srate.htm (Date of use: 23 August 2011). 
101  Finkel M “This little kidney went to market” http://www.nytimes.com 
/2010/05/27/magazine/27ORGAN.html (Date of use: 23 August 2011).  
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CHAPTER 2 – HUMAN RIGHTS AND KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS 
“A bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, 
and what no just government should refuse, or rest on interference.”102 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a world where human rights are seen as inconsequential. Everybody, 
including the government, would be free to do as they please and to treat other 
people as they like. In this world it would not be frowned upon if people were 
discriminated against on grounds of their race, religion or sexuality. Treating human 
beings with complete disdain and utter disregard for humanity would be 
commonplace. Concentration camps, genocide – these horrific acts would be seen as 
justifiable based on prejudicial rhetoric. Furthermore, in this world it would not be 
regarded as unacceptable if non-consensual experiments were performed on human 
beings, such as having their bones broken and their wounds infected until they had 
seizures and suffered cardiac arrest.103  
If this all sounds familiar, it is because this world without human rights once existed 
before 1947. The horrific scene described above is known as the Holocaust. During 
this era, human rights were not regarded as important, and many atrocities were 
committed by the Germans against the Jewish. The Holocaust led to the Nuremberg 
Trails,104 and these trails led to the Nuremberg Declaration, which was promulgated 
in 1947.105 The Nuremberg Declaration has limited applicability, as it only deals 
specifically with human research and experimentation. Nonetheless, it was the first 
step in the direction of the modern era of human rights.106 In 1948 – one year later – 
that the most significant development in human rights took place: the adoption of the 
                                            
102  Bernstein RB Jefferson 72. 
103  Newman B “The doctors of the Holocaust” http://www.remember.org/imagine/doctors.html 
(Date of use: 17 May 2012). 
104  The Nuremberg Trials were a series of military tribunals held by the victorious allies of World 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations.107 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was adopted to set international standards for human 
rights: firstly, to defend individuals against the abusive powers of organs of state, and 
secondly, to promote the opportunity for individuals to develop through measures 
such education, healthcare and a safe living environment.108  
It is clear that the relationship between human rights and medical ethics is 
undeniable.109 Human rights can be defined as the rights that we have, as humans, 
from birth until death, which are comprehensively defined in various documents and 
codes.110 In South Africa, human rights have been codified into international, regional 
and national human rights law. Human rights are protected by the International Bill of 
Rights, which consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights111 and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.112 As can be seen from the last mentioned, 
human rights are broadly divided into categories. The three categories are civil and 
political rights, economic, social and cultural rights and lastly environmental rights. 
This chapter will mainly focus on the first two categories of human rights.  
Civil and political rights, also known as “first-generation rights”, were introduced to 
protect people from oppression by the state.113 First-generation rights ensure that 
everyone is entitled to participation in the political process and are free from 
interference by the government – as long as their actions are not harmful to others.114 
An example of a first-generation right would be the right not to be subjected to 
medical or scientific experimentation without consent.  
                                            
107  Hereinafter referred to as the UDHR. McLean http://www.unesco.org (Date of use: 17 May 
2012). 
108  Dhai A and McQuoid-Mason D Bioethics, human rights and health law 36. 
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111  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, hereinafter referred to as the 
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112  The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, hereinafter 
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114  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Human rights and health law 37. 
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Economic, social and cultural rights, also known as “second-generation rights”, were 
introduced because people needed more than freedom from interference from the 
state to survive, for instance access to economic and other resources like food and 
shelter – thus, an adequate standard of living.115 An example of a second-generation 
right would be the right of access to healthcare. Section 231 of the Constitution 
clearly states the importance of international agreements. The section reads:  
(A)ny international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of 
an agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament.116  
At regional level, South African human rights are protected by the African Charter of 
Human and People’s Rights.117 In this chapter, both the international and regional 
human rights instruments are mentioned briefly in relation to the specific human rights 
pertaining to kidney transplants.  
The most important national document protecting South African human rights is the 
Constitution or, more specifically, the Bill of Rights. The Constitution has a general 
impact on kidney transplants in three sections. First and foremost in section 2 it is 
stipulated that the Constitution is the supreme law and that any law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled. 
Secondly, it is stated that the Bill of Rights must be respected, protected and fulfilled 
by the state.118 Thirdly, in section 39(1) it is stipulated that when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, a court, tribunal or forum must promote the values such as human dignity, 
equality and freedom. Furthermore, international law must be considered and foreign 
law may be considered.119 In the Constitution there is also more specific fundamental 
human rights relating to kidney transplants – such as the right to life, the right to 
human dignity, the right to self-determination, the right to privacy and the right of 
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117  Hereinafter referred to as the African Charter. 
118  Section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
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access to healthcare services. These rights are discussed below. However, all these 
fundamental human rights are not absolute and may be limited or restricted by 
section 36 of the Constitution.  
2.2 SECTION 36 OF THE CONSTITUTION: LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 
None of the human rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are absolute. The general 
limitation section of the Constitution sets out specific criteria for the justification of 
restrictions on the rights in the Bill of Rights.120 Section 36 is referred to as a general 
limitation section because it applies to all the rights in the Bill of Rights, and limits all 
rights according to the same criteria.121 It should be borne in mind that a right cannot 
be limited for any reason. A law may legitimately limit a right in the Bill of Rights if it is 
a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.122 The law of general application requirement can be summarised as 
follows: law for the purposes of this requirement is all forms of legislation,123 including 
common law124 and customary law.125 The general application requirement requires 
that the law must be sufficiently clear, accessible and precise so that the persons who 
are affected by it can ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations.126  
Consequently, the law must apply equally to all.127 For the second part of the 
requirement – that the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society – a number of relevant factors must be taken into account. These 
factors are:128 
• the nature of the right; 
                                            
120  Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights handbook 163. 
121  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights handbook 165. 
122  Section 36(1) of the Constitution. 
123  All forms of legislation include delegated and original legislation. 
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125  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC). See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 
handbook 169. 
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127  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights handbook 169. 
128  Section 36(1)(a)-(e) of the Constitution. 
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• the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
• the nature and extent of the limitation; 
• the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
• less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Thus, it is clear that fundamental human rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited; but 
only after a number of requirements have been fulfilled and if the limitations are for 
legitimate reasons. The human rights and their limitations in the Bill of Rights 
applicable to kidney donations will be discussed below. 
2.3 THE RIGHT TO LIFE 
The right to life is regarded as the most fundamental of all human rights.129 This is 
because it gives rise to all other rights. If a person is not alive, he cannot be the 
bearer of other rights or exercise any of his rights, as observed by O’Regan in 
Makwanyane:130 
The right to life is, in one sense, antecedent to all the other rights in the 
Constitution. Without life in the sense of existence, it would not be 
possible to exercise rights or to be the bearer of them. 
The importance of the right to life is reflected by the fact that the right is protected by 
all international and regional human rights instruments.131 
2.3.1 International and regional human rights instruments 
The right to life is firstly and most importantly protected by the UDHR. In article 3 it 
clearly states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”. The 
right to life contained in the UDHR has become so established in international law 
                                            
129  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational principles of South African medical law 27. 
130  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as the 
Makwanyane case) para 326.  
131  Rehman J International human rights: A practical approach 68. 
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that it is described as having a jus cogens132 character; thus meaning that no 
derogation of this right is permitted.133 The right to life is furthermore protected by 
article 6(1) of the ICCPR, which reads, “Every human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of life”. 
States such as South Africa, which has ratified the ICCPR, must at all time take 
positive steps to effectively protect the right of life.134  
At regional level, the right to life is protected by article 4 of the ACHPR, which reads, 
“Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his 
life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right”. In 
most cases, the African Commission has followed the jurisprudence of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee regarding the right to life.135 However, in some 
cases, the African Commission has interpreted the right to life in a wider context. For 
instance, in the ground-breaking case of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre v 
Nigeria,136 the African Commission stated that the right to life implied a right to food 
as well.137 Even though the various international and regional human rights 
instruments may vary regarding the right to life, all the instruments have one thing in 
common, and that is that everyone has a right to life and that the state has an 
                                            
132  The notion of jus cogens has its origin in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
1969, which, in article 53 provides: “A treaty is void, if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present 
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
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perspective 43. 
133  Dugard International law: A South African perspective 43. 
134  Joseph R “The right to life is the most important of all” http://www.arha.org.au (Date of use: 19 
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135  Manby B “Civil and Political rights in the African Charter on human and Peoples’ Rights: 
Articles 1-7” in Evans M and Murray R (eds) The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 184. 
136  Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v 
Nigeria Communication No.155/96. 
137  This case was about the environmental pollution of the Ogoni territory. The African 
Commission was of opinion that that the Nigerian Government was obliged to protect existing 
food sources from (among other things) environmental pollution. The Commission stated in 
this case that the destruction of land and farms was a violation of the right to life. Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria 
Communication No.155/96. 
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obligation to protect this right. In South Africa, the right to life is ensconced in the Bill 
of Rights. 
2.3.2 The Constitution  
The year 1996 ushered in the dawn of a new era, known as constitutionalism, which 
changed the entire legal landscape in South Africa. Suddenly the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty was replaced by the doctrine of constitutional 
supremacy.138 Constitutionalism now meant that the government could only derive its 
power from a written constitution and that its powers would be limited to those as set 
out in the Constitution.139 The Constitution, as described in Makwanyane, 
... provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society 
characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future 
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-
existence and development opportunities for all South Africans, 
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. 
The Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that protects the rights of each South 
African citizen. One of the most fundamental rights provided by the Constitution is 
found in section 11 and reads that everyone has the right to life. The right to life, 
along with the right to human dignity, must be valued above all other rights.140 The 
absoluteness of the right to life has also been mentioned in a decision by the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court.141 In this decision it was mentioned that other rights 
may be limited, and may even be withdrawn and then granted again, but the right to 
life is absolute and must be preserved at all times.142 The South African Constitution 
differs from most other constitutions,143 as well as the ICCPR, due to the fact that the 
right to life is unqualified.144 In the other constitutions, the right to life is qualified due 
                                            
138  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights handbook 2. 
139  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights handbook 8. 
140  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 214. 
141  Decision 23/1990 (X31) AB. 
142  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 83-85. See also Currie and De 
Waal Bill of Rights handbook 281. 
143  It differs from other constitutions of jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada, Hungary 
and India. Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights handbook 281. 
144  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights handbook 281. 
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to the fact that the right to life may not be deprived arbitrarily.145 Chaskalson P 
remarks in the Makwanyane case that the right to life is given greater protection in the 
South African Constitution due to the fact that it is unqualified.146 According to section 
7(2) of the Constitution, the state has obligations to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the right to life. Due to these obligations, negative and positive duties are 
imposed on the state. The negative duty implies that the right to life must be 
protected to the extent that no one else can take it away.147 For instance, one’s right 
to life cannot be taken away by imposing the death penalty and one also has a right 
to defend your life by means of self-defence. The positive duty obligates the state to 
protect the lives of its citizens. The question can however be raised whether the 
state’s duty to protect and promote life could be extended to include prolonging an 
end-stage renal-failure patient’s life where it is within the state’s capabilities to do so.  
2.3.3 The right to life and kidney transplants  
In all the international and regional human rights instruments that were mentioned 
above it is obvious that everyone has a right to life and that this right may not be 
deprived arbitrarily. The South African Constitution even entails an unqualified right to 
life; thus it is not limited in any way, except by section 36 of the Constitution. Yet, 
none of these human rights instruments discuss what exactly the right to life entails. 
In South Africa, the right to life was intentionally left unqualified and the Constitutional 
Court was given the authority to develop the right to life. That is exactly what the court 
did in the Makwanyane case. Although this case mainly focuses on the invalidation of 
the death sentence, a number of important remarks are made regarding the right to 
life. In this section, the author would like to focus on how the right to life can be 
interpreted in such a manner that the scope is extended to include the prolonging of 
an end-stage renal-failure patient’s life by means of a kidney transplant. 
                                            
145  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights handbook 281. 
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Thus far it has been argued that the right to life definitely entails a physical existence. 
Nonetheless, what is the use of a right to life as a physical being if it is not a life worth 
living? In Makwanyane, O’Regan J commented as follows: 
... But the right to life was included in the Constitution not simply to 
enshrine the right to existence. It is not life as mere organic matter that the 
Constitution cherishes, but the right to human life: the right to live as a 
human being, to be part of a broader community, to share in the 
experience of humanity. This concept of human life is at the centre of our 
constitutional values. The Constitution seeks to establish a society where 
the individual value of each member of the community is recognised and 
treasured. The right to life is central to such a society.148 
Sachs J enhances the idea of a life worth living by adding that the right to life could 
possibly impose a duty on the state to create conditions that will enable all persons to 
enjoy a life worth living.149 It could be argued that a patient with end-stage renal 
failure does not live a life worth living. Studies have shown that patients on dialysis 
have a noteworthy decrease in their quality of life. A patient on dialysis has to receive 
dialysis treatment for three to four hours at a time three to four times a week.150 Renal 
dialysis has a number of side effects, which can be divided into physical and 
psychological effects.  
The physical side effects include a decrease in energy levels and endurance, fatigue, 
headaches, pain, itchiness, loss of sight, nausea, cramps, infections and weight 
loss.151 It is obvious that all these symptoms will seriously affect the performance of a 
person’s simple daily activities. The psychological effects include depression, 
aggression, fear, mental anguish, sadness and stress.152 Consequently, it is obvious 
that a patient on renal dialysis has to make long-term health and lifestyle 
adjustments. Except for physical and psychological side effects, renal dialysis also 
places a tremendous financial burden on either the state or the private-sector patient. 
If the renal dialysis is supplied by the state, it costs the state more or less R200 000 
                                            
148  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 326 (own emphasis added). 
149  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 353. 
150  Canadian Institute for Health “Renal transplantation saving millions in dialysis costs” 
http://www.cihi.ca (Date of use: 20 May 2012). 
151  Harillall and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 5. 
152  Harillall and Kasiram 2011 Health SA Gesondheid 5. 
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per patient per annum.153 The patient in the private sector can look at a financial 
setback of more or less R40 000 to R60 000 per month.154 To make matters worse, 
the majority of patients are not healthy enough to attend work each day, or their 
occupation does not allow them to be absent during the hours required for renal 
dialysis; thus, they are retrenched and as such they also suffer a loss of income. 
Above all, it should be borne in mind that renal dialysis is only a life-prolonging 
treatment – it is not a cure for renal failure.155  
The ideal treatment for end-stage renal failure is a kidney transplant.156 After careful 
consideration of all the facts mentioned above, it is clear that life on renal dialysis is 
not a life worth living. This is possibly the reason why so many patients decide to stop 
their dialysis treatment and rather go home to die.157 However, a renal transplant has 
a number of benefits and can clearly increase one’s quality of life.158 In our Bill of 
Rights the state’s positive obligations to make life liveable is mostly codified by our 
socio-economic rights – such as the right to access to adequate housing159 and the 
right to access to healthcare, food, water and social security.160 This approach was 
confirmed in the Khosa v Minister of Social Development161 case, where it is cited 
that the socio-economic rights in the Constitution are implicated with the right to life, 
human dignity and equality.162 In socio-economic rights cases, the availability of 
human and financial resources also has to be taken into account to determine 
whether the state had complied with the constitutional standard of reasonableness.163  
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In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal)164 the court dealt with an 
application for life-saving medical treatment in the context of the socio-economic right 
to healthcare instead of the right to life. Soobramoney brought a constitutional 
application, seeking an order for the hospital to provide him with access to dialysis 
treatment on grounds of emergency medical treatment. However, the court dismissed 
this application because Soobramoney’s health could not be seen as emergency 
medical treatment, but rather as an “ongoing state of affairs”.165 This case is 
discussed in more detail in section 2.7.2. Nonetheless, one is left to wonder if the 
court’s decision would not have been different if Soobramoney was a 25-year-old 
healthy man with renal failure, instead of a 41-year-old man who was extremely 
sick.166 One can also wonder if the decision would not have been different if the 
application was brought on the grounds of a right to life and a right to access to 
healthcare and not based on emergency treatment.167 Surely the results would have 
been different? In the author’s opinion it could be argued that, as mentioned above, 
there is a duty on the state to provide end-stage renal-failure patients with conditions 
that constitute an enjoyable human existence. Chaskalson P comments in 
Makwanyane that the right to life is one of the most important rights and the source of 
all other rights. These rights must be valued and the state must demonstrate this in 
everything that it does. 168 Thus, the state could supply these patients with an 
alternative that is within their available resources. If these patients could be allowed 
to obtain a kidney for transplant purposes by buying it in a constitutionally acceptable 
manner they will be able to enjoy their human existence, instead of having a right to 
life that entails constant pain and suffering.  
                                            
164  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 CC 
165  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 CC para 21. 
166  As mentioned in the Soobramoney case, Soobramoney was very ill. He was a diabetic who 
suffered from ischemic heart disease and cerebro-vascular disease. He had suffered a stroke 
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2.4 THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 
The right to human dignity entails the acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of 
human beings.169 Human dignity is regarded as one of the supreme human rights. 
The reason for this is because the right to life and the right to human dignity are 
joined at the hip, as stated in Makwanyane by Ackermann J:170  
The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the 
rights to human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than 
existence, it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without 
dignity, human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be 
dignity. 
Everyone has the right to be treated in a dignified and humane manner.171 The 
importance of human dignity is incorporated in various international human rights 
instruments, as well as national constitutions. Human dignity is thus regarded as a 
universal duty and a universal responsibility.172 
 
2.4.1 International and regional human rights instruments 
The main purpose of the right to human dignity is to try and correct substantial past 
human dignity violations and to prevent the reoccurrence of such violations in the 
future.173 The UDHR emphasises the importance of human dignity in its preamble, 
which states that the recognition of inherent dignity of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. The right to 
human dignity is furthermore protected in article 1 of the UDHR, which reads, “All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.”  
                                            
169  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 328. 
170  S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 327. 
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Additionally, both the ICCPR and the ICESCR proclaim in their preambles that human 
rights are derived from the inherent dignity of the human person. Furthermore, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities174 explicitly expresses the 
importance of human dignity in article 1 and 2, which are categorised under the 
heading “Fundamental Principles for Humanity”. Article 1 reads, “Every person 
regardless of gender, ethnic origin, social status, political opinion, language, age, 
nationality or religion has a responsibility to treat all people in a humane way”; while 
article 2 takes the responsibility even further: “No person shall lend support to any 
form of inhumane behaviour, but all people have a responsibility to strive for dignity 
and the self-esteem of all others. 
At regional level, the right to human dignity is directly protected by article 5 of the 
ACHPR, which reads, “Every individual shall have the right to the respect of the 
dignity in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status”. Human dignity is 
also protected in relation with the right to life in article 4 of the ACHPR, which reads, 
“Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his 
person”. In comparison with Western philosophies, African traditions place great 
emphasis on the responsibilities of an individual regarding his rights.175 In a Western 
sense, the main focus is on individual rights; whereas in an African sense the focus is 
community responsibility and loyalty.176 A perfect example of this African community 
sense is ubuntu. According to ubuntu, the life of another person is at least as 
valuable as one’s own; thus respect for the dignity of every person is integral to it.177 
Ubuntu is comprehensively explained by Mokgoro J in Makwanyane: 
Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness. In its most fundamental 
sense, it translates as personhood and morality. Metaphorically, it 
expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the 
significance of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival 
of communities. While it envelops the key values of group solidarity, 
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and 
collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and morality. 
                                            
174  The Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities of 1997.  
175  Goolam 2001 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 47. 
176  Goolam 2001 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 47. An ethic of community responsibility 
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Its spirit emphasises respect for human dignity, marking a shift from 
confrontation to conciliation. 
It can easily be deduced that the right to human dignity plays a very important role in 
the South African Constitution since, as stated in section 1, South Africa is a 
sovereign democratic state founded on human dignity, freedom and equality.  
2.4.2 The Constitution 
In South Africa, human dignity is regarded as the focal point of the Constitution due to 
the country’s horrendous past of racial segregation. As mentioned in Makwanyane by 
O’Regan J:178 
Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in 
South Africa. For apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black 
people were refused respect and dignity and thereby the dignity of all 
South Africans was diminished. The new constitution rejects this past and 
affirms the equal worth of all South Africans. Thus recognition and 
protection of human dignity is the touchstone of the new political order and 
is fundamental to the new constitution. 
Among the trinity of human rights that the South African society is based on, the right 
to human dignity is the most important. Human dignity is entrenched in section 1,179 
7,180 36181 and 39182 of the Constitution. Section 10 of the Constitution explicitly 
proclaims that “everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected”. As established by Chaskalson J in Carmichle v Minister of 
Safety and Security,183 human dignity is a central value of the objective, normative 
value system that must guide the development of all areas of law.184 South Africa is 
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regarded as one of the world’s most developed bodies of dignity jurisprudence.185 
The only country that can compare with South Africa in this regard is Germany. 
Human dignity is not only a justifiable and enforceable right that must be respected 
and protected; it is also a value that is essential for the interpretation of all other 
fundamental rights, and it is of central significance regarding the limitation of other 
fundamental rights.186 In order to respect the right to inherent dignity, everyone must 
be able to enjoy their civil and political liberties and also have access to the social 
and economic means essential to their development.187 It can thus be concluded that 
a person’s dignity is denigrated if he lives in degrading living conditions and is 
deprived of his basic needs.188 Consequently, the question can be raised whether a 
person in end-stage renal failure who is dependent on renal dialysis lives a life of 
human dignity or not. 
2.4.3 The right to human dignity and kidney transplants 
The Constitution of South Africa specifically guarantees the right to human dignity in 
section 10.189 It is clear from the discussion above that the right to human dignity – 
similar to the right to life – is the fountain from which all other fundamental human 
rights flow. Both these supreme rights have an absolute nature and must be 
preserved at all times.190 If either of these rights is taken away, all other rights 
cease.191 It should be borne in mind that human dignity demands a humane 
existence, as emphasised by Ackermann J in Makwanyane:192 
The right to life, thus understood, incorporates the right to dignity. So the 
rights to human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than 
existence, it is a right to be treated as a human being with dignity: without 
dignity, human life is substantially diminished. Without life, there cannot be 
dignity. 
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From the above it can be deduced that life and human dignity are inseparable. 
Furthermore, health is an essential for both life and human dignity. It goes without 
saying that the capacity for enjoyment of the right to life, as well as human dignity, is 
significantly diminished by poor health.193 According to the Constitution of the WHO, 
dignity is a prerequisite of health.  
The question then is, can any human dignity exist in relation to renal dialysis? Can 
any human dignity be lost when a kidney donor receives a form of remuneration for 
the donation of his kidney? Lastly, the author would like to compare the mental 
anguish of a person on death row with that of a patient with end-stage renal failure. 
Up until now it could easily be summarised that the right to human dignity entails that 
everyone has the right to be treated in a dignified and humane manner. The question 
can now be raised whether a patient with end-stage renal failure that is dependent on 
renal dialysis leads a dignified and humane life.  
It could be argued that, if a patient has to attend his renal dialysis therapy three to 
four times a week for three to four hours per session,194 he is not living a dignified and 
humane life. The fact that this patient will have to make significant adjustments to his 
lifestyle instantly impairs his human dignity. Furthermore, it could be argued that if a 
patient has to suffer all the various physical and psychological side-effects described 
in section 2.3.3, his human dignity would be impaired. It is evident that a person’s 
human dignity is harmed when he experiences a decrease in energy levels, fatigue, 
pain, loss of sight, infection, nausea and cramps. The patient’s human dignity is 
impaired even more by psychological effects such as depression, aggression, fear 
and mental anguish.195  
On the contrary, it could be debated that neither the kidney recipient nor the donor’s 
human dignity would be impaired in any way by means of a kidney transplant. It 
would be more sensible to supply patients with viable donor kidneys and remove 
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them from renal dialysis treatment. Kidney transplants would also be more cost-
effective196 for society as a whole and would increase the recipient’s human dignity 
and life expectancy.197 This argument can also be extended to the constitutional 
acceptability of regulated sales of donor kidneys. One of the main arguments against 
a regulated market of kidney sales is that the selling of human kidneys constitutes a 
commodification of the body and consequently results in a decrease of human 
dignity. In this regard, the question can be raised why sperm donors, egg donors, milk 
donors and surrogate mothers do not suffer a loss of dignity but a kidney donor does? 
The words of Gill and Sade could be used to emphasise the position that human 
dignity is not decreased if a kidney donor receives remuneration:198 
(M)y kidney is not my humanity. In part, dignity is something that we 
convey by our behaviour and attitudes. If we establish a regulated system 
of sales, then it is our responsibility to create a culture of dignity for the 
paid donor. Many have suggested that the term “paid donation” or 
“rewarded gifting” be used to confer dignity to the procedure. 
The fact that a sum or value is placed on a person’s kidney does not lead to a 
decrease of a person’s dignity. The court presently establishes the value on the loss 
of or damage to a person’s body parts by means of damage claims – this does not 
lead to a decrease in the value of a person’s dignity.199 As stated by Slabbert, 
monetary values are already attached to body parts: a diva is allowed to insure her 
voice and a tennis player to insure his arm, yet this does not make them any less 
human or impairs their dignity.200  
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The author would like to extend the scope of the right to human dignity to the right not 
to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way.201 In Makwanyane it 
was proclaimed that one of the reasons for the abolishment of the death penalty was 
because it was found to be a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.202 In this 
case it was stated:203 
Once sentenced, the prisoner waits on death row in the company of other 
prisoners under sentence of death, for the processes of their appeals and 
the procedures for clemency to be carried out. Throughout this period, 
those who remain on death row are uncertain of their fate, not knowing 
whether they will ultimately be reprieved or taken to the gallows. 
How does the situation of the prisoner on death row differ from that of the patient with 
end-stage renal failure? The patient who receives renal dialysis is basically on “death 
row” – he receives his dialysis treatment along with other patients that are in the 
same position. Similar to the prisoner on death row, the patient is also uncertain of his 
fate. He does not know whether he will receive a donor kidney or eventually be left to 
die when renal dialysis is no longer a viable option. In Makwanyane, reference is 
made to the mental anguish that a convicted prisoner suffers while awaiting his death 
sentence.204 Does a renal-failure patient not suffer this exact same mental anguish 
while awaiting his “death sentence”? Furthermore, the prisoner on death row does not 
have the burden of financial implications that the renal dialysis patient has. Yet it is 
regarded as constitutionally unacceptable to treat a convicted criminal in this manner 
but constitutionally acceptable in the case of an end-stage renal failure patient. 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution maintains that the state must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the right to human dignity. From the above discussion it is evident 
that renal dialysis causes a decrease of a person’s human dignity. However, it is also 
evident that a renal transplant has the opposite effect and increases a person’s 
dignity. Additionally in this section it was emphasised that the sale of human kidneys 
would not lead to a decrease of human dignity. Thus, the sales of human kidneys 
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should be considered by the state as a viable and constitutionally acceptable manner 
to save thousands of lives while protecting a person’s right to dignity.  
2.5 THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
The right to self-determination entails that a person has a right to make decisions 
regarding his own body. Self-determination is closely associated with the bioethical 
perspective of respect for autonomy that incorporates the doctrine of informed 
consent.205 The idea of control over one’s own body can be illustrated by the 
following:206 
I wish my life and decisions depend on myself, not on external forces of 
whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's, 
acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, 
by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, 
as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody: a doer – 
deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by 
external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal or a 
slave … I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, 
active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain 
them by references to my own ideas and purposes. 
The idea of control of our own bodies is something that we as humans practise every 
day by the various decisions that we are entitled to make. The importance of this right 
is clearly reflected in various international and regional human rights instruments. 
2.5.1 International and regional human rights instruments 
As all other fundamental human rights, the right to self-determination is firstly and 
most importantly protected by the UDHR. Article 3 stipulates that every individual has 
a right to life, liberty and security of person. Three different rights are encompassed 
by article 3: firstly, the right to life, which entails the right to a humane existence (as 
discussed above); secondly, the right to personal freedom; and lastly, the right to 
security. The right to security entails the right to be protected against interferences 
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from the state, as well as protection of integrity rights.207 The fact that the right to 
security of persons is listed along with the right to life could mean that this right 
should be regarded just as important as the right to life and human dignity. At 
international level, the right to self-determination has been described as “one of the 
essential principles of contemporary International Law” and it has been mentioned 
that this right enjoys an erga omnes208 character.209 Additionally, the right to self-
determination is protected by the identical provisions of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. 
Article 1 of these human rights instruments provides that “all peoples have the right of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status 
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”. Self-
determination is very broadly defined in International Law and thus leads to every 
state deciding individually what the exact parameters of this right entails.210  
At regional level, the right to self-determination is even less precise. The ACHPR 
protects this right in article 20, which reads, “All peoples shall have the right to 
existence. They shall have the unquestionable and inalienable right to self-
determination. They shall freely determine that political status and shall pursue their 
economic and social development according to the policy they have freely chosen”. 
The right to self-determination represents one of the most important roots of modern 
international human rights protection.211 Because this right is broadly defined, the 
African Commission has made numerous attempts to determine what exactly the right 
to self-determination entails.212  
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2.5.2 The Constitution 
The right to self-determination is even guaranteed by the Constitution in section 
12(2)(b), which reads: “(E)veryone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity 
which includes the right to security and control over their body”. As noted by 
Ackermann J in Ferreira v Levin,213 the purpose of this section is to protect aspects of 
bodily self-determination. In Phillips v De Klerk214 the right to control one’s own body 
in so far as that right is not in conflict with the overriding social interest was 
recognised: 
The mentally competent individual’s right to control his own destiny in 
accordance with his own value system, his “selfbeskikkingsreg”, must be 
rated even higher than his health and life. 
The right to self-determination basically entails the right to be left alone, and in 
relation to one’s body, the right creates a sphere of individual inviolability.215 Section 
12(2)(b) explicitly illustrates that this inviolability has two components, namely 
“security in” and “control over” one’s body. The former entails the protection of bodily 
integrity against intrusions by the state and others; consequently, the right to be left 
alone in the sense of being left unmolested by others.216 The latter entails the 
protection of what is described as bodily autonomy or self-determination against 
interference; consequently, the right to be left alone in the sense of being allowed to 
live the life one chooses.217 In this section the focus will be on the latter right.  
The fact that self-determination is an essential right is clearly illustrated by the 
capacity it protects – the capacity to express one’s own character.218 By recognising 
an individual right of self-determination, the Constitution makes self-creation possible. 
It allows each one of us to be responsible for shaping our lives according to our own 
distinctive personalities. Kriegler J observed in Ex Parte Minister of Safety and 
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Security: In re S v Walters219 that if the right to life, to human dignity or bodily 
integrity, are compromised, then the society to which we aspire becomes illusory. 
Kriegler J further emphasised the fact that any significant limitation to any of these 
rights would for its justification demand a very compelling countervailing public 
interest.220 The question can be raised: could the scope of the right to self-
determination possibly be extended to the extent where a person has the right to be 
remunerated for a kidney donation, seeing that a person is allowed to decide upon 
the fate of his own body? 
2.5.3 The right to self-determination and kidney transplants 
A person’s typical day consists of making various decisions. Every waking moment is 
filled with decisions and choices; choices such as what to wear, what to eat and what 
a typical day will involve. Except for these minor, mundane daily choices that one 
makes one also makes major decisions that has an influence on one’s life. Decisions 
are made such as what religion, lifestyle or career to follow. From the above it can 
easily be deduced that everyone has the right to make decisions regarding control 
over their own bodies. It is obvious that people are entitled to this right. After all, it is 
guaranteed in various international human rights instruments and even explicitly in 
the Constitution. Yet, these same autonomous persons are not granted the 
opportunity to choose to be remunerated for a kidney donation. 
Presently in modern South Africa people are more aware of the fact that they have a 
right to self-determination than they were 18 years ago. Since 1994 South Africans 
have been allowed to become more and more autonomous – even to the extent that 
since 1 February 1997 mothers are allowed to legally terminate their pregnancy.221 In 
the landmark case Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of 
Health222 it was noted by Mojapelo J that if the state was to prohibit termination, that 
the state’s interference would clearly constitute an impairment of women’s right “to 
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bodily and psychological integrity” and more particular their right “to make decisions 
concerning reproduction” and “to security in and control over their body”. 223 
The question could be raised why the termination of a pregnancy is constitutionally 
acceptable, yet a kidney donor is not granted the choice to be remunerated for the 
donation of his kidney. The Constitution clearly states that “everyone” has the right of 
control over their body; thus the kidney donor should be allowed to receive 
remuneration for his kidney if he wishes; or at the very least be given the choice of 
being remunerated. Presently, a person only has the choice to donate a kidney 
altruistically. The pregnant mother is allowed to end the life of her unborn child 
because she firstly has the right to bodily and physically integrity and secondly the 
right to control over her body. As stated in the Christian Lawyers case:224 
The fundamental right to self determination itself lies at the very heart and 
base of the constitutional right to termination of pregnancy. 
Consequently, on the grounds of section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution, a kidney donor 
has a right to control over his body and thus he has the right to do with his body as he 
pleases. If one is allowed to end a life due to one’s fundamental right to self-
determination, then surely one should be allowed to save a life based on this exact 
same right? To make matters even worse, according to section 5(3) of the Choice on 
Termination of Pregnancy Act, any woman of any age is allowed to consent to an 
abortion.225 The implication of this section is that a minor as young as 12 years old is 
allowed to legally terminate her pregnancy without the consent of a parent. Thus, if a 
minor is allowed to make vital decisions regarding her body, it could be argued that a 
competent adult kidney donor should be allowed to decide to donate a kidney and 
benefit financially in return. 
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Because of a person’s strong right to self-determination, a person even has the right 
to refuse medical treatment.226 In most cases the refusal of medical treatment usually 
results in death. It could be argued that if a patient is allowed to make decisions that 
could result in his death, then a kidney donor should surely be allowed to make the 
decision to donate his kidney and receive remuneration for the donation? Donating a 
kidney does not result in death – as the case is with abortion or refusal of medical 
treatment. In fact, it results in quite the opposite: it saves the life of another person. 
Section 7(2) of the Constitution entails that the state must respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the right to self-determination. From the above discussion it is clear that the 
right to self-determination has already been developed to a certain extent. It is 
regarded as constitutionally acceptable for women to terminate their pregnancies due 
to this right, and for patients to refuse essential medical treatment. Both of these 
practices result in death. The author is of opinion that if a person is allowed to make 
such a decision on the grounds of the constitutional right to self-determination, a 
kidney donor should be allowed to receive remuneration for his kidney donation. The 
kidney donor is also entitled to the right to make decisions regarding control over his 
body. It should be borne in mind that a person is already legally allowed to donate his 
kidney; it is the remuneration of a kidney donation that is regarded as illegal. The 
question, however, could be raised what difference would the added benefit of 
remuneration make to the kidney donor’s right to self-determination? In the author’s 
opinion it would make no negative difference. The donor chooses to sell his kidney; it 
is but a mere part of his body. After his kidney is removed, he still has his whole body 
to have control over. If the remuneration of a kidney donor is regarded as 
constitutionally acceptable it will pose no disadvantage to the donor’s right to self-
determination. It would rather develop his right into a more developed right – the right 
to be allowed to choose to receive remuneration or not. The donor would then be 
allowed to make his own decisions regarding his body while prolonging the life of 
another person in need of a kidney transplant. 
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2.6 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
The right to privacy can broadly be defined as the fundamental right of an individual 
to isolate his private life from the interference of the state or other persons. This right 
includes that the individual should be able to control what he wants to share or 
withhold from others. Privacy is regarded as a very important aspect of a person’s 
personality; thus a person has an interest in the protection of his privacy.227 In the last 
few decades, the right to privacy has developed and become widely recognised in 
various human rights instruments.  
2.6.1 International and regional human rights instruments 
The protection of territorial and communications privacy is explicitly guaranteed in the 
UDHR. Article 12 reads that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with 
his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks”. The right to privacy is also dealt with in article 17 of the 
ICCPR. The phrasing of this article is identical to the words stipulated in article of the 
UDHR. This article has been elaborated further by the Committee’s general 
comment, and also by its case law under the optional protocol.228 In the general 
comment to this article, the Committee noted that the obligations imposed by this 
article require the state to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to the 
prohibition of such interferences and attacks, as well as to the protection of this 
right.229 
The right to privacy is not explicitly guaranteed in the ACHPR, but it is found in most 
domestic bills of rights, such as the South African Bill of Rights.  
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2.6.2 The Constitution 
In South Africa, an individual’s right to privacy is protected by both the common law 
and the Constitution. According to the common law, every person has an 
independent personality right to privacy. For this section, however, the author will only 
focus on a person’s constitutional right to privacy. 
Section 14 of the Constitution reads that “everyone has the right to privacy, which 
includes the right not to have their person or home or property searched, their 
possessions seized or the privacy of their communications infringed. The right to 
privacy has two parts the first guarantees a general right to privacy and the second 
protects people against specific infringements of privacy such as searches, seizures 
and the infringement of communication”.230 It should be noted that, unlike the three 
fundamental human rights discussed earlier, the right to privacy is not absolute. This 
right can be limited in accordance with section 36 (the limitation clause) of the 
Constitution. The purpose of this limitation is because the courts have to find a 
balance between the public’s right to know and the individual’s right to privacy.231 
The right to privacy aims to protect three categories of an individual’s life. The first 
category protects a person against intrusions and interferences in his private life.232 
With regard to this right, a person is entitled to be left alone. The purpose of this right 
is to establish that the state and other people have nothing to do with a person’s 
intimate affairs. The second category protects a person’s privacy against infringement 
of his autonomy and allows every individual to choose the kind of lifestyle that he 
wants to lead. 233 The third category protects a person against the infringement of 
private facts.234 This right grants every individual control over his private information. 
This right is closely related to the right to human dignity, since the publication of false 
information that reflects negatively on a person can damage a person’s dignity.235 In 
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this section, the focus will mainly be on the third category of informational privacy. In 
the medical context, the right to privacy is further protected by section 14 of the 
National Health Act.236 Also, the Promotion of Access to Information Act237 stipulates 
that no person may disclose any information about a patient unless the patient gives 
his written consent, or a court order requires the disclosure, or the non-disclosure 
represents a serious threat to public health.238 The question could be raised: would 
the remuneration of kidney donors constitute a breach of the donor’s right to privacy? 
2.6.3 The right to privacy and kidney transplants 
Information pertaining to a person’s health is regarded as highly confidential and, as 
mentioned above, is protected by the Constitution, National Health Act and Promotion 
of Access to Information Act. In Hyundai Motor Manufactures239 it was noted as 
follows: 
Privacy is a right which becomes more intense the closer it moves to the 
intimate personal sphere of the life of human beings, and less intense as it 
moves away from that core ... 
It could easily be said that a kidney transplant is part of one’s intimate personal 
sphere of life. The right to privacy pertaining to a kidney transplant could easily be 
breached if a kidney donor’s identity is revealed to the kidney recipient. In this 
section, the author would like to illustrate that by allowing a kidney donor to be 
remunerated for his donation would not infringe his right to privacy. 
Presently in South Africa, all cases of kidney donations are regarded as confidential, 
except of course in the case of living donors where transplants are done within the 
same family.240 The implication of this confidentiality is that the identity of the kidney 
donor is protected and is not revealed to the kidney recipient. The reason for this is 
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that the kidney donor’s right to privacy is regarded as stronger than the kidney 
recipient’s right to information.  
In the United States of America, a case study was done regarding whether the 
donor’s right to information would outweigh the recipient’s right to privacy if the kidney 
recipient was HIV positive.241 In this case study it was concluded that the recipient’s 
right to privacy was dominant – the reason being that a kidney donation is completely 
voluntary and the donor should not base his choice on the transplant outcome.242 The 
author is of opinion that if the case study was to be done in South Africa, the results 
would be the same; mainly because the right to privacy is so strongly protected by the 
Constitution. The author further feels that the above case study emphasises the 
importance of the right to privacy. In South Africa, especially, the importance of the 
right to privacy is clearly illustrated by the fact that minors are allowed to obtain 
condoms, abortions and HIV tests without the knowledge of their parents.243  
In consideration of the above, the author is of opinion that by allowing a kidney donor 
to be remunerated for his donation would not infringe his privacy. In Singapore, the 
remuneration of kidney donors has had no effect on the privacy of the kidney donors. 
According to the Minister of Health of Singapore, the identity of the kidney donor is 
confidential information.244 The kidney donor’s privacy could only be infringed if his 
identity is revealed to the kidney recipient. If remuneration is allowed it would not 
change the current position. The mere fact that the kidney donor would receive an 
added benefit does not force him to reveal his identity. 
                                            
241  Formica RN et al “Kidney transplantation and HIV: Does recipient privacy outweigh the donor’s 
right to information?” 2010 (5) Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 925. 
242  Formica et al 2010 Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 925. 
243  Dhai and McQuoid-Mason Bioethics, human rights and health law 89. 
244  Minister of Health Singapore “HOTA” http://www.pqms.moh.gov.sg (Date of use: 29 May 
2012). The remuneration of Singapore citizens will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6 of 
this dissertation. 
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2.7 THE RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE 
In all parts of the world, a person’s health is vital to all other aspects of his life, such 
as his personal and social development. A person needs to be healthy to live his life 
to the fullest. Without health a person cannot do his work, care for his family or enjoy 
his life. Enjoyment of the right to life is interlinked and crucial to the realisation of 
many other fundamental human rights such as the right to life, human dignity, self-
determination and privacy.  
The right to health did not officially emerge from an international human rights 
instrument as other fundamental rights, but rather from an international health 
authority.245 In the preamble of the WHO, which was written in 1946, it was 
proclaimed that “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of living is one of 
the fundamental rights of every human being”. According to the WHO, health can be 
defined as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity”. However, unfortunately for the majority of the 
world and especially South Africa, the reality of their definition of health does not 
meet the standard set by the WHO definition.  
The right to health is further protected by international and regional human rights 
instruments.  
2.7.1 International and regional human rights instruments 
The right to health is foremost protected by Article 25 of the UDHR, which reads, 
“everyone has the right to standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family including food, clothing, housing and medical care ...”246 The 
UDHR aims to achieve “a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all 
                                            
245  Ngwena C and Cook R “Rights concerning Health” in Brand D and Heyns C (eds) Socio-
economic rights in South Africa 108. 
246  The article further states that everyone has the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control. The author regards only the first part of this definition as important relating to the 
discussing of the right to healthcare.  
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nations”.247 Unfortunately, the UDHR has one missing component with regard to the 
right to health. It does not impose an obligation on the state to take positive measures 
toward the realisation of this right. This lacuna was addressed and corrected by the 
ICESCR. Article 12(1) of the ICESCR reads, “The State Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health”. The steps required for the realisation of 
these rights are stipulated in Article 12(2) of the ICESCR.248 The obligation to take 
steps toward the realisation of this right is mandatory; however, every state has a 
margin of discretion in the choice of appropriate means for satisfying the right to 
health.249 The Committee on the ICESCR has established that there must be a 
maximum deployment of available resources towards the realisation of the right to 
health.250 If a state cannot meet the full realisation of a right due to lack of resources, 
it must at least endeavour to meet a certain minimum-level content of the right.251 
Consequently, it can be deduced that the state must demonstrate that it has deployed 
its available resources to the maximum extent. The Committee also emphasised that 
the availability and accessibility of healthcare for all individuals is a provision that 
should be sensitive to medical ethics and distinct cultures.252 
As a result of the influence of international human rights instruments, the right to 
health is also protected at regional level by the ACHPR. Article 16(1) reads, “Every 
individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental 
health”. Article 16(2) provides for the realisation of the right by stating that “State 
parties to the present Charter shall take necessary measures to protect the health of 
their people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick”. It 
                                            
247  Ngwena and Cook in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa 111. 
248  Article 12(2) reads, “The steps to be taken by the State Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) the provision for 
the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy development of the 
child; (b) the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene; (c) the 
prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and other diseases; (d) 
the creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in 
the event of sickness”. 
249  Ngwena and Cook in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 113. 
250  Ngwena and Cook in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 114. 
251  Ngwena and Cook in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 114. 
252  ICESCR General Comment 14 para 12. See also Rehman International Bill of Rights 119. 
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is clear that the right to health is an important right, although compliance with its 
obligation remains rather problematic.  
In South Africa, the right to health is explicitly recognised as a fundamental right in 
the Constitution. 
2.7.2 The Constitution 
During the era of apartheid,253 South Africa inflicted a number of violations against the 
human right to health. The racial segregation of white and black people affected 
people’s health in a number of ways. Health was affected due to poor social 
conditions that caused ill health, the segregation of health services and unequal 
spending on health services.254 Since 1994, health in South Africa has been 
recognised as a fundamental human right.  
The right to health is guaranteed explicitly by the Constitution in section 27(1)(a), 
which reads that “everyone has the right to have access to health care services, 
including reproductive health care”.255 It should be emphasised that the Constitution 
does not guarantee a right to health, but only the right of access to healthcare 
services. Section 27 does not only allow a person to have access to healthcare; it 
furthermore follows the international example of the ICESCR by developing the right 
even further – by stating that the government has a duty to steadily improve people’s 
healthcare. Section 27(2) reads that “the state must take reasonable legislative 
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of 
each of these rights”. Section 27 imposes both positive and negative obligations on 
the state. The positive obligation pertaining to section 27(1) is discussed above. 
Section 27(3), however, imposes a negative obligation on the state by stipulating that 
no person may be refused emergency care. As with all other rights in the Bill of 
Rights, the state’s general positive duties regarding these rights are set out in section 
                                            
253  From 1948 to 1994. 
254  Heywood M “A background to health law and human rights in South Africa” in Hassim, 
Heywood and Berger (eds) Health and democracy 11. 
255  Section 27(1) of the Constitution further states that everyone has the right to have access to 
sufficient food, water and social security. These rights will however not be discussed in this 
section. 
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7(2) of the Constitution. The state is required to respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the right to health. Section 27 is not an absolute right and is subjected to the limitation 
clause.  
It should, however, be borne in mind that section 27 is not the only constitutional 
provision dealing with a right concerning health. As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
the right to bodily and psychological integrity also directly protects a person’s health. 
Furthermore, the health of children and prisoners are also directly protected – 
respectively by section 28(1)(c)256 and section 35(2)(e)257 of the Constitution. There 
are additional rights that have an indirect bearing on the right to health, such as the 
right to life, human dignity, equality and housing.258  
As a socio-economic right the right to healthcare poses a challenge to the courts due 
to the fact that the development of socio-economic rights jurisprudence in South 
Africa is still in its infancy.259 The Constitutional Court, however, has affirmed that 
socio-economic rights are justiciable and that the principle of separation of powers 
does not have the effect of depriving courts of competence over such rights.260 There 
have been four Constitutional Court decisions that have a direct impact on the 
development and understanding of the right to healthcare. In this section, three of 
these cases and the direct influence they have had on the right to health will be 
discussed briefly.261 The relevance of these cases pertaining to kidney transplants will 
be discussed in section 2.7.3 of this dissertation. 
The first and most important case is the Soobramoney case. Soobramoney, a 41-
year-old unemployed man, was a diabetic who suffered from ischemic heart disease 
                                            
256  Section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution reads, “Every child has the right to basic nutrition, shelter, 
basic health care services and social services”. 
257  Section 35(2)(e) of the Constitution reads, “Everyone who is detained, including every 
sentenced prisoner, has the right to conditions of detention that are consistent with human 
dignity, including at least exercise and the provision, at state expense, of adequate 
accommodation, nutrition, reading material and medical treatment”. 
258  Ngwena and Cook in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa 130. 
259  Ngwena C “Substantive equality in South Africa health care: The limits of the law” 2000 (4) 
Medical Law International 2. 
260  Ngwena and Cook in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa 132. 
261  The fourth case, Van Biljon v Minister of Correctional Services 1997 (4) SA 441, will be 
omitted due to the fact that it has limited value as a precedent and it does not contribute to the 
argument of this dissertation. 
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and cerebro-vascular disease, which caused him to have a stroke in 1996. In that 
same year his kidneys also failed. His condition was regarded as irreversible and by 
the time of the court case he was in the final stages of renal failure. His life could 
have been prolonged by means of renal dialysis; however, due to limited facilities at 
the Addington State Hospital, dialysis was denied.262 His request was also denied 
due to the fact that he did not meet the medical criteria for providing dialysis at state 
expenses.263 It should be noted that prior to the application Soobramoney had been 
receiving dialysis via private care, but his funds had run out and that is why he sought 
dialysis from a state hospital.  
Soobramoney then decided to make an urgent application to the High Court for an 
order directing Addington Hospital to provide him with renal dialysis, and interdicting 
the respondent from refusing him admission to the renal unit of the hospital. In his 
application, he relied on sections 27(3) and 11 of the Constitution.264 The application 
was dismissed, and Soobramoney appealed to the Constitutional Court. The Court 
was of view that the right-to-life argument was inappropriate, as the Constitution 
provided explicitly for the right to health.265 Regarding section 27(3), the Court was of 
view that “emergency medical treatment” was capable of a broader meaning to 
include ongoing treatment for chronic conditions but it had a narrower meaning. This 
section was, however, not intended for conditions such as chronic renal failure but 
rather for sudden catastrophe or unexpected trauma.266 Soobramoney’s condition 
                                            
262  Soobramoney sought renal dialysis therapy from the Addington State Hospital in Durban. The 
hospital only provided treatment to a limited number of patients due to the fact that their renal 
unit only had 20 dialysis machines. Some of the machines were already in a poor condition. 
The hospital further noted that each treatment takes four hours and a further two hours for the 
cleaning of the machine before it can be used again. 
263  Renal dialysis can only be provided to patients who are candidates for renal transplantation. 
Thus, dialysis is only provided to patients who need it as short-term therapy. Due to the fact 
that Mr Soobramoney had suffered from other diseases he was not a fit candidate for 
transplantation. 
264  Section 11 of the Constitution was discussed in section 2.3.2 of this dissertation. 
265  “In our Constitution the right to medical treatment does not have to be inferred from the nature 
of the state established by the Constitution or from the right to life which it guarantees. It is 
dealt with directly in section 27.” Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) 
SA 765 para 19. 
266  The purpose of the right seems to be to ensure that treatment be given in an emergency, and 
is not frustrated by reason of bureaucratic requirements or other formalities. What the section 
requires is that remedial treatment that is necessary and available be given immediately to 
avert harm. Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 para 20. 
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was described as an ongoing state of affairs and not an emergency that required 
immediate remedial treatment.267 The Court decided that section 27(3) did not apply 
to the facts of this case. The Court also emphasised that, even if chronic renal failure 
could be regarded as an emergency, the state was not violating its obligation as its 
resources were scarce. If section 27(3) was to have been interpreted in favour of 
Soobramoney, the state’s obligation to ensure access to healthcare services would 
have been severely jeopardised. The state would have been constantly forced to 
provide immediate access to healthcare services, wherever and whenever it was 
demanded.268 Although the state has a constitutional duty to comply with the 
obligations imposed on it by section 27 of the Constitution, it was held in 
Soobramoney that the state did not breach their constitutional obligation by refusing 
Soobramoney renal dialysis. 
The second case pertaining to the enforcement of socio-economic rights concerning 
health is Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others269. 
This case was an appeal by the government against the decision of the High Court. 
The applicants had challenged the decision of the government to confine the 
dispensation of Nevirapine to 18 pilot sites for the purpose of prevention of mother-to-
child transmission of HIV. The main argument of the applicants was that the 
government’s failure to provide access to all anti-retroviral therapy to prevent mother-
to-child transmission constituted a number of breaches of the provisions of the 
Constitution. The provisions that were breached were section 7(2), 10, 12(2)(a), 27, 
28(1)(c), 195270 and 237.271 The applicants were successful before the High Court, 
but the case especially focused on the interpretation and application of section 27(1) 
and (2) of the Constitution. Botha J stated that the government did not take 
                                            
267  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 para 21. 
268  Berger J “The Constitution and Public Health Policy” in Hassim, Heywood and Berger Health 
and democracy 36. 
269  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others 2002 10 BCLR 1033 
(CC) (hereinafter referred to as the TAC case). 
270  Section 195 of the Constitution requires that public administration must be governed by 
democratic values enshrined in the Constitution and that a high standard of professional ethics 
must be promoted and maintained.  
271  Section 237 of the Constitution stipulates that all constitutional obligations must be performed 
diligently and without delay. 
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reasonable measures to realise the right of access to healthcare. The judge granted 
an order to make Nevirapine available to all pregnant women who gave birth in the 
public sector and to their babies if a doctor was of the opinion that the Nevirapine is 
needed. The government appealed to the Constitutional Court against the decision. 
The Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the High Court and the appeal was 
determined by the application of section 27. In the TAC case the following was stated 
regarding rights such as access to education, land, housing, healthcare, food and 
water:272 
These are the socio-economic rights entrenched in the Constitution, and 
the state is obliged to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within it available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of each 
of them. In the light of our history this is an extraordinarily difficult task. 
Nonetheless it is an obligation imposed on the state by the Constitution. 
In this case it was held that the decision to confine Nevirapine to only 18 pilot sites 
was unreasonable and thus constituted a breach of the state’s obligations under 
sections 27(1) and (2) to the extent that it was rigid and inflexible.273 The mothers and 
their newborn babies outside the pilot sites were denied a potentially life-saving drug 
that could have been administered within the available resources of the state. The 
judgement of this case illustrates that the Constitutional Court regards the state as a 
servant of the Constitution and that it will be held to its constitutional duties.274 
The relevance of the last constitutional case of importance, Khosa v Minisiter of 
Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development,275 lays in section 
27(2) of the Constitution. This decision deals with the costs of extending social 
security to all. This case considered the reasonableness of the statutory limitation on 
access to an existing social assistance programme, and how this affects the state’s 
positive obligation stated in section 27(2) of the Constitution. The Court rejected the 
state’s allegation that the extension of benefits in question to all eligible permanent 
                                            
272  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others para 94. 
273  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others para 80. 
274  Swanepoel M Embryonic stem cell research and cloning: A proposed legislative framework in 
the context of legal status and personhood (LLM Thesis University of Pretoria 2006) 154. 
275  Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) 
SA 505 (CC) (hereinafter referred to as the Khosa and Mahlaule case). 
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residents would impose an extensive financial burden on the state.276 In doing this, 
the Court emphasised that the state had failed to provide clear evidence to show 
what the additional cost of providing social grants to aged and disabled residents 
would be.277 From this case it can be deduced that the state cannot simply plead 
poverty when it comes to realising a socio-economic right; instead it has to make out 
a case that is indeed limited by resources.278 
The question could be raised that if a certain resource has been limited for a number 
of years, is the state not under an obligation to provide an alternative option that 
could relieve the need?  
2.7.3 The right to health and kidney transplants 
In 1946 the WHO proclaimed that the highest attainable state of health is an objective 
to aspire to. It is conspicuous that this objective has not been met in South Africa and 
will not be met in the near future. With the support of the relevant case law, in this 
section the author would like to challenge whether the state does fulfil its obligation in 
relation with the right to health. Thus, does the state really attempt to take reasonable 
legislative and other measures within its available resources to achieve the 
progressive realisation towards the availability of donor kidneys for transplant 
purposes? The author also questions whether it cannot be expected of the state to do 
something more and as such provide an alternative, like the remuneration of kidney 
donors in the case where they lack available resources to make more donor kidneys 
available.  
Firstly, the author would like to focus on the general obligations imposed on the state 
by section 7(2) of the Constitution. This section requires the state to respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the right to health. Each of these obligations can be analysed 
individually. Respect means that the government must respect the right of access to 
healthcare services by not unfairly or unreasonably getting in the way of people 
                                            
276  Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) 
SA 505 (CC) para 60. 
277  Berger in Hassim, Heywood and Berger Health and democracy 44. 
278  Berger in Hassim, Heywood and Berger Health and democracy 45. 
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accessing healthcare services.279 In a way it could be argued that, if the state does 
not grant persons the option of receiving remuneration for their kidney donation, the 
state is unreasonably getting in the way of kidney recipients’ access to available 
donor kidneys; thus their healthcare services. Promote entails that the state must 
create a legal framework so that individuals are able to realise their rights on their 
own.280 This obligation has a direct relevance to the remuneration of kidney donors. It 
could be argued that the state could create a legal framework that allows for the 
remuneration of a kidney donor and therefore individuals will be able to realise their 
right to health on their own. The obligation to fulfil entails that the government must 
create necessary conditions for people to access healthcare by providing positive 
assistance, benefits and actual healthcare services.281 Once again, the remuneration 
argument is of relevance to the obligation to fulfil. By allowing kidney donors to be 
remunerated, the state is creating the necessary conditions for kidney recipients to 
access healthcare.  
Secondly, the author would like to focus on the case law discussed above and how it 
contributes to the argument in favour of remuneration for kidney donors. Even though 
the Court arrived at the correct conclusion in Soobramoney with relevance to the 
case’s specific set of facts, there were nonetheless a number of shortcomings. This 
case was about renal dialysis and because of this it is also relevant to kidney 
transplants and the state’s available resources. The Court held that the right-to-life 
argument was inappropriate to this case. Yet, the right to health and life should be 
seen as interconnected – without the right to life no other rights are able to exist. By 
adopting this approach the Court unduly minimised the relevance of the right to life.282 
The Court also seemed to suggest that they had a limited role regarding the decisions 
about the allocation of healthcare resources and the protection of socio-economic 
rights.283 The Court suggested that once it is asserted by a provincial or national 
healthcare provider that resources are unavailable, that per se limits the realisation of 
                                            
279  Berger in Hassim, Heywood and Berger Health and democracy 33. 
280  Berger in Hassim, Heywood and Berger Health and democracy 33. 
281  Berger in Hassim, Heywood and Berger Health and democracy 34. 
282  Ngwena and Cook in Brand and Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa 136. 
283  Moellendorf D “Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the future of economic right 
claims” 1998 (14) South African Journal on Human Rights 328. 
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a right of access to the service sought.284 From this it can be deduced that there is no 
promise in the judgement that the Court would actually ascertain whether the state 
and the provinces were in fact attempting to realise rights by making resources 
available that ought to have been available and utilising such resources effectively.285  
In the Soobramoney case it was held that the state did not have to provide access to 
renal dialysis for people with Soobramoney’s medical condition. The author would like 
to contest this. What would the judgement of this case have been if the facts were 
somewhat different? What if Soobramoney was a patient that was an eligible 
candidate for a kidney transplant? Surely the Court would then have granted him 
access to renal dialysis, and as soon as a viable kidney became available, access to 
a kidney transplant. According to the proper reading of this case, the state cannot 
spend vast amounts of money on non-priority areas if the effect is to limit access to 
essential services.286  
If kidney donors are remunerated it will have quite the opposite effect. In the first 
place, the state will not have to spend vast amounts because the amount they will be 
paying for a kidney transplant will be less than that of renal dialysis.287 The state 
would actually save money. Secondly, renal failure cannot be regarded as a non-
priority area in South Africa, seeing that the major health problems are regarded as 
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, gastroenteritis and hypertension.288 It should be noted 
that hypertension leads to renal failure and affects about 20% of the adult 
population.289 Thirdly, if the state is to spend funds on the remuneration of kidney 
donor patients, it will not limit access to essential services (renal dialysis); it would 
rather lighten the burden on the renal dialysis machines and thus more patients would 
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286  Berger in Hassim,Heywood and Berger Health and democracy 37. 
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have access to this life-prolonging treatment while they wait for a viable kidney 
match.  
Another point the author would like to raise is that the case was heard 15 years ago 
in 1997. Surely after such a period of time circumstances have changed. At the time 
of this case the state could only meet 30% of the demand of renal dialysis.290 Is this 
still the case today? Chaskalson P noted that291  
(t)he state has to manage its limited resources in order to address all 
these claims. There will be times when this requires it to adopt a holistic 
approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the specific 
needs of a particular individual within society. 
If the Constitution allows for the remuneration of kidney donors, then the state will be 
attending to the larger needs of society, seeing that there is a dire need for viable 
donor kidneys in South Africa.  
The approach of the Court in the TAC case clearly illustrates that the idea of the 
minimum core should be seen as integral to rather than independent from the 
question whether the state has taken reasonable legislative and other measures to 
discharge its duty.292 Ngwena and Cook are of opinion that293 
Treatment Action Campaign itself is an instance where the state lost sight 
of its obligation concerning protecting health and the notion of providing a 
minimum floor or protection that was easily within its reach. 
It could be asked: has the state not lost sight concerning the right to health of patients 
with end-stage renal failure? The demand for kidneys exceeds the supply extensively. 
There are not enough renal dialysis machines to keep patients alive while they await 
a viable kidney, neither are there enough viable kidneys available to relief the stress 
of the dialysis treatment. It could be argued that kidney patients, similar to the 
mothers and children in the TAC case, also have a right to life-saving treatment. A 
“floor of minimum protection”, as mentioned above, is easily within the state’s reach 
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291  Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazula-Natal) 1997(1) SA 765 CC para 31. 
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concerning kidney recipients. If the remuneration of kidney donors is allowed, more 
kidneys will be available and there will not be a lack of available resources.  
As mentioned in the Khosa and Mahlaule case, the state cannot merely plead 
poverty; it has to make a case that it is indeed limited by resources. If remuneration is 
allowed, the state cannot be limited by resources – in the first place because enough 
kidneys will be made available for transplant purposes, and secondly if there are 
funds available for dialysis, then surely the same funds could be used for life-saving 
treatment rather than life-prolonging treatment.  
Consequently, in the author’s opinion, the state is not fulfilling its obligation under 
sections 7(2) or 27(2) of the Constitution. The state does not respect, promote, 
protect or fulfil the kidney recipients’ right to healthcare. Furthermore, the state does 
not take reasonable, legislative and other measures within its available resources to 
achieve the progressive realisation of the right to health pertaining to kidney 
recipients. The dire need for available kidneys has been a problem for a number of 
decades. Therefore, the state should provide the kidney recipients with an alternative 
option: they should be allowed to obtain a kidney in a constitutionally acceptable 
manner by having the state remunerate the kidney donor. 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to examine whether the remuneration of kidney donors could be 
regarded as constitutionally acceptable. In the author’s opinion, all of the 
constitutional rights that were examined proved that they could be used in favour of 
the remuneration of the kidney donor.  
The right to life is regarded as the most important right of all the fundamental human 
rights because it is the foundation of all other rights. Without life, no other right can 
exist. It was held in Makwanyane that the right to life entails a life worth living. The 
author contested that the pain and suffering of renal dialysis does not constitute a life 
worth living, but that a kidney transplant would. The right to human dignity is regarded 
as interconnected with the right to life. According to Ackermann J, the right to life 
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incorporates the right to dignity. According to the author, human dignity and renal 
dialysis cannot exist in one space. The worldwide argument that a kidney donor’s 
human dignity will be infringed if he receives remuneration for his kidney donation 
was also seen as far-fetched, seeing that a person’s dignity is not infringed if he 
receives compensation for a body part lost in a car accident.  
Furthermore, the issue was also raised why the cruel and inhumane treatment of a 
criminal could be regarded as constitutionally unacceptable, but the same treatment 
is regarded as constitutionally acceptable regarding an end-stage renal failure 
patient. All persons are allowed to make decisions regarding their own bodies – as 
guaranteed by the right to self-determination in the Constitution. Thus, if one is not 
allowed the option to decide whether or not to be remunerated for a kidney donation, 
then this right to self-determination is infringed. The remuneration of a kidney donor 
will have absolutely no effect whatsoever on the kidney donor’s right to privacy. The 
kidney donor would still be allowed to remain anonymous.  
Lastly, the author is of opinion that due to everyone’s right to healthcare within the 
state’s available resources, the state should allow persons to be remunerated for their 
kidney donation. Consequently, more end-stage renal failure patients will have 
access to renal dialysis until a viable kidney becomes available, and available 
kidneys will always be within the state’s available resources. If the state does not 
allow the remuneration of a kidney donor but merely leaves the matters as it is 
(meaning that kidney donation is the only acceptable way to obtain a kidney), it could 
be argued that the state infringes on the rights that a person is entitled to by the 
Constitution. 
After careful consideration of the above it should be regarded as constitutionally 
acceptable to remunerate a kidney donor for his kidney. However, it should be borne 
in mind that the sale of human kidneys is currently legally prohibited. The 
transplantation legislation pertaining to kidney transplants are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 – SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPLANT LEGISLATION 
“Written laws are like spiders’ webs, and will, like them, only entangle and hold the 
poor and weak, while the rich and powerful will easily break though them”294 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In South Africa, the Constitution is the supreme law of the land; any law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.295 
Section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution grants everybody the right to have access to 
healthcare services. Section 27(2) takes it one step further and states that the state 
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. The requirements for a 
lawful kidney transplant are to the utmost extent regulated by legislation. Presently 
the regulatory framework in South Africa that is in force is the National Health Act. 
This chapter is a discussion of the requirements for a lawful kidney transplant of a 
living and deceased donor. Although this dissertation focuses only on the buying and 
selling of kidneys from living donors it is relevant to discuss the complete organ 
donation process in South Africa which includes deceased donors. Although the 
Human Tissue Act was repealed on 1 March 2012, it will be discussed, since it was 
the law for the past 29 years. A discussion of the current National Health Act and the 
draft regulations will then follow. Furthermore, shortcoming in the current Act will be 
highlighted.  
3.2 THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A LAWFUL KIDNEY TRANSPLANT 
3.2.1 The Human Tissue Act  
The Human Tissue Act was repealed on 1 March 2012, but it was the only Act 
regulating organ transplants for the past 29 years and thus could be responsible for 
the acute kidney shortage. 
                                            
294  Anarchis (600 BC), Scythian philosopher, quoted in Plutarch Lives of the Nobel Grecians and 
Romans. 
295  Section 2 of the Constitution. 
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3.2.1.1 Deceased kidney donors  
3.2.1.1.1 Consent regarding donation  
A donor could be any person who has testamentary capacity (above the age of 16). 
Section 2 of the Act stipulated that a person could become a prospective donor in two 
different ways. Firstly, he could either state his wishes to become a donor in his will or 
in a document signed by him and attested to by at least two competent witnesses.296 
Secondly, the prospective donor could express his wishes in an oral statement made 
by him in the presence of at least two competent witnesses.297 According to section 
2(1)(b) the prospective donor could nominate a institution or person as a donee 
however this could be done by the donor’s own discretion it was not a requirement. A 
prospective donor could also apply for an organ donor card, which includes two 
stickers for the prospective donor’s identity document and driver’s licence. Although 
this was not a requirement according to the Act, it could be done out of free will.298 
When the deceased’s wishes were unknown, the Act stipulated that there were two 
ways to obtain permission for the donation. The most common way was for the 
deceased’s spouse, major child, parent, guardian, major brother or major sister to 
grant permission for the donation.299 If the abovementioned persons were not 
available, the Director-General300 could grant permission for the usage of the organs 
after he had taken all reasonable steps to trace the deceased’s family.301  
A decision to donate could be revoked at any time before the prospective donor’s 
death. A donation that was made under section 2(1) of the Act could have been 
revoked in the same way in which it was made; in the case of a will or other 
document, another will or document could be drawn up or the original will or 
document could be intentionally destroyed.302 Since the whole donation process was 
                                            
296  Section 2(1) of the Human Tissue Act. 
297  Section 2(1) of the Human Tissue Act. 
298  Organ Donor Foundation http://www.odf.org.za (Date of use: 20 January 2012). 
299  Section 2(2)(a) of the Human Tissue Act. 
300  Director-General means the head of the national Department of Health. 
301  Section 2(2)(b) of the Human Tissue Act.  
302  Section 5 of the Human Tissue Act. 
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linked to a time limit, a prospective donor needed to inform his family or those close 
to him about his decision to donate.303 
3.2.1.2 Living kidney donors 
3.2.1.2.1  Consent regarding kidney donation 
Section 18 of the Act stipulated that only a major person (18 years or older) could be 
a prospective donor after he granted written informed consent thereto. If a person 
wanted to be a donor but was a minor, he could become a prospective donor if his 
parents or guardians granted written consent thereto.304 The parents could only grant 
consent in the case of the removal of tissue that was replaceable by a natural 
process (for instance blood or hair). The minor could also in this instance grant 
written or oral consent in his own capacity as long as he was older than 14 years. A 
minor was not allowed to be a kidney donor, since a kidney is not replaceable by a 
natural process. 
There were a number of restrictions regarding the transplantation of tissue.305 Under 
no circumstance could the following be used for transplantation: 
• Any tissue of a person who was mentally ill within the meaning of the 
Mental Health Act 18 of 1973 (now replaced by the Mental Health Care Act 
17 of 2003).306 Thus, it was prohibited to use a kidney for transplantation 
that was removed from a person who had been defined as mentally ill. 
• Any tissue of a person who was a minor and that was not replaceable by 
natural processes. As mentioned previously, a kidney is not replaceable by 
a natural process and could therefore not be donated by a minor.  
                                            
303  From the prospective donor’s time of death, the practitioners have only limited time to 
transplant the organs, for instance heart and lungs must be transplanted within five hours, 
lungs within six hours, liver within 34 hours and kidneys within 72 hours. Slabbert 2009 
Stellenbosch Law Review 129. 
304  Section 18(b)(ii) of the Human Tissue Act. 
305  In this section, there will only be a discussion of the prohibition regarding kidney transplants. 
306  Section 19(i) of the Human Tissue Act. 
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In South Africa, most living kidney donations are between persons that share a family 
relationship or by spouses. If any other person, for instance a friend, wants to donate 
a kidney there is one more step regarding the consent. An application for consent 
must be sent to the Department of Health to ensure that the donation is completely 
altruistic. 
3.2.1.2.2 Place of removal 
There were specific requirements regarding the removal of a kidney from a living 
kidney donor for transplanting into the body of a living kidney recipient. The transplant 
could not occur in any place other than a hospital or authorised institution.307 
Furthermore, the transplant could not take place without the written authority of the 
medical practitioner in charge of the hospital or institution. The abovementioned 
medical practitioner should not have been involved in the transplant concerned.308 
3.2.1.2.3 Persons authorised to perform the kidney transplant 
Section 23 of the Act firmly stipulated that no person except a medical practitioner or 
a person acting under his supervision could remove a kidney from the body of a living 
person or use or transplant a kidney so removed in the body of another living person.  
3.2.2 The National Health Act  
3.2.2.1 Deceased kidney donors 
The donation of human bodies and tissue of deceased persons is controlled by 
sections 62 to 68 of the National Health Act. Kidneys obtained from a deceased 
person may only be transplanted according to the prescribed procedures. It is also of 
importance that a kidney may not be transplanted into any person who is not a South 
African citizen or a permanent resident of the Republic without the written consent of 
the Minister of Health. The prescribed requirements for a lawful kidney transplant are 
described below. 
                                            
307  Section 20(a) of the Human Tissue Act. 
308  Section 20(b) of the Human Tissue Act. 
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3.2.2.1.1 Consent regarding kidney donation 
Consent is probably one of the most important requirements that should be adhered 
to regarding kidney transplants. There are a number of manners in which consent can 
be granted. These manners are all stipulated in section 62(a)(i)-(iii) and are the same 
as in the repealed Human Tissue Act.  
The manners in which consent can be granted may be the same, but according to 
section 62(1)(b) of the Act, if a deceased granted consent in accordance with the 
abovementioned methods,309 he also had to nominate an institution or person as a 
donee. If he did not nominate an institution or a person, the donation will be 
considered as null and void.310 
If the deceased did not express his wishes during the duration of his lifetime, consent 
can also be granted by the deceased’s spouse, partner, major child, parent, guardian, 
major brother or sister.311 Consent is only acceptable in this manner if the deceased 
did not express his unwillingness to donate when he was alive. The abovementioned 
persons also need to nominate an institution or person as a donee.312 If none of the 
mentioned family members can be located, the Director-General may grant consent 
to have the kidney of the deceased donated to a nominated institution or person. 
There are a number of requirements connected to consent given by the Director-
General: the deceased should not have shown any inconsistency regarding the 
donation, and the Director-General must be convinced that all reasonable steps had 
been taken to trace the relevant persons to grant consent.313 The position regarding 
an unidentified deceased person is still uncertain. 
According to section 65 of the Act, a prospective donor may revoke his consent to 
donate a kidney at any time. The consent must be revoked in the same way in which 
                                            
309  A prospective donor does not need to nominate an institution or person when applying for a 
donor card. Organ Donor Foundation http://www.odf.org.za (Date of use: 20 January 2012). 
310  Section 62(1)(c) of the National Health Act. 
311  In the specific order mentioned. 
312  Section 62(2) of the National Health Act. 
313  Section 62(3)(b) of the National Health Act. 
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it was obtained. In the case of a will or a document, another will or document can be 
drawn up or the original will or document can be intentionally destroyed. 
3.2.2.1.2 The kidney donor must be “dead” 
Although this requirement seems very obvious, it is not. The most important part of 
this requirement is what exactly is meant by the term “dead”. This requirement is of 
great importance because from the time of death there is only a limited time that most 
organs can still be considered as viable. For instance, the skin or corneas of a donor 
do not need to be transplanted immediately, but in the case of a heart the transplant 
must take place within five hours and a kidney transplant within 72 hours. It is evident 
that most transplant processes need to take place immediately after the donor’s time 
of death; while there is still sufficient blood circulation for the transplant to be the 
successful. 
In previous years, the decisive factor for “death” was the absence of any heart 
activity. This test was applied by Dr Barnard and his medical team and it entailed the 
following: a practitioner could certify a potential donor as dead as soon as the 
electrocardiogram showed no activity for five minutes and there was an absence of 
any spontaneous respiratory movement and reflexes.314 Medical science has 
developed a lot over the years and this test is no longer applied. Modern health 
practitioners are of opinion that there is not one single moment that can be accepted 
as a time of death, but that the determination of death can be described as a 
process.315  
The brain, heart and lungs are considered as the organs that are needed for the 
continuation of life. Any disturbance or damage to any of these organs has almost an 
automatic effect on the other organs. Death was not previously defined and this led to 
huge complications in the legal world. In the Anatomical Donations and Post Mortem 
Examinations Act there were no definitions regarding “death” or “corpse”; however, in 
                                            
314  Barnard CN “The operation” 1967 South African Medical Journal 1271. 
315  Strauss SA Aspekte van wetgewing vir gesondheidspersoneel 39. 
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the National Health Act “death” can now be accepted as brain death.316 The majority 
of practitioners support the definition of death as the cessation of any brain activity. 
Most patients that have an absence of brain activity exist in a vegetative condition 
and can be regarded as merely “living corpses.”317 It is not only medical practitioners 
that share this opinion; philosophers like McMahan and Singer are also of opinion 
that humans are merely “embodied minds”, and that once a person has lost his higher 
cerebral functions he can be regarded as a non-person.318 Practitioners are of 
opinion that organs that are harvested before the donor’s blood circulation stops will 
be more advantageous for the organ recipient.319 Thus, the new definition is more 
beneficial for kidney recipients because it will now be possible to harvest kidneys 
from a donor that still has a heartbeat, even though the heartbeat is supplied by a life-
support device. 
3.2.2.1.3 The allocation and use of deceased-donor kidneys 
Kidneys obtained from a deceased donor for the purpose of transplantation may only 
be used in the prescribed manner and need to be allocated320 in accordance with the 
prescribed procedures.321 The Minister322 needs to prescribe a criterion for the 
approval of organ transplant facilities323 and procedural measures to be applied for 
                                            
316  Brain death must be established by at least two medical practitioners, of whom one must have 
been practicing as a medical practitioner for at least five years, and neither of these medical 
practitioners may participate directly or indirectly in the transplantation. Section 11 of the 
Regulations to the National Health Act 61 of 2003 in GG 30828 of 7 March 2008 20 
(hereinafter referred to as the Regulations to the Act). 
317  Strauss Aspekte van wetgewing vir gesondheidspersoneel 40. 
318  Clarke DL and Egan A “Euthanasia – is there a case?” 2008 (1) South African Journal of 
Bioethics and Law 26. Also see McMahan J The ethics of killing: Problems at the margin of 
life. 
319  Strauss Aspekte van wetgewing vir gesondheidspersoneel 40. 
320  The assessment process regarding donations will be discussed in section 3.3. 
321  Section 61 of the National Health Act. 
322  Defined as the Cabinet member responsible for health. 
323  The approved kidney transplant facilities in South Africa are the following (divided into state 
and private facilities: 1.State facilities: Universitas Hospital (Bloemfontein). Groote Schuur 
Hospital, Red Cross War Memorial Children’s Hospital and Tygerberg Hospital (Cape Town). 
Inkosi Albert Luthuli Hospital (Durban). Charlotte Maxeke Johannesburg Academic Hospital 
(Johannesburg). George Mukhaki Hospital and Steve Biko Academic Hospital (Pretoria). 2. 
Private facilities: Netcare Universitas Hospital (Bloemfontein). Christiaan Barnard Memorial 
Hospital Netcare (Cape Town). Entabeni Hospital and St Augustine Hospital Netcare (Durban). 
Garden City Clinic Netcare, Milpark Hospital Netcare and Wits Donald Gordon Medical Centre 
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such approval.324 The allocation of organs in South Africa is rather a troublesome 
concept, as previously mentioned.  
3.2.2.1.4 Purposes of donation of body and tissue of deceased persons 
The body and tissue of a deceased person may only be donated for the following 
purposes: 
• The training of students in health sciences. 
• Health research. 
• The advancement of health sciences. 
• Therapeutic purposes, including the use of tissue in any living person. 
• The production of a therapeutic, diagnostic or prophylactic substance. 
3.2.2.2 Living kidney donors 
Section 56 of the National Health Act mainly regulates the position regarding the use 
of tissue harvested from living persons. “Tissue” is described in the Act as “human 
tissue, and includes flesh, bone, a gland, an organ, skin, bone marrow or body fluid, 
but excludes blood or a gamete”.325 The donation of tissue that is not replaceable by 
natural processes is more strictly controlled than tissues that are replaceable by 
natural processes. Section 56(1) of the Act stipulates that tissue may only be 
withdrawn from a living person for medical or dental purposes, as prescribed. The 
other requirements for a lawful transplant are described below. 
                                                                                                                                         
(Johannesburg). Jakaranda Hospital Netcare (Pretoria). Organ Donor Foundation 
http://www.odf.org.za (Date of use: 25 January 2012).  
324  Section 59(4) of the National Health Act. 
325  A gamete is defined as either of the two generative cells essential for human reproduction.  
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3.2.2.2.1 Consent regarding kidney donation 
One of the most important requirements for a lawful kidney transplant is that the 
potential kidney donor must have given written informed consent.326 Tissue that is not 
replaceable by natural processes, such as kidneys, may not be harvested from a 
person younger than 18 years old even if there is consent from the parents.327 The 
donation of replaceable tissue is much more straightforward; there is no need for 
written consent from a major and a minor’s parents can give permission regarding 
this donation.  
A practitioner may only use tissue from a living person for the medical purposes that 
are prescribed in the Act. Even though these conditions exist, there are a number of 
restrictions on tissue donations. Under no circumstances may tissue be removed 
from the following persons: 
• A person who is mentally ill within the meaning of the Mental Health Care 
Act. Thus, a kidney may not be removed from the living body of a person 
that can be defined as mentally ill by the abovementioned Act.328 
• A person younger than 18 years, if the tissue is not replaceable by natural 
processes. A kidney is not replaceable by a natural process and may 
therefore not be removed from a minor.329 
It should be mentioned that the Minister may authorise the removal or withdrawal of 
tissue and he may also impose any condition that may be necessary in respect of 
such removal or withdrawal.330 
Section 60 of the Act imposes a strict limitation: remuneration may not be received for 
any donation. All donations are regarded as a “gift of life” and it will be an offence if a 
person who has donated a kidney receives any form of financial or other reward for 
                                            
326  Section 55(1)(a) of the National Health Act. 
327  Section 56 (2)(a)(ii) of the National Health Act. 
328  Section 56(2)(a)(i) of the National Health Act. 
329  Section 56(2)(a)(ii) of the National Health Act. 
330  Section 56(2)(b) of the National Health Act.  
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such a donation.331 However, section 60(4)(a) of the Act stipulates that a donor may 
receive reimbursement of reasonable costs incurred by him to provide such a 
donation, but neither the Act nor the Regulations332 or the draft regulations determine 
who will be liable for these costs or what exactly “reasonable costs” entail. Any 
person who violates the Act is liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding five years or to both a fine and imprisonment.333  
3.2.2.2.2 Place of removal 
Section 58 of the Act regulates the position regarding the place of removal of the 
kidney from the living donor for the transplantation. The Act stipulates that the 
removal may only take place in a hospital or an authorised institution.334 Furthermore, 
the written authority of the medical practitioner in charge of the clinical services at the 
hospital or institution is required.335 If the medical practitioner in charge is unavailable, 
any other medical practitioner authorised by him can grant authority.336 Neither 
practitioner is allowed to participate in a transplant that he authorised.337 
3.2.2.2.3 Authorised persons that may perform the kidney transplant 
The removal of the donor kidney may only be done by a registered practitioner, or a 
person acting under the supervision or on the instructions of the medical 
practitioner.338 
3.3 THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS REGARDING KIDNEY DONATIONS 
Fairness is the most important and vital concept regarding the assessment process. 
However, fairness is not easily achieved. Creating fair procedures is problematic: how 
can we, as human beings, decide whose life is more important regarding two 
                                            
331  Section 60(4)(a) of the National Health Act.  
332  Regulations of the National Health Act. 
333  Section 60(5) of the National Health Act. 
334  Section 58(1)(a) of the National Health Act. 
335  Section 58(1)(b)(i) of the National Health Act. 
336  Section 58(1)(b)(ii) of the National Health Act. 
337  Section 58(2) of the National Health Act. 
338  Section 59 of the National Health Act 
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patients? A system of fairness is partially created by legislation, but the final decision 
rests in the hands of the practitioners.  
Annexure B of the draft regulations issued by the National Health Act must still be 
approved by Parliament. As soon as this takes place, the assessment of potential 
kidney donors will take place. 
3.3.1 The criteria for deceased-donor kidney transplantation339 
When organs are harvested from a deceased, there are a number of requirements 
that the donation must comply with. All these requirements need to be met according 
to the standard protocol. The requirements are as follows: 
• Establishment and confirmation of brain death of the donor. 
• The potential kidney(s) need to be declared as suitable and viable. 
• Consent needs to be obtained from the family (even if the donor did 
previously give consent). 
• The exclusion of any communicable diseases, malignancy or any other 
serious health issues regarding the kidney(s). 
• The ability to maintain circulation or kidney viability until the kidney can be 
removed for transplantation. 
The potential kidney donor will also be evaluated according to a number of other 
factors. These factors will differ, depending on the type of transplant and the needs of 
the patients on the recipient waiting list. There is also further evaluation on the 
following criteria:340 suitable ABO (blood-type) matching, suitable cytotoxic antibody 
screening, suitable HLA (human leukocyte antigen) matching, suitability of size and 
age of the kidney recipient, medical condition and degree of urgency, and the time 
that the kidney recipient has been on the waiting list. 
                                            
339  Draft regulations of the Act 27. 
340  Draft regulations of the Act 27. 
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3.3.2 The criteria for living-donor kidney transplantation 
Encouraging the public to become potential living kidney donors is of great 
importance. As mentioned previously, it is more medically advantageous and can 
help with the dire need of available kidneys. Living kidney donors need to comply with 
a pre-criterion to qualify as donors. In the first place, the potential donor must be aged 
18 years or older.341 Secondly, fully informed consent should be obtained from both 
the potential donor and the potential recipient concerning the risks and benefits of the 
procedures.342 Lastly, particulars of both the donor and recipient should be recorded 
in a transplant database and a lifetime follow-up must be established.343 If the kidney 
donor is not related to the kidney recipient, ministerial permission must be obtained 
for the transplantation. There is also a difference regarding the assessment of a 
related and an unrelated potential kidney donor. 
3.3.2.1 The assessment of related living kidney donors 
Regarding the assessment of relatives, the potential donor and potential recipient 
only need to prove that they share a genetic relationship within the third degree. The 
genetic relationship can be any person that falls into the following categories: parents, 
children, siblings, aunts and uncles, nieces and nephews or cousins.344 The 
abovementioned person can be a full or half blood relative. A potential donor needs 
to satisfy the medical, ethical and psychiatric criteria, and the donor as well as the 
recipient must be assessed and found suitable by a multi-disciplinary transplant 
selection panel.345 
3.3.2.2 The assessment of unrelated living kidney donors 
Regarding the assessment of unrelated donors the requirements are stricter. The 
reason for this is that a donation is supposed to be a “gift of life”. When an unrelated 
person decides to become a donor, it can be questioned whether there is a financial 
                                            
341  Draft regulations of the Act 27. 
342  Draft regulations of the Act 27. 
343  Draft regulations of the Act 27. 
344  Draft regulations of the Act 28. 
345  Draft regulations of the Act 28.  
76 
 
gain or any other type of benefit for him. Regarding this category, a potential donor 
can be a spouse, friend or acquaintance, but it is not limited to these. The potential 
unrelated kidney donors need to meet the following requirements:346 
• The motives of the donor should be assessed; his motive should be 
altruistic and in the best interest of the recipient. There should be no profit 
involved. 
• Both the potential donor and recipient should conform to all medical 
investigations. 
• There must be a psychological assessment done by an independent 
qualified social worker or psychologist to ensure that both parties are fully 
informed and there is no form of coercion. 
• An application for the unrelated donation needs to be forwarded to the 
relevant office of the national Department of Health. 
• The abovementioned application needs to be approved by the Ministerial 
Advisory Committee or another committee established for this purpose. 
All potential kidney donors and recipients are further evaluated in terms of the 
guidelines set by the various transplant centres.347 The main purpose of the 
discussed draft regulations is to try and establish a system of allocation regarding the 
donation of organs in South Africa. As mentioned earlier, currently the allocation of 
donor kidneys is simply done by an agreement between the various transplant 
centres and the private and public sector. This system could be regarded as unfair 
and unjust. The allocation of donor organs should be done according to the needs of 
the potential kidney recipients. The process needs to be more just, fair and controlled.  
                                            
346  Draft regulations of the Act 28. 
347  Draft regulations of the Act 28. 
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3.4 SHORTCOMINGS IN SOUTH AFRICAN TRANSPLANT LEGISLATION  
In the 1950s, South Africa was a pioneer regarding transplant legislation. However, 
after a closer look at the current transplant legislation in force today this is no longer 
the case. There are a number of obvious shortcomings in the legislation.348 
The author is of opinion that the consent requirement in the National Health Act is a 
very problematic area. The first problem regarding consent is the fact that a potential 
deceased kidney donor can meet all the requirements for becoming a donor and 
have a will, document or organ donor card to show his willingness to donate; 
however, at his time of death his family has the choice whether they want to donate 
his kidney(s) or not. This power position of the family is unfair and unjust and could 
even be unconstitutional – a donor’s family should only be allowed to interfere if the 
donor showed unwillingness to donate before his death. The second problem 
regarding consent is the prohibitions regarding the mentally ill and minors previously 
discussed in both Acts. The mentally ill prohibition should be regulated on a case-to-
case basis: if a person has sufficient intellectual capacity he should be allowed to 
make his own decisions. In Pienaar v Pienaar’s Curator349 the court stated:  
The mere fact that such a person has been declared insane or incapable 
of managing his affairs, and that a curator is appointed to such a person, 
does not deprive him of the right of administrating his own property and 
entering into contracts and other legal dispositions to the extent to which 
he may de facto be capable, mentally and physically, of doing so. 
Section 2(1) of the Human Tissue Act and section 62 of the National Health Act 
states that any person who is competent to make a will or document that 
contains his wishes to donate a kidney can become a donor. If a mentally ill 
person is capable to enter into a legal contract without any influence, he should 
be allowed to become a potential donor.  
In both Acts there is a prohibition that states that a kidney may not be harvested 
from a minor (18 years and younger) because it is not replaceable by a natural 
                                            
348  There is only a short discussion concerning the shortcomings of the relevant legislation in this 
section, as this is not the main focus of the dissertation.  
349  Pienaar v Pienaar’s Curator 1930 OPD 171 para 174. Also see: Fourie Organ procurement 59. 
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process. This prohibition seems to be a bit contradictory, since section 129 of 
the Children’s Act350 states that any child from the age 12 and older is allowed 
to give consent for any medical treatment or surgical operation if the child is of 
“sufficient maturity” and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
risks, social and other implications of the treatment. Thus, these children are 
allowed to consent to surgical operations such as abortions but are not allowed 
to donate a kidney. Regarding this prohibition, section 2(1) of the Human Tissue 
Act and section 62 of the National Health Act plays a role again: a person only 
needs to be 16 years of age to make a will or document; thus a minor of the age 
16 and above should be allowed to consent to transplantation.  
Another problem area regarding both the Acts is the whole concept of “altruism”. 
In both Acts351 it is considered as a major offence to receive any payment for a 
donation. A donation is supposed to be a “gift of life” and it is commonly known 
that something cannot be perceived as a gift if a payment took place. However, 
the author regards this prohibition as one of the main reasons for the lack of 
available donor kidneys. The kidney donor makes a big sacrifice, in comparison 
with the kidney recipient. He has the larger scar after the surgery and he is not 
covered by the recipient’s medical scheme, nor will his own medical aid pay for 
the costs as it not a required procedure. Section 60(4)(a) of the National Health 
Act creates the possibility of remuneration; yet it is not defined what exactly this 
remuneration entails. The cruel reality is that there will be more kidney donors if 
there is some kind of financial gain for the donor. And why should this not be 
allowed? Both donor and recipient will receive some form of benefit – the 
recipient will receive a kidney that will increase his life expectancy and quality, 
and the donor will receive a reimbursement that will improve his life in one way 
or another.  
To substantiate this view, a reference is made to Radcliffe-Richards, who 
discusses the case of a Turkish father who wanted to sell his kidney with the 
                                            
350  Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
351  Section 28 of the Human Tissue Act and section 60 of the National Health Act.  
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purpose of paying for urgent hospital treatment for his daughter. The father did 
not have any valuables or money that he could use to cover the costs of his 
daughter’s treatment. Yet, he was prohibited from selling his kidney. This 
prohibited the father from saving his daughter’s life and that of the potential 
kidney recipient. However, if the case was somewhat different and the sick 
daughter needed a kidney and her father had acted as her kidney donor, he 
would have been regarded as a hero.352 It is difficult to understand why selling 
his kidney to pay for his daughters medical treatment should be regarded as a 
crime. A form of financial reward could help to improve the current shortage of 
available kidneys. As discussed earlier in chapter 2 the state cannot provide 
end-stage renal failure patient due to lack of resources thus they could provide 
the patients with an alternative – the choice to receive a donor kidney by means 
of compensation. However, to encourage the public, their perception regarding 
the payment of kidney donors should change, and this can only be done by 
educating the community regarding the need for more kidneys to be 
transplanted. 
There are also a few serious shortcomings regarding the administration process 
of kidney donations. As previously mentioned, there is no national list of 
recipients waiting for kidneys or of people who are registered as potential 
donors. These lists could make a huge difference: they could give more clarity 
regarding the situation. Once there is more clarity it will be easier to find a 
solution for the shortage.  
3.5 CONCLUSION  
The transplant legislation in South Africa plays a major role in the procurement of 
donor kidneys. This chapter sought to examine the statutory framework and its 
shortcomings pertaining to kidney transplants in South Africa. The transplant 
legislation in South Africa plays a major role in the procurement of donor kidneys. 
Chapter 8 of the National Health Act could be a step in the right direction because 
                                            
352  Radcliffe-Richards et al “The case for allowing kidney sales” 1998 (351) The Lancet 1951. Also 
see Slabbert and Oosthuizen 2007 Obiter 313. 
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section 60(4)(a) of the Act attempts to improve the current shortage of kidneys by 
providing the kidney donor with a reimbursement for the reasonable costs incurred by 
him. Yet, in the Act there is no indication what exactly is meant by reasonable costs 
and who will determine these reasonable costs. The legislator should have taken 
section 60(4)(a) one step further and legalised kidney sales in a regulated and 
constitutionally acceptable manner.  
In the previous chapter of this dissertation it was concluded that kidney sales could 
be regarded as constitutionally acceptable. In the following chapter there will be a 
discussion whether kidney sales is acceptable if measured against bioethical 
principles.  
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CHAPTER 4 – BIOETHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON KIDNEY TRANSPLANTS 
“Protection of the integrity of medical ethics is important for all of society. If 
medicine becomes, as Nazi medicine did, the handmaiden of economics, 
politics, or any force other than one that promotes the good of the patient, it 
loses its soul and becomes an instrument that justifies oppression and the 
violation of human rights.”353 
4.1 AN INTRODUCTION TO BIOETHICS  
The doctor-patient relationship forms one of the most important foundations of 
contemporary bioethics. This relationship is based on mutual trust between a patient 
and his healthcare practitioners. The term “profession” means “a dedication, promise 
or commitment publicly made”.354 But it is not always as easy as it sounds for the 
healthcare practitioner to uphold this promise. The foundations of this promise is 
based on the Hippocratic Oath, which is regarded as the first written document 
pertaining to the ethical practice of medicine. The core concept of this oath is primum 
non nocere or “above all, do no harm”.355 Since the times of the Hippocratic Oath up 
to the middle of the twentieth century, medical ethics stagnated to some degree, 
given that there was not much development in biological or health sciences. 
However, as the years went by, things started to change: technology advanced, 
practitioners became more experienced and discovered better ways of practising 
medicine and the general community’s view of medical advantages changed. 
Practices that were once regarded as contra bones mores seemed to become more 
and more acceptable as the years went by. For example, medical advances such as 
organ transplants, legal abortions, in vitro fertilisation and life-sustaining treatment of 
terminally ill patients became an everyday occurrence. These medical advances 
changed most people’s lives, as well as the role of the medical practitioner. 
Previously, the practitioner’s world of decision-making was mostly black and white; 
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the American Board of Family Medicine 148. 
355  Moodley K “A place for ethics, law and human rights in healthcare” in Moodley K (ed) Medical 
ethics, law and human rights 3. 
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grey areas almost never occurred. A practitioner could follow basic rules and codes 
and all would be fine. However, as the medicine advanced the practitioner’s role 
changed and the concept of bioethics was born.  
Since its birth in the early 1970s, bioethics has grown immensely and now applies to 
all medical practitioners. Bioethics can be regarded as the part of ethics that deal with 
the moral issues raised by developments in the biological sciences at a more general 
level.356 Since bioethics is part of ethics it is also of importance to look at the general 
definition of ethics. According to the World Medical Association, ethics can be defined 
as follows: “Ethics is the study of morality – careful and systematic reflection on and 
analysis of moral decisions and behaviour, whether past, present or future”.357 Thus, 
ethics is a matter of knowing what the right thing is to do, while morality is a matter of 
doing the right thing.358 Because of bioethics, present practitioners follow a patient-
centred holistic approach to healthcare instead of the more traditional approach of 
doing good and avoiding harm. Bioethics is based on four principles that provide 
practitioners with a framework to consult when they encounter any ethical problems. 
The four-principle approach developed in the United States of America and is based 
on four common basic moral principles, namely respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence and justice.359 Although these four principles do not provide ordered 
rules, they can help doctors and other healthcare workers to make decisions when 
reflecting on moral issues that might arise from kidney transplants. In this chapter 
there will be a discussion of the four principles and how they relate to kidney 
transplants. 
4.2 AUTONOMY AND THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
Every day in life – from the moment we wake up until we go to sleep – we make our 
own choices regarding everything we pursue on that specific day. The act of making 
our own choices and often saying “it is my life, I’ll do as I like”, can be described as 
acting autonomously. 
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358  Moodley in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human rights 3.  
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The word “autonomy” is derived from the Greek word autos, which means “self”, and 
the word nomos, which means “rule”; thus literally meaning self-rule. According to 
Beauchamp and Childress,360 personal autonomy at a minimum can be defined as 
self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from certain 
limitations that prevent meaningful choice. Autonomy is of great importance regarding 
kidney transplants because a kidney transplant can only be seen as morally 
legitimate if the kidney donor’s autonomy can be guaranteed.361 This resonates with 
the right to self-determination discussed earlier in chapter 2 is interlinked. A kidney 
donor can only be regarded as autonomous if he decided to proceed with his 
donation after being informed of the associated risks and if there was no pressure or 
force from others when the decision was made. It should be borne in mind that a 
financial gain should not be regarded as a measure of pressure – lacking wealth does 
not prevent a person from making a rational decision.362 Respect for autonomy entails 
both a negative and positive obligation. As a negative obligation, autonomous actions 
should not be subjected to controlling constraints by others.363 As a positive 
obligation, respect for autonomy requires both respectful treatment in disclosing 
information and actions that foster autonomous decision-making.364 However, it 
should be noted that autonomy is not merely about someone making their own 
decisions: the concept of autonomy also has a number of implications and limitations. 
In healthcare, respecting someone’s autonomy has a number of prima facie365 
implications. These implications will now be discussed. The medical practitioner 
needs to consult with his patient and obtain his agreement before he performs any 
procedures on him – hence, the vital obligation of informed consent.366 Patients wants 
to actively participate in decisions about their medical care and it is their right to make 
                                            
360  Beauchamp TL and Childress JF Principles of biomedical ethics 99. 
361  Munson R “Organ transplantation” in Steinbock B (ed) Oxford handbook of bioethics 217. 
362  Friedman EA and Friedman AL “Payment for donor kidneys: Pros and cons” 2006 (69) Kidney 
International 961. 
363  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 104. 
364  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 104. 
365  A prima facie rule refers to one that must be fulfilled unless it conflicts on a particular occasion 
with an equal or stronger rule. Moodley in Moodley K (ed) Medical ethics, law and human 
rights. 
366  Gillon R “Medical ethics: four principles plus attention to scope” 1994 (309) British Medical 
Journal 185. 
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decisions regarding treatment according to their own belief system, cultural and 
personal values and life plan.367 If one wants to respect a patient’s wishes, one has to 
facilitate and encourage their input into the decision-making. All these implications 
are important regarding kidney transplants: a medical practitioner must obtain a 
kidney donor’s informed consent after proper consultation, and during this 
consultation the practitioner should have made the kidney donor aware of all the risks 
associated with a kidney transplant (thus he may not deceive the patient).  
As previously mentioned, autonomy is not without its limitations. One of the most 
problematic limitations is if a patient is unable to contribute fully to the discussion 
between him and his medical practitioner.368 “Capacity” is the term used to denote a 
patient’s ability to make healthcare decisions.369 Capacity requires four elements of a 
patient’s ability: to comprehend information about the condition and the choices 
available, to make judgements about the information consistent with personal values, 
to understand the potential outcomes and possible adverse consequences of the 
choices, and to possess the facility to freely communicate one’s wishes.370 Regarding 
a kidney transplant, only the first two limitations can occur, namely a communication 
barrier or a patient rejecting his opportunity to exercise his right. Mental 
incompetence is not relevant to a kidney transplant because, as stated in the 
previous chapter, a kidney may not be removed from a person that can be regarded 
as mentally ill according to the Mental Health Care Act. 
A patient, if adequately informed, is usually the best judge of his own interest. If a 
patient agrees to undergo a medical procedure without the adequate information 
about the possible risks or alternatives he is not acting autonomously. This 
emphasises the importance of informed consent concerning respect for autonomy 
and the right to self-determination. 
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Informed consent has been part of South African law since the 1920s, but it was the 
landmark decision in Castell v De Greef371 that emphasised its importance. A number 
of important decisions regarding informed consent were made in this case. One of the 
most important was the requirements that must inter alia be satisfied for consent to 
be regarded as a defence. These requirements include that the consenting party 
must have had knowledge and been aware of the nature of the harm or risk; the 
consenting party must have appreciated and understood the nature and extent of the 
harm and risk; the consenting party must have consented to the harm and assumed 
risk; and the consent must be comprehensive.372 Consent to treatment will only be 
regarded as informed if it is based on substantial knowledge concerning the nature 
and the effect of the act consented to.373 The main purpose of the doctrine of 
informed consent is to protect autonomy. To protect a patient’s autonomy, a medical 
practitioner is obliged to warn the patient consenting to a medical treatment of the 
material risk inherent to the proposed treatment.374  
A risk is regarded as material in the following circumstances: if a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position is warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it 
or if the medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular 
patient, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.375 It should be 
emphasised that, in more recent case law it was decided that if there is only a very 
small chance of a risk occurring, the risk is regarded as negligible and the omission 
will not constitute negligence.376 The risk must be regarded as a greater than usual 
risk. The obligation to warn the patient of any inherent risk to the medical treatment is 
also subjected to the therapeutic privilege. In terms of the therapeutic privilege, a 
                                            
371  Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C).  
372  The consent must be comprehensive in that it extends to the entire transaction, inclusive of its 
consequences. 
373  Olwage v Louwrens 2004 1 SA 532 (C). 
374  Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) para 426. 
375  Castell v De Greef 1994 4 SA 408 (C) para 426. 
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bypass he experienced a claudication in his left leg. The medical practitioners refer to this as 
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medical practitioner may withhold information from a patient that in his view could be 
detrimental to the patient.377 
When it comes to decision-making, informed consent can prevent patients from being 
deceived, exploited, tricked, misled, duped, manipulated or pressured so that their 
autonomy is violated.378 Informed consent is both an ethical and legal requirement. 
The National Health Act makes provision for the requirement of informed consent. In 
section 7 it stipulates that a health service may not be provided to a user without the 
user’s informed consent.379 Section 8 stipulates that a user has the right to participate 
in any decision affecting his personal health and treatment. Informed consent is not 
something that should be taken up lightly. It does not take just a few minutes to obtain 
– it is a process. This process starts by first making sure that the patient is competent 
to make decisions380 (the requirements for a competent person was discussed 
earlier). Next, the competent patient must be provided with information relevant to his 
decision; and the information must be understandable and sufficient.381 The last step 
is to ensure that the patient’s autonomy is not infringed by means of coercive forces, 
deception or situational pressures.382 The last step is extremely important for a 
transplant programme that permits living kidney transplants, because it protects the 
kidney donor from familial and situational pressures.383 In some cases, the pressure 
the kidney donor receives from his family can be far worse than the so-called 
pressure that is caused by a financial gain. If a kidney donor makes the choice to sell 
it has no influence whatsoever on his right to privacy as discussed in chapter 2. As 
previously mentioned, a person’s financial status has no direct link to his decision-
making skills. 
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Informed consent has an integral role to play with regard to kidney transplants. A 
kidney donor and recipient must be informed of all the consequences of the 
transplant. They must also be aware of the nature and extent of the transplant and 
must lastly appreciate and understand the nature and extent of the transplant.384 All 
this must be explained to the kidney donor and recipient in a sufficient and 
understandable manner. If a transplant is performed and there was no proper 
informed consent (meaning that the patient did not know in broad terms the nature of 
the transplant procedure), it could constitute criminal assault. Also, the failure to 
inform the kidney recipient sufficiently of alternative treatment available and the risks 
and consequences of the kidney transplant could lead to an action in delict.385 
 
4.3 NON-MALEFICENCE AND BENEFICENCE 
In any medical intervention where a medical practitioner tries to help a patient there is 
always the unavoidable risk of harming the patient. An example would be when a 
patient is operated to remove a cancerous tumour: there is the chance that the 
cancer may be cured; however, during the surgery the patient is also harmed – his 
body is cut open in order to perform the surgery and in some cases an organ may be 
removed to prevent the cancer from spreading. In this case, a medical practitioner is 
confronted with the two principles of “beneficence” and “non-maleficence”. The 
Hippocratic Oath imposes an obligation of non-maleficence and an obligation of 
beneficence: “I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and 
judgement, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them.”386 Together, these two 
principles aim at producing net benefit over harm.387  
Although these two principles are inseparable in most cases, they are discussed 
separately in this chapter. The reason for this separation is because there are certain 
circumstances that exist where there is no obligation of beneficence towards others, 
but there is always an obligation not to do harm to others. 
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4.3.1 Non-Maleficence 
Medical practice has been firmly rooted in the principle of primum non nocere (above 
all [or first] do no harm) since the times of the Hippocratic Oath. The majority of 
authors agree that it is the most fundamental principle of the Hippocratic Oath.388 
Non-maleficence implies that medical practitioners may not inflict harm on others. 
Thus, a surgical intervention may in no way harm the patient.389 The obligation not to 
harm others is sometimes more inflexible than the obligation to help them. Non-
maleficence is regarded as a constant duty, whereas beneficence is regarded as a 
limited duty.390 In some situations non-maleficence will overpower beneficence, even 
if the best outcome can be achieved by acting beneficently.391 Non-maleficence will 
always overpower beneficence when the benefit involves committing a moral crime. 
When harm exceeds benefit it is best to assess whether this harm is unavoidable or 
intentional.392 Yet, the principle of non-maleficence is not absolute and a beneficial 
action will not always take second place to an act of causing harm. According to 
Beauchamp and Childress,393 no rules in ethics favour avoiding harm over providing 
benefit in all circumstances – the authors claim that an order of priority existing 
among the principles is unsustainable. A medical practitioner who acts in accordance 
with this principle needs to follow a number of rules. These five prima facie rules 
include the following: do not kill; do not cause pain or suffering; do not incapacitate; 
do not cause offense; and do not deprive others of the goods of life.394 
The principle of non-maleficence has a direct influence on the kidney transplant 
procedure when a living donor is used. When a kidney transplant is performed, harm 
to the recipient and donor is unavoidable. However, in the case of the recipient his 
harm is justified by the fact that he receives a more functional and beneficial kidney 
by means of living donation. The situation is however somewhat different for the 
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donor – he donates his kidney and by this action is harmed, but he receives no 
medical benefit to justify this action. The question here is, is the donor really 
“harmed”? According to studies done by Dr Thomas Peters, director of the Transplant 
Centre in Jacksonville, Florida, the estimated mortality rate from living kidney 
donation is 3 out of 10  000, and more than 90% of those who have donated a kidney 
and been given proper medical care395 have confirmed that they would go through 
the process again.396  
In the world of modern medicine, harm is sometimes acceptable in order to avoid 
harm. Beauchamp and Childress397 are of opinion that sometimes we have to do 
harm to the body in order to prevent harm. The author supports this argument by 
saying if you weigh up the harm done to the donor by means of the transplant (i.e. 
pain and discomfort for a few weeks) it cannot relate to the harm done to the recipient 
if he does not receive a kidney. One should remember the argument concerning the 
right to human dignity and the question whether a patient that receives renal dialysis 
is living in a dignified manner. If the recipient is in end-stage renal failure he will be 
subjected to the painful and exhausting process of dialysis. The dialysis can only do 
so much for the patient. Eventually, if the patient does not receive a kidney it can lead 
to his death (see the arguments on the right to life). It would be considered narrow-
minded to just focus on the donor. The medical practitioner has two patients – the 
donor and the recipient – and both should be considered.398 Furthermore, this 
argument can be substantiated by referring to the fifth rule of non-maleficence: others 
should not be deprived of the goods of life. If a patient may not receive a kidney 
because the donor has to be harmed during the kidney transplant, both the recipient 
and the donor are harmed (in comparison with only the donor being harmed by the 
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procedure).399 Is it not better to accept a limited amount of harm to the donor, as long 
as it takes place in the interest of the life and health of the recipient?400  
According to Schreiber401 there are four essential preconditions for the permissibility 
of live donors, which represent the maxim of no-harm principles. The following must 
be insured: the risk to the donor must be compared with the need of the recipient, the 
donor must be extensively informed before consenting to the operation, the 
agreement must be made willingly with no form of pressure, and the donation may 
not be made in connection with monetary reimbursement.402 Most medical 
practitioners feel that the removal of a kidney from an individual who has given 
autonomous consent and faces minimum risk is an ethically acceptable action.403 
Thus, the principle to do no harm can be justified by consent; in other words, with the 
principle of respect for autonomy and the constitutional right to self-determination.404 
According to Kleinman and Lowy,405 living kidney donation makes an ethical 
compromise when the donor consents to donate his kidney. At first glance it seems 
as if the principle of non-maleficence prohibits any surgical intervention because of 
the possibility of harm. But, as mentioned previously, non-maleficence cannot be 
assessed without taking into consideration the principle of beneficence.  
4.3.2 Beneficence 
The word “beneficence” literally means well or good (bene) and to do (facere).406 
Beneficence can be defined in different ways. Generally it refers to doing good and 
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the active promotion of goodness, kindness and charity.407 More specifically referred 
to in terms of medical law, it refers to the fact that all medical practitioners have a 
responsibility to provide beneficial treatment and to avoid or minimise harm.408 
Although this principle is of great importance, it does not prescribe that life must be 
preserved at all costs.409 The medical practitioner who makes an oath to “do no harm” 
is not promising never to cause harm but rather that he will try to create a positive 
balance of good over inflicted harms.410 Beneficence imposes a limited duty because 
a medical practitioner has a duty to provide beneficial treatment to any or all of his 
patients, but he has the option of choosing who to admit into his practice.411 However, 
beneficence does impose a number of moral rules. The most general rules include 
protecting and defending the rights of others, preventing harm to others, removing 
conditions that will cause harm to others, helping persons with disabilities, and 
rescuing persons in danger.412  
In order to achieve these obligations, medical practitioners have to commit to three 
prima facie obligations. Firstly, a medical practitioners needs to ensure that he can 
deliver the benefits that he professes. To obtain this, medical practitioners need 
rigorous and effective education and training before and during their professional 
lives.413 Secondly, a medical practitioner needs to ensure that he can offer each 
patient net benefit. This obligation requires a medical practitioner to be clear about 
the risk and probability of harm and benefit when he assesses a patient.414 In the 
context of beneficence it is of high moral importance to be able to supply a high 
probability of benefit, such as a cure for a life-threatening disease. Ensuring that a 
patient is supplied with the various probabilities of benefit or harm, empirical 
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information is needed; which can only be obtained by the last of the prima facie 
obligation – effective medical research.415 
The principle of beneficence has a direct influence on the kidney transplant 
procedure. When performing a kidney transplant, the recipient and donor are harmed 
by the mere fact that surgery is performed on them. However, a donor kidney of the 
highest possible quality is immediately available to be transplanted to the recipient.416 
In this case, the benefit is clearly in favour of the recipient; yet the donor is harmed for 
this benefit.417 The question here is: is it ethically acceptable that the kidney donor 
must be “harmed” without receiving any benefit? When answering this question it 
must be borne in mind that beneficence is not obligatory in some cases. For instance, 
the donation of a kidney is not a moral obligation.418  
There are authors like Gillon that are of the opinion that the net medical benefit 
argument does not work insofar as the donor’s role in the transplant is concerned, 
because the donor takes a risk without any corresponding medical benefit.419 
Followers of this argument base their argument on going back almost 2 500 years to 
the time of Hippocrates. According to the Hippocratic Oath, a medical practitioner 
may only impose harm if he believes that it will produce net medical benefit for that 
particular patient.420 However, the author is of opinion that in the case of the kidney 
donor, the benefit should not be limited to a medical or physical benefit. The kidney 
donor definitely benefits psychologically by means of altruism and, of course, if the 
kidney donor is allowed to be legally remunerated for his donation he also receives a 
financial benefit. It should also be kept in mind that the kidney donor is not “seriously 
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harmed”. This has been shown by various researches.421 The reality of these two 
principles is that one cannot be honoured without violating the other; and this is 
where the doctrine of double effect has to be taken into account.  
4.3.3 The Doctrine of double effect 
The doctrine of double effect was formulated with the purpose that an act may have 
both a good and bad effect, thus a benefit may be regarded as ethical even if some 
harm occurs. As discussed earlier, the principle of non-maleficence and beneficence 
cannot be applied without the one violating the other. However, these two principles 
in relation to a kidney transplant can be applied together if the four requirements of 
the doctrine of double effect are satisfied.  
The first requirement is that the act performed must be good.422 Any form of organ 
donation is regarded as a virtuous act; thus, a kidney transplant is a good act. The 
second requirement is that the good accomplished must be at least as immediate as 
the harm.423 When a kidney transplant procedure is performed, the donor is harmed 
by the transplant. He experiences pain and discomfort. However, these conditions are 
tolerable, will not lead to the death of the donor and will be cured in due time.424 By 
means of the same kidney transplant procedure the recipient of the kidney is helped 
in his critical stage and he receives the benefit of a much better quality of life as 
guaranteed by the constitutional right to life discussed in chapter 2. The donor is also 
not left without any benefit whatsoever – he receives a spiritual and psychological 
benefit.425 Thus, immediacy of good and harm can be proven. The third requirement 
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with a single kidney still have a normal life with no problems. Any decrease in kidney function 
is usually mild. A study was done where kidney donors between the ages of 20 and 37 were 
followed. Most of them had normal function and most problem were the same as for people of 
the same age with two kidneys. Long-term risks to a kidney donor are small. With 
consideration to the surgery, the harm is also minimal; after the removal of the kidney the 
donor may be sore for a few weeks but that is all. This pain may also be less if surgery is done 
through laparoscopy (a small cut). Griffith D “Living with one kidney” www.myoptumhealth.com 
(Date of use: 8 April 2012). 
422  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 162. 
423  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 162. 
424  Kanniyakonil S “The principle of double effect and its relevance in bioethics” 
www.lifeissues.net (Date of use: 10 April 2012). 
425  Kanniyakonil www.lifeissues.net (Date of use: 10 April 2012). 
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is that the intention of both parties must be good.426 Concerning a kidney transplant, 
both the donor and the recipient’s intentions are good. The donor has the intention of 
helping the recipient in his critical stage and the recipient has the intention of 
recovering to be a much healthier person and increasing his quality of life. The final 
requirement is that there must be a proportionate reason for causing the harm.427 
With a kidney transplant there is more than enough substantial reasoning for causing 
the harm. Once again, the donation of the kidney will not cause the death of the 
donor or even serious decrease in the functionality of his kidney. Moreover, a life is 
saved; and if pain and discomfort is weighed up against a life, surely a life must be of 
greater importance? In the medicinal world presently there is a clear equilibrium 
between harm and benefit. The most reasonable approach regarding this matter will 
thus be to look at the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence together. 
 
4.4 JUSTICE 
Justice in general can be defined as “the quality of being fair and reasonable”. 
However, with regard to healthcare, the term justice has a much broader meaning. In 
this sense, justice implies an impartial and fair approach to treatment and the 
distribution of resources.428 Therefore, this definition imposes an obligation on a 
medical practitioner that he is not allowed to discriminate against a patient by allowing 
his personal prejudice to directly influence his work. Various ethical and human-rights 
documents emphasise that discrimination will not be tolerated. It is clearly stated in 
the Bill of Rights that no person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone.429 However, justice in the healthcare context entails more than just not to 
discriminate; it also includes that resources (especially scarce resources) must be 
distributed equally. But equal distribution is easier said than done. There are a 
number of difficulties that arise, such as the unavoidable scarcity of resources and 
                                            
426  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 162. 
427  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 162. 
428  Porter and Rai in Rai (ed) Medical ethics and the elderly 4. 
429  Discrimination is not allowed on one or more of the following grounds: race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. Section 9 of the Constitution.  
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the subsequent conflicts between groups competing for these sources.430 The 
principle of justice, just as its predecessor principles, imposes a number of moral 
rules that have to be followed. These rules include to each person an equal share 
according to his need, effort, contribution and merit.431 
Because justice is such a broad term, the obligations of justice have been divided as 
follows: respect for morally acceptable laws (legal justice), respect for people’s rights 
(rights-based justice) and fair distribution of limited resources (distributive justice).432 
Legal justice entails fairness to patients from a legal perspective. It is therefore 
essential to have a good working knowledge of legislation regarding healthcare.433 
Thus, to uphold this obligation all medical practitioners need to have knowledge of 
and respect for morally acceptable laws regarding healthcare. Rights justice has a 
direct influence on the doctor-patient relationship. To understand rights justice, it is 
important to keep in mind that a right434 may be regarded as an entitlement to 
something. This requires no justification.435 The link between a right and an obligation 
is essential to healthcare, because when one person is entitled to a certain right it 
also means that another person might be obligated to ensure that the person entitled 
to the right enjoys his right. In return, enjoying the privileges of a specific right also 
brings forth an obligation. For example, a patient has a right to confidential treatment 
from his doctor. The doctor has an obligation to treat the patient in this manner, and 
the patient in return must follow the doctor’s advice and comply with the prescribed 
treatment.436  
                                            
430  Porter and Rai in Rai (ed) Medical ethics and the elderly 4. 
431  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 243. 
432  Moodley K, Moosa R and Kling S “Justice” in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human 
rights 73. 
433  Moodley, Moosa and Kling in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human rights 73. 
434  Examples of rights in the healthcare context include the right to healthcare, the right to be seen 
on time and the right to a certain standard of healthcare. In South Africa these rights are based 
on the Patients’ Rights Charter, which in turn is based on the Bill of Rights (chapter 2) of the 
Constitution. Moodley, Moosa and Kling in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human rights 
74. 
435  Moodley, Moosa and Kling in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human rights 74. 
436  Moodley, Moosa and Kling in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human rights 74. 
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Distributive justice is probably the most important obligation regarding a kidney 
transplant. Distributive justice is defined by Beauchamp and Childress437 as fair, 
equitable and appropriate distribution in society determined by justified norms that 
structure the terms of social cooperation. Thus, concerning distributive justice, all 
conflicting claims must be treated fairly or just – especially in the context of scare 
resources.438 The TAC-case discussed earlier is a perfect example of distributive 
justice. 
In relation to a kidney transplant there is an overwhelming disagreement over what 
exactly constitutes fair treatment. Most authors, such as Gillon, agree that fair 
behaviour constitutes treating people as equals. Yet this cannot be applied to kidney 
transplants. It will not be fair to give a kidney to everyone in the population, since 
everybody does not need a donor kidney to survive.439 It will, however, be better to 
follow the approach that people have to be treated equally in a morally relevant 
manner. According to this approach, persons with an equal need for kidneys should 
receive kidneys equally when available.440  
In the context of kidney transplants, a number of issues of justice may arise – such as 
the number of resources that should be allowed to go into this type of treatment and 
the fair allocation of donor kidneys. With all forms of medical treatment there is 
always the question of how much of the available resources should be put into a 
specific kind of treatment. Neither a kidney transplant nor dialysis is regarded as 
primary healthcare in South Africa. The majority of citizens are of the opinion that 
there are a lot of other factors in the healthcare context that are more important than 
treatment for a patient with end-stage renal failure. However, prioritising does take 
place concerning patients who make use of dialysis treatment.  
                                            
437  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 241.  
438  Gillon in Thomasma and Kushner (eds) From birth to death 113. 
439  Gillon in Thomasma and Kushner (eds) From birth to death 113. 
440  Gillon in Thomasma and Kushner (eds) From birth to death 113. 
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In the Soobramoney case,441 the court decided that it was legitimate to adopt 
guidelines to determine who should receive dialysis treatment. In this case it was 
agreed that, by using dialysis machines in accordance with guidelines, more patients 
(who complied with the guidelines) would benefit than would be the case if they were 
used to keep patients (who did not comply with the guidelines) with chronic renal 
failure alive. Prioritising the treatment is more beneficial because it is directed at 
curing patients and not simply maintaining the chronically ill. It should be emphasised 
that, even in the most advances countries access to life-prolonging treatment is 
rationed.442  
The next concern regarding the principles of justice is the fair allocation of donor 
kidneys. Two questions arise in this regard: firstly, about the process of contributing 
kidneys, and secondly regarding the process of allocating kidneys. The first (the 
contribution of kidneys) was discussed in the context of the principles of non-
maleficence and beneficence, and will not be repeated here. The second process 
(the allocation of kidneys) takes place in accordance with guidelines. These 
guidelines prescribe a “gentleman’s agreement” that entails that one donor kidney 
goes to the state and one donor kidney goes to the private medical sector.443  
The prioritising of donor kidneys does not always seem fair; yet it is justified because 
of the scarcity of kidneys and resource constraints in South Africa. However, if the 
current justice system cannot provide because of the resource constraint, an 
alternative that can be regarded as constitutionally acceptable should be given. 
Justice is an integral part of the healthcare system, and the best way to make sure 
                                            
441  This case will only be discussed briefly in this chapter, since it was discussed in full in chapter 
2 regarding the right to access to healthcare. 
442  In South Africa, there is a prioritisation policy that divides patients with end-stage renal failure 
into three categories regarding dialysis treatment. Category 1 patients must be accommodated 
on the dialysis and transplant programme. Resources will always be found to treat these 
patients. Category 2 patients will only be accommodated on the programme if resources allow. 
Category 2 patients are also further prioritised according to who has waited the longest and 
who has the best chance of a good outcome. Category 3 patients will be offered optimal 
conservative treatment and will not be offered renal transplant therapy.  
443  Allocation of donor kidneys were discussed in section 3.3 (the assessment process regarding 
kidney donation). 
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that justice is present in the kidney transplant programme is to rely on the words of 
Aristotle – “giving to each that which is his due”. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to examine whether kidney sales would be acceptable if 
measured against bioethical perspectives. After discussing the four principles of 
bioethics it is clear that all four principles have an undeniable influence on a kidney 
transplant and that a kidney transplant is bioethically acceptable. The four principles 
also have an undeniable link with regard to the constitutional rights discussed in 
chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
However, this is only the author’s opinion. A person’s opinion regarding the matter of 
bioethical acceptability and kidney transplants can differ according to how much 
weight or importance that person gives to one moral principle when it is in conflict 
with another principle (such as in the case of the principles of non-maleficence and 
beneficence). A person’s view of bioethical perspectives can also be influenced by his 
opinion of whether the selling of donor kidneys is acceptable or not. This matter will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 – TO SELL A KIDNEY OR NOT: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST 
THE SELLING OF HUMAN KIDNEYS 
“The aim of argument, or of discussion, should not be victory, but progress.”444 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Many people profess how the procedure of organ transplants is one of the most 
miraculous discoveries in the world of medicine. This much is true, but what use is it if 
there are no organs available for transplant purposes? Presently in South Africa there 
is an acute shortage of available donor kidneys – in 2010 only 244 recipients 
received kidneys. These lucky few only represent about 1% of the community who 
need a donor kidney to survive.445 The South African Dialysis and Transplant Registry 
estimates that approximately 21 000 South Africans experience kidney failure. Of 
these, only 5 000 receive treatment;446 leaving more than 15 000 without treatment 
because of a lack of donor kidneys and an insufficient number of dialysis 
machines.447 South Africa has made numerous attempts to improve this situation, but 
none of these methods have been successful and there has been no improvement in 
the current situation.  
Currently in South Africa is it illegal to sell your kidney. If a person is caught trying to 
sell his kidney, he can be held liable for the payment of a fine or imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding five years or both a fine and imprisonment.448 The selling of 
kidneys has developed from a concept only known to the black market into something 
that is causing debate in almost every country – as the only solution to improve the 
number of available donor kidneys. Illegal transplants presently occur in countries 
such as India, Turkey, China, Russia and South Africa.449 In 1999 someone 
                                            
444  Quote by Joseph Joubert, French moralist and essayist, www.quoteland.com (Date of use: 16 
April 2012). 
445  Organ Donor Foundation www.odf.org.za (Date of use: 16 April 2012). 
446  Treatment mainly refers to dialysis, which is only an interim measure that is used until a 
transplant is performed. Molakeng S “15 000 wait for donated organs” 
http://www.hst.org.za/news/15-000-wait-donated-organs (Date of use: 16 April 2012). 
447  Molakeng http://www.hst.org.za (Date of use: 16 April 2012). 
448  Section 60(5) of the National Health Act of 2003. 
449  Friedman and Friedman 2006 Kidney International 961. 
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attempted to sell his kidney on eBay. The bidding reached approximately $5,7 million 
before eBay intervened and had the advertisement removed.450 This is not the only 
example of such an incident: one only has to log onto Google and type in the words 
“kidney for sale”, and you will be amazed at how many individuals are willing to sell 
their kidneys. All these desperate attempts to sell kidneys demonstrate the high 
demand that exist for the legalising of kidney sales. Yet there are still people that 
argue that the legal sale of kidneys is unjustified. In this chapter there will be a 
discussion of the arguments for and opposing the selling of kidneys.451 
 
5.2 ARGUMENTS THAT OPPOSE THE SELLING OF DONOR KIDNEYS 
Kidney sales are a very controversial matter, and because of this there have 
developed various arguments supporting and opposing the legalisation of kidney 
sales. The main arguments opposing the selling of donor kidneys will follow below. 
5.2.1 Exploitation of the poor by the rich would occur452 
Opponents of the sale of kidneys are of the opinion that if kidney sales are legalised, 
only the rich will benefit, since only they will be able to afford a kidney. In this case, 
organ allocations will be based on wealth and not on need.453 In the author’s opinion 
there are three possible responses to this argument. Firstly, the treatment of end-
stage renal failure is high, regardless of the recipient’s financial situation. A kidney 
transplant itself may be a costly procedure (costing as much as R250 000)454 but 
                                            
450  Richardson T “Man tries to sell vital organ on eBay” 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/1999/09/03/man_tries_to_sell_vital/ (Date of use: 18 April 2012). 
In 2011, a man once again tried to sell his kidney on Craigslist for $75,000 
http://www.wayodd.com/kidney-for-sale-on-craigslist-for-75000-v/9736 (Date of use: 18 April 
2012). In 2012, one of the leading classified websites known as Dubizzle.com had to remove 
yet another kidney-for-sale advertisement. The kidney was advertised as in a flawless 
condition and was available for Dh200,000 Kapur V “Another kidney goes on sale on 
Dubizzle.com” www.emirates247.com/news/emirates/another-kidney-goes-on-sale-on-dubizzle 
-com-2012-01-25 (Date of use: 18 April 2012). 
451  This chapter will only entail a short discussion of the arguments for and against the selling of 
kidneys, since authors such as Prof. Slabbert has already discussed this concept in depth. 
452  Kleinsmidt A and Moosa MR “Organ transplant ethics” in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and 
human rights 286. 
453  Herring J Medical law and ethics 388. 
454  The amount of R250 000 includes the ImmunoPro Rx medication that must be taken in the first 
three months. After the procedure, the costs of a kidney transplant is approximately R10 000 
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renal dialysis455 may exceed this cost, making a transplant the better option.456 
According to Prof. Tony Meyers, the National Kidney Foundation’s chairperson, 
kidney disease is one of the most expensive diseases to treat.457 Secondly, it may be 
unfair; but in reality the rich already have access to quicker and higher-quality 
medical treatment than the poor.458 Furthermore, in some cases the rich already buy 
kidneys from the black market and thus, with or without being legally allowed to 
obtain a kidney in this manner, they do – leading to the rich being in the position to 
get a kidney before the poor in any case. Lastly, if the poor are allowed to sell a 
kidney they are not exploited. On the contrary, they are given an opportunity to get 
themselves out of poverty.459 By legalising the sale of kidneys, the poor will have an 
additional choice to change their financially disadvantaged situation. The author 
would like to emphasise that if a person is allowed to sell a kidney, the option alone 
does not force him to do so – it only gives him an additional option to improve his 
circumstances instead of taking another opportunity away. 
5.2.2 Informed consent cannot exist where payment is an undue inducement 
Opponents of kidney sales are concerned that people who sell their kidneys will be 
driven to do so by poverty. It has been suggested that if a person sells his kidney out 
of desperation, his consent is regarded as invalid.460 There are two possible 
responses to this argument. Firstly, if kidney sales are allowed it will most probably be 
lawfully regulated. Thus, one will only be allowed to sell one’s kidney after giving 
proper consent.461 Secondly, it can be questioned whether being driven to act out of 
                                                                                                                                         
per annum as opposed to renal dialysis of R200 000 per annum. Information supplied by Prof 
RS Britz (rsbritz@gmail.com) (29/04/2012). 
455  Renal dialysis costs the government more or less R200 000 per patient per year. De Klerk A 
“A simple answer to kidney disease” http://www.mg.co.za/article/2011-04-04 (Date of use: 19 
April 2012). According to Nurse R du Toit, a nurse at Medi-Clinic Upington, renal dialysis can 
costs from R40 000 to R60 000 per month for a private patient. It must be borne in mind that 
dialysis is not a cure for end-stage renal failure. 
456  Molakeng www.hst.org.za (Date of use: 18 April 2012). 
457  De Klerk http://www.mg.co.za/article/2011-04-04 (Date of use: 19 April 2012). 
458  Herring Medical law and ethics 388. 
459  Murphy SR “Eight ethical objections to an organ market and why they’re wrong” 
http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/murphy-s2.html (Date of use: 19 April 2012). 
460  Herring Medical law and ethics 388. 
461  Herring Medical law and ethics 388. 
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poverty can be regarded as coercion.462 The simple answer is no: lacking wealth 
does not pre-empt making rational decisions.463 If a person sells his kidney, his 
autonomy is not infringed; rather the opposite: this person is given a choice (he is not 
forced) to improve his financial situation. 
5.2.3 Selling a kidney is an affront to human dignity 
One of the strongest arguments of the opponents of kidney sales is that selling a 
kidney is a devaluation of the body and human life.464 Pope John Paul II supports this 
argument. He is of the opinion that buying and selling organs violates “the dignity of 
the human person”.465 Some argue that this is a valid argument, seeing that the 
commercialisation of the human body will reduce the human body to a mere net 
worth. Others feel that this argument is a very vague notion and it is difficult to identify 
the precise harm that it can cause.466 Gill and Sade467 are of opinion that even if a 
kidney is for sale it does not render the donor incapable of exercising free will. This 
will only happen if the body part for sale is a necessity for continued existence (which 
a kidney is not). Gill and Sade468 take this argument even further and state that a 
person’s kidney is not his humanity. Humanity is what gives humans their dignity and 
intrinsic value; thus their ability to make rational decisions. In the author’s opinion, 
whether the selling of a kidney is an affront to human dignity or not should be looked 
at in perspective and not in isolation. The arguments regarding the constitutional right 
to human dignity should also be borne in mind when one has to decide whether 
selling a kidney is an affront to human dignity or not. It should be compared as such: 
which is a worse offence to human dignity – selling a kidney or letting someone die of 
renal failure because there are not enough kidneys available?  
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466  Herring Medical law and ethics 390.  
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5.2.4 Poor people will undergo risky procedures out of financial desperation 
Another argument often stated is that people living in poverty will take the risk of a 
selling a kidney out of financial desperation. The truth is that people do a lot worse to 
escape and prevent poverty. In West Africa, the majority of parents living in poverty 
have no other choice than to sell their children into slavery for as little as $20 a year 
per child.469 This act cannot even compare to selling one’s kidney. In this situation, 
children’s lives are destroyed simply to avoid poverty. People are more than willing to 
live a life of crime to escape poverty. For example, women (and men) who experience 
poverty often turn to prostitution; others may start to steal or even murder merely to 
survive. In the author’s opinion the above examples cannot even begin to compare to 
selling one’s kidney. In all the examples, people destroy their lives and self-worth to 
avoid poverty. Selling a kidney to avoid poverty will not destroy a person’s life or self-
worth. Furthermore, all these examples include two parties who are harmed: the 
person who commits the crime and the person affected by the crime. As previously 
discussed, selling a kidney does not harm a person and neither is another party 
affected by it. 
5.2.5 Public opinion 
It has been suggested that the public is so revolted by the idea of selling kidneys that 
the law should match this strong opposition.470 However, statistics suggest that this 
may not be the case. One survey found that between 40 and 50% of those 
questioned thought it should be permissible to pay for organs.471 In another survey, 
the voters were asked, “should people be able to sell human organs?” Only 18% of 
the voters felt that one should never be able to sell their organs. In contrast, almost 
65% voted that people should be allowed to sell their organs.472 Another example that 
                                            
469  Sheil M “Children sold as slaves in West Africa” http://www.abcnews.go.com 
/WNTstory?id=131004&page=1#.T5khmntniQyw (Date of use: 19 April 2012). 
470  Herring Medical law and ethics 389. 
471  Herring Medical law and ethics 389. 
472  A total of 4 934 voters took place in the survey. The results were the following: a) Yes without 
restriction of regulation – 21% (1 066 votes); b) Yes but closely regulated – 44% (2 172 votes); 
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104 
 
people are not revolted by the idea of kidney sales can be seen in a debate that took 
place before a capacity crowd at the Asia Society and Museum in New York. By the 
end of the debate, those who favoured the selling of organs went from 44% to 60%, 
whereas those opposed to it only changed from 27% to 31%.473 
 
5.3 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF SELLING KIDNEYS 
5.3.1 A competent person has the right to make informed decisions about their body 
parts474 
A lot of authors in favour of kidney sales substantiate their argument by emphasising 
autonomy.475 As mentioned in the previous chapters, respect for autonomy and the 
right to self-determination is of great importance in the whole process of kidney 
transplants. By not allowing kidney sales, the autonomy of a person is ignored, 
because if sales are not allowed the donor cannot exercise his autonomy and decide 
whether or not he would like to sell his kidney. Supporters of this argument are of the 
opinion that it is not only ethical to sell a kidney but a right, because it is their body 
and their life – they have the right to decide what to do with both.476 In the opinion of 
Friedman,477 individuals are in control of their own body parts, even to the point of 
inducing risks to their health. It should be borne in mind that if a person is in control of 
his body, it automatically implies that he owns his body. Thus, if you own something 
you should be permitted to sell it if you wish. The current situation, however, is that 
                                                                                                                                         
votes); and e) I don’t know/don’t care – 3% (161 votes). Cline A “Is it ethical to let organs be 
sold on the open market?” http://www.atheism.about.com/library/ (Date of use: 20 April 2012). 
473  This debate was attended by leading persons in the transplant community, such as Amy 
Friedman, Lloyd Cohen and James Childress. Knox R “Should we legalize the market for 
human organs?” http://www.npr.org/tenplates/story/ story.php?storyId=90632108 (Date of use: 
20 April 2012). 
474  Kleinsmidt and Moosa in Moodley (ed) Medical ethics, law and human rights 286. 
475  Matas AJ “The case for living kidney sales: Rationale, objections and concerns” 2004 (4) 
American Journal of Transplantation 2009. 
476  Savulescu J “Biotechnology; ethics and the free markets” http://www.practicalethicsnews.com 
/practicalethics/2008/06/setting-a-minim (Date of use: 20 April 2012).  
477  Friedman AL “Payment for living organ donation should be legalized” 2006 (333) British 
Medical Journal 747. 
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there is no ownership rights regarding the human body, and the legalisation of kidney 
sales could only occur if these rights exist.478 
5.3.2 Permitting the selling of kidneys has a number of benefits479 
There are a number of benefits that will occur if kidney sales are allowed. A donor will 
benefit financially from the sale of a kidney.480 As mentioned by the arguments 
against the selling of kidneys, the financial benefit that a donor receives could help 
him to escape or prevent poverty. Prohibiting the poor from selling a kidney still 
leaves them in the same situation – poor. If the possibility of being paid for a kidney is 
not permissible, it eliminates the chances for the poor to improve their financial 
situation.481 Arguments in favour of a financial incentive is based on the possibility 
that such a system would increase the supply of kidneys; thus saving lives that may 
otherwise be lost due to the lack of available kidneys.482 Financial incentives will most 
likely induce people to act as donors who would otherwise not have done so. Another 
way of looking at the financial incentive is that it will not decrease the current number 
of kidney donations.483  
Thus, from the above it is clear that both the donor and the recipient will benefit from 
legalising kidney sales. Currently, the donor is the only person involved in the 
transplant process who does not receive a benefit. The recipient receives a kidney 
and his quality of life is increased; the medical practitioners involved receive 
remuneration for their services; but the donor – who in reality offers up a kidney – 
does not receive a benefit. Furthermore, it can be argued that in the case of the 
public sector the state will also receive a benefit from legalising kidney sales: they will 
save money. As previously mentioned, kidney dialysis is a very costly treatment. If 
the government is allowed to buy kidneys, they can save money on dialysis by rather 
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offering a patient a kidney transplant in the place of renal dialysis. Therefore, it is 
clear that legalising the sales of kidneys is a win-win situation for the kidney donor, 
recipient and the public sector.  
5.3.3 Society allows persons to make informed decisions about other risky 
activities484 
Arguments against the sale of kidneys propose that people living in poverty are so 
desperate that they will undergo risky procedures. Yet, society has no problem with 
the fact that people are already allowed to make informed decisions about risk-
associated activities. Currently, there is the practice of payment for drug tests on 
human subjects. It is mostly wealthy people who sign up to be subjects of these tests. 
The tests are described as unpleasant, inconvenient and not free of risk.485 It is 
possible to implement standards that offer satisfactory protection to test subjects, and 
as long as these standards are met it is considered acceptable to be paid as a 
subject of a drug test.486 Furthermore, it seems that the benefits of drug testing are 
considerable. But kidney sales can be analogous to drug testing, since the benefits of 
kidney sales are considerable, and proper regulation can ensure satisfactory 
protection for the kidney donor. Yet the sale of kidneys (but not drug testing) is 
frowned upon.  
Another example of allowed risky activity is people who sign up for military services. 
Military service is known to be dangerous, but one is allowed to have a force made up 
of “paid volunteers”.487 In the case of military services, it is allowed to pay people to 
participate in a high-risk activity; and it is well known that many enlistees are from the 
lower end of the economic spectrum.488 Yet, once again people are not allowed to 
take the risk of selling their kidneys if they suffer of poverty. Other examples of 
activities that people are allowed to participate in, even though there is an undeniable 
risk involved, are skydiving, smoking, working on an oil rig and refusing medical 
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treatment. It can also be argued that other practises of the poor to make money are 
distasteful, for instance cleaning toilets or other hard labour. Yet these activities are 
not outlawed. Why is the selling of kidneys outlawed then?489 
5.3.4 The demand for a black market will be diminished 
Because the sale of kidneys is currently illegal and the need for kidneys is so big, it 
has led to the existence of an underground black market.490 The problem with a black 
market is that the kidney transplants are done in secret, which usually involve poor 
and dangerous conditions. In this case the donor has no legal recourse (e.g. if he 
does not get paid or if he suffers complications) because his conduct is illegal. If 
kidney sales are legalised, the kidney donor will be allowed to enter into a legal 
contract and thus be allowed to take legal action if he is not remunerated. He can 
also seek medical help if complications related to the procedure arise. Furthermore, if 
kidney sales are legalised the black market will slowly start to diminish because there 
will no longer be a need for it. Many practices that were once frowned upon are now 
acceptable. The world and everything in it is changing constantly.  
After discussing all the arguments that oppose and support legalising the sale of 
kidneys it is clear that the best option would be the legalisation of kidney sales.  
5.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter sought to examine the arguments in favour of and against the selling of 
human kidneys. The passing of time leads to inevitable changes of what is seen as 
acceptable by the community. The law is designed to govern. Society’s moral 
compass is not set in stone – it is ever fluctuating – and the law needs to take heed of 
these developments. After discussing all the arguments that oppose and support the 
legalisation of kidneys sales, it is clear that the best option would be the legalisation 
thereof. In South Africa, the possibility of remunerating the kidney donor can easily 
change from a possibility to a reality if section 60(4)(a) of the National Health Act is 
                                            
489  Gill and Sade 2002 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 35. 
490  Slabbert 2008 KOERS 76. 
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implemented in the correct manner.491 This section could be the first step in the 
direction of legalising kidney sales in South Africa. It should be borne in mind that 
altruism is not erased if a person sells his kidney. In the case where a parent sells his 
kidney to take care of his children or to improve their living conditions it is still an 
altruistic act. Very rarely will a person sell his kidney to increase his own 
happiness.492 The author wants to emphasise that the position of not selling kidneys 
has not stopped the illegal buying and selling of organs. The reality is that the black 
market is flourishing, because it is the only resort for people who have been on 
waiting lists for ages and are busy dying.  
All the arguments that oppose kidney sales are already true – nothing can change 
that. But by regulating kidney sales all the negative effects of the illegal kidney sales, 
such as exploitation and the poor quality of medical treatment, can be improved. The 
main argument that should be borne in mind is that by giving people the option to sell 
their kidneys does not force them to do so. They still have a choice. It can be 
deduced from the arguments against the selling of kidney that most of the arguments 
are based on emotions or morals. People are clearly not aware of the dire need for 
kidneys. There may be a disagreement regarding whether kidney sales should be 
allowed or not. Nevertheless, there is no disagreement when it comes to the shortage 
of kidneys in South Africa and the world. The real question is not whether a market 
for human organs or other bodily tissues should exist; it already does.493 The question 
is rather how we can develop the current market to benefit the patients who are in 
dire need of kidneys. 
South Africa should seek guidance from abroad on how to improve its current 
situation. In the following chapter, the author will look at the transplantation legislation 
in Singapore and Iran for international guidance. 
                                            
491  Section 60(4)(a) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 stipulates that it is an offence for a 
person who has donated tissue, a gamete, blood or a blood product to receive any form of 
financial or other reward for such donation, except for the reimbursement of reasonable costs 
incurred by him or her to provide such donation (own emphasis). 
492  Herring Medical law and ethics 389. 
493  Matthews M “Have a heart, but pay for it” http://www.organselling.com/expert (Date of use: 21 
April 2012). 
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CHAPTER 6 – A MICRO-COMPARISON WITH THE TRANSPLANT LEGISLATION 
OF SINGAPORE AND IRAN 
“The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, 
the image of its own future”494 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
If one was to draw a comparison between certain countries in terms of the number of 
kidney donations, the difference is startling. For instance, South Africa only averages 
9,2 kidney donations per one million people,495 whereas a country such as Iran, which 
allows payment for living-donor kidneys and has one of the most successful kidney 
transplant programmes in its region, boasts with 28 kidney donations per one million 
people.496 It is a reality that the need for viable donor kidneys just keeps on 
increasing while the supply of viable donor kidneys has almost stagnated or 
decreased in the majority of countries. These statistics illustrate that South Africa has 
to take extreme measures that are constitutionally acceptable to improve its number 
of kidney donations.  
In chapter 2 of this dissertation it was established that the legalisation of kidney sales 
could be regarded as constitutionally acceptable; yet the National Health Act prohibits 
a person from receiving any form of financial or other reward for a kidney donation, 
except for the reimbursement of costs associated with the donation.497 To make 
matters worse, South Africa has no case law to rely on to support the legalisation of 
kidney sales. Consequently, if South Africa wants to improve its current kidney 
donation rate it should seek guidance from abroad. Section 39(1) of the Constitution 
stipulates that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, international law must be 
                                            
494  Marx K “A contribution to the criticism of political economy” www.marxist.org (Date of use: 24 
April 2012). 
495  It should also be mentioned that the current estimate for renal dialysis in South Africa is 70 per 
one million people. Bowa K “Editorial on live donor renal transplantation in South Africa” 2011 
Annals of African Medicine 131. 
496  Khosroshahi HT “Short history about renal transplantation program in Iran and the world: 
Special focus on world kidney day” 2012 (1) Journal of Nephropathology 6. 
497  Section 60(4)(a) of the National Health Act. 
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considered and foreign law may be considered.498 This chapter draws a comparison 
between legislation in Singapore and Iran pertaining to kidney donations and how 
these legislative provisions could be applicable to South Africa.499 
6.2 SINGAPORE AND KIDNEY DONATIONS 
The Republic of Singapore is a city, state and country all in one; situated at the 
southernmost tip of the Malay Peninsula, and has a population of approximately 5,8 
million people.500 Just as South Africa boasts with the fact that its cultures represent a 
rainbow nation, Singapore is also a melting pot of cultures, which include Malay, 
Chinese, Indian and European. The diversity in culture leads to a whole range of 
religions, such as Buddhist, Taoism, Christian, Catholic, Muslim and Hindu. South 
Africa and Singapore share a number of similarities, but there is one main aspect that 
separates them – Singapore is a developed country whereas South Africa is a 
developing country.  
Singapore performed its first kidney transplant in 1970. At that time, their kidney 
donations were still based on a voluntary system.501 Singapore enjoyed great 
success with kidney transplants during that era, but needless to say the number of 
kidney donations was insufficient due to the fact that kidneys were harvested from 
individuals who voluntary agreed to be kidney donors. From 1970 to 1988, only 85 
deceased kidney transplants occurred.502 In June 1987, in an effort to remedy the 
kidney shortage, Singapore adopted the Human Organ Transplant Act.503 The HOTA 
and the various amendment acts that followed had an immense impact on 
Singapore’s kidney donations. 
                                            
498  Section 39(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution. 
499  It should be borne in mind that due to the sheer magnitude of information on legislation at an 
international level, this dissertation is restricted to provide only certain information relevant to 
this discussion. 
500  Heng J “Singapore’s population hits 5.18 million as at end June” 
www.stratstimes.com/Breakingnews (Date of use: 25 April 2012). 
501  Fitzgibbons SR “Cadaveric organ donation and consent: A comparative analysis of the United 
States, Japan and China” 1999 (73) Journal of International and Comparative Law 93. 
502  Vathsala A and Khuan YC “Renal transplantation in Singapore” 2009 (38) Annals Academy of 
Medical Singapore 292. 
503  Human Organ Transplant Act of 1987, hereinafter referred to as HOTA. See Fitzgibbons 1999 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 93.  
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6.2.1 The HOTA and presumed consent 
Internationally, two main systems for organ procurement are recognised, namely the 
system of “opting in” and “opting out” (also known as presumed consent). In terms of 
the opting-in system that is followed by South Africa, a person who wishes to become 
an organ donor must explicitly express his consent to have his organs removed prior 
to or after death.504 The opting-in system allows a person to exercise his 
constitutional right to freedom of self-determination by giving his consent. It will be 
considered unlawful if an organ is removed without the donor’s consent.505 
Singapore, on the other hand, follows the system of “opting out”. This system is one 
of the biggest changes that were brought on by the HOTA to improve the organ 
shortage. In terms of the opting-out system everyone is regarded as an organ donor 
unless they explicitly revoke their consent. Thus, if a person does not revoke his 
consent by registering his objection with the Director of Medical Services,506 he will be 
regarded as an organ donor.507  
When the HOTA was first implemented in Singapore, section 5(2)(a) to (e) stipulated 
that all Singapore citizens and permanent residents, excluding Muslims, who were 
between the ages of 21 and 60 years old and of sound mind would be regarded as 
organ donors. The Amendment Act of 2008 that was implemented on 1 August 2008 
changed the position a bit. The “opting-out” system then included all Muslim 
residents, and if a Muslim did not want to be an organ donor he would have to revoke 
his consent.508  
One year later, the Amendment Act of 2009 changed the position once again, and the 
60 year and older age limit was removed.509 Presently, section 5(2)(a) to (e) of the 
HOTA stipulates that all Singapore citizens and permanent residents over the age of 
21 years who are of sound mind will be regarded as organ donors unless a person 
                                            
504  For more information regarding the South African “opting-in” system see Slabbert and 
Oosthuizen 2007 Obiter 45. 
505  Fourie Organ procurement 37. 
506  Section 5(2)(a) of the Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2008. 
507  Slabbert and Oosthuizen 2007 Obiter 45. 
508  The Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2008. 
509  The Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2009. 
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explicitly revokes his consent. The introduction of the opting-out system lead to an 
increase of kidney transplants between 1988 and 2004 – 664 deceased-donor kidney 
transplants were performed, yielding an average of 41,4 deceased-donor kidney 
transplants yearly.510  
There was also a slight increase in living-donor kidney transplants. A total of 233 
kidney transplants were performed, yielding an average of 14 living-donor kidney 
transplants yearly.511 It must be borne in mind that a living-donor kidney transplant 
has a much higher success rate and is more beneficial for the kidney recipient.512 The 
abovementioned kidney statistics of 1988 to 2004 clearly illustrate that the opting-out 
system does not have much of an effect on living-donor kidney transplants. Kidney 
transplant rates progressively started to decrease from 2004, and the HOTA had to 
be amended once again to ensure more kidney transplants. The Amendment Act of 
2009 initiated the reimbursement of living donors in accordance with international and 
local ethical practices.513  
6.2.2 The HOTA and the reimbursement of living donors 
In Singapore, almost 300 patients suffer from end-stage renal failure yearly. The 
country has the fifth highest incidence of kidney failure in the world, with 20,1% 
Singaporeans suffering from hypertension, and an additional 8,2% suffering from 
diabetes.514 Singapore’s first attempt to increase their kidney donation rates was to 
change their voluntary system to a presumed consent system. The change of an 
organ procurement system, however, did not have an immense effect on living-donor 
kidney transplants. Consequently, it was decided that more serious steps needed to 
be taken in order to increase the number of living-donor kidneys – the reimbursement 
of living kidney donors, as stipulated in the HOTA Amendment Act of 2009. Section 
14(3)(c)(i) stipulates that the living donor may be reimbursed for costs that may be 
                                            
510  Vathsala and Khuan 2009 Annals Academy of Medical Singapore 293. 
511  Vathsala and Khuan 2009 Annals Academy of Medical Singapore 292. 
512  For the benefits of living kidney transplants, please see section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 of this 
dissertation, as well as footnote 421. 
513  Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2009. 
514  The National Kidney Foundation (Singapore) “Haemodialysis” http://www.nkfs.org (Date of 
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incurred by him in relation to the removal, transportation, preparation, preservation, 
quality control or storage of a kidney.515 Section 14(3)(c)(ii) stipulates further costs 
that may be reimbursed, such as the costs or expenses (including the costs of travel, 
accommodation, domestic help or child care) or loss of earnings as far as are 
reasonably or directly attributable to the donor supplying his kidney.516 Lastly, section 
14(3) (c)(iii) stipulates that the donor will be reimbursed for any short-term or long-
term medical care or insurance protection that may reasonably be necessary as a 
consequence of the donor supplying his kidney.517  
Before the Amendment of the HOTA, payment of any kind to an organ donor was 
prohibited. Thus, the implementation of reimbursement for the living kidney donor 
sparked a lot of controversy under the Singaporeans as well as the WHO. Critics of 
the reimbursement had two main concerns: Firstly, they were concerned that the 
reimbursement may open the “back door” to organ trading.518 The Amendment Act of 
2009, however, prevented the increase in organ trading by increasing the penalties 
for organ-trading syndicates and middlemen.519 Secondly, there was the concern that 
the reimbursement lacks caps and detailed formulae for assessing losses. The 
Minister of Health was of the opinion that he preferred not to make the Act too 
technical, as he wanted to prevent the reimbursement from turning into an 
inducement.520 The Minister of Health decided that an inducement could be 
prevented as long as the amount of reimbursement was not too high. The 
government’s view was that the reimbursement of verifiable and reasonable 
expenses of the kidney transplant could not constitute a payment for a kidney, and 
that it should rather be viewed as part of the legitimate costs of treating the patient.521  
The government also mentioned that the reimbursement to donors actually “rights a 
wrong”. The HOTA then took a further step in terms of the Act’s vagueness, and 
                                            
515  Section 14(3) (c)(i) of the Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2009. 
516  Section 14 (3)(c)(ii) of the Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2009. 
517  Section 14 (3)(c)(iii) of the Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2009. 
518  Kin LM “Reimbursement of living organ donors” http://www.hpm.org (Date of use: 28 April 
2012). 
519  Section 14(2) of the Human Organ Transplant (Amendment) Act 2009. 
520  Kin http://www.hpm.org (Date of use: 28 April 2012). 
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instated a hospital ethics committee requirement. According to section 15B (2) of the 
HOTA, every transplant ethics committee will consist of not less than three persons, 
of whom at least one shall be a medical practitioner with no connection to the 
hospital, and one shall be a lay person. The purpose of the transplant ethics 
committee is to assess and give its written authorisation for a living kidney transplant 
to be carried out.522 The transplant ethics committee plays a very important role when 
it comes to verifying that the donor is not being coerced, financially induced or 
emotionally pressured.523 The transplant ethics committees work according to 
guidelines, and the members of the committee have to undergo training in medical 
ethics and they are subjected to close regular audits.524  
The reimbursements of kidney transplants are primarily done by the organ recipients. 
According to the Minister of Health, the issues of equity are addressed by having the 
rich subsidise the poor in obtaining their kidneys. The National Kidney Foundation 
also launched a $10-million kidney living-donor support fund in November 2009 to 
provide financial assistance to live kidney donors.525 By April 2010, the National 
Kidney Fund had already reimbursed five kidney donors for their medical expenses 
and loss of income from donating a kidney.526 Additional voluntary welfare 
organisations have also expressed interest in giving ad hoc financial assistance.527 
Singapore currently has approximately 22 kidney donations per one million people. 
Their rates are higher than that of surrounding areas such as Malaysia (4,5 kidney 
donations per one million people), Philippines (8 kidney donations per one million 
people) or Hong Kong (9,6 kidney donations per one million people).528 The statistics 
are a clear indication that Singapore’s legislative initiatives have increased their 
living-donor kidney transplant rates.  
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South Africa has a lack of constitutional guidance and case law regarding kidney 
donations. The Constitution states that South Africa must seek guidance from 
International Law, and thus Singapore would be the perfect example to follow due to 
the cultural and religious similarities of South Africa and Singapore.529 The National 
Health Act already stipulates in section 60(4)(a) that the donor may be reimbursed for 
the reasonable costs incurred by him to provide an organ. However, in South Africa it 
has not yet been decided what will be regarded as reasonable costs and who will be 
responsible for these reasonable costs. South African legislators could take a look at 
section 14(3)(c)(i) to (iii) of the HOTA and also reimburse kidney donors for direct 
expenses incurred as a result of the donation, such as transport and accommodation, 
as well as indirect expenses, such as loss of earnings and future expenses for the 
costs of long-term care of the donor and all medical follow-up costs. Furthermore 
South African legislators could also seek guidance from the Declaration of Istanbul on 
Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism530 that states that comprehensive 
reimbursement of the actual documented costs of a kidney donation does not 
constitute a payment but is rather part of the legitimate costs of treating the kidney 
recipient. The Istanbul declaration also recommends that the reimbursement should 
be made by the party responsible for the costs of treating the kidney recipient such as 
the health department of the government. The Istanbul declaration also clearly states 
what expenses may be reimbursed.531 It should be borne in mind that the donor has 
the choice to accept the reimbursement or not. He is in no way obliged to accept the 
reimbursement, and can still donate his kidney altruistically.  
South Africa could also establish a transplant ethics committee to evaluate whether a 
donor may receive reimbursement and to what extent the reimbursement will be 
                                            
529  Section 39(1) of the Constitution.  
530  Hereafter referred to as the Declaration of Istanbul. South Africa is a signatory to the 
 Declaration. See also the WHO Principle 5 which allows the reimbursement of costs 
concerning kidney donation. World Health Organization “WHO guiding principles on human 
cell, tissue and organ transplantation” http://www.who.int/transplantation /Guiding _ 
PrinciplesTransplantation_WHA63.22en.pdf (Date of use: 18 June 2012). South Africa is a 
member of the World Health Organization. 
531  Legitimate expenses that may be reimbursed: The cost of any medical and psychological 
evaluations of a potential living donor. The costs incurred in arranging and effecting the pre-, 
peri- and post-operative phases of the kidney donation. Medical Expenses incurred for post-
discharge care of the donor and lastly lost income in relation to the kidney donation.  
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made. Instating a transplant ethics committee will insure that all reimbursements are 
done fairly and equally. South Africa could also take a step further regarding 
transplant legislation by following the Iranian model of paid and regulated kidney 
donations.  
6.3 IRAN AND KIDNEY DONATIONS 
In Ancient Greek times, Iran was referred to as “Persia” or “the land of Aryans”. 
Today, Iran is a developing country situated in the Middle East between the Caspian 
Sea and the Persian Gulf and has 68 million inhabitants.532 The first kidney transplant 
in Iran was performed in 1967. Since this first kidney transplant until 1985, Iran only 
transplanted approximately 100 kidneys due to a lack of infrastructure available to 
maintain and develop a kidney transplant network in the country.533 The transplant 
activity was very low up until 1980, and due to this the Minister of Health decided to 
allow patients that were starting dialysis to travel abroad to receive a kidney 
transplant, which would be funded by the government.534 From 1980 to 1985, more 
than 400 patients were sent to various European countries and the United States of 
America to receive government-funded kidney transplants.535 From 1985 to 1987, the 
prevalence of patients with end-stage renal failure was approximately 25 000 (or 350 
per one million persons) in Iran.536 In 1988, the number of patients with end-stage 
renal failure started to escalate drastically, and most of these patients did not have a 
living related donor.537 To make matters even worse, at this time Iran had no 
deceased-donor organ programme or any plans for such a programme.538 At this 
time, the government-funded travel to overseas countries for kidney transplants were 
too expensive, and with this number of patients, completely unaffordable. All these 
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circumstances led to the government-funded regulated and compensated living 
unrelated donor renal transplantation programme539 that was adopted in 1988.540  
6.3.1 The Iranian model of paid kidney donations541 
Since the implementation of the Iranian model, 19 609 kidney transplants have been 
performed.542 The Iranian model led to the establishment of the Dialysis and 
Transplant Patient Association.543 If a patient does not have a living related kidney 
donor, or if the related kidney donor is unwilling, then he will be referred to the 
DATPA, and they will locate a suitable living unrelated kidney donor for the patient.544 
Volunteers that would like to donate a kidney are also referred to the DATPA. It 
should also be mentioned that all members of the DATPA have end-stage renal 
failure and that the members receive no incentive for finding the unrelated kidney 
donor, or for referring the recipient and donor to the transplant team. Once the kidney 
recipient and kidney donor have been matched, the next step is the evaluation of 
both the donor and recipient. The donor and recipient are both subjected to extensive 
clinical and psychological evaluation, as well as appropriate laboratory tests and 
imagining.545 During the evaluation, the transplant physician emphasises the 
advantages of using a living related donor, compared with an unrelated donor, and 
the scarcity of deceased-donor kidneys is also mentioned.546 All living kidney donors 
                                            
539  Hereinafter referred to as the Iranian model. 
540  Bagheri A “Compensated kidney donation: An ethical review of the Iranian model” 2006 (16) 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 270. 
541  It should be borne in mind that the Iranian model of paid kidney donations does not involve the 
buying and selling of donor kidneys. An established amount is given to the kidney donor as a 
rewarding gift from the government and the kidney recipient. 
542  3 421 transplants were from living related donors, 15 365 transplants were from living 
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Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1137. 
543  Hereinafter referred to as DATPA. 
544  Ghods and Savaj 2006 Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1137. 
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Savaj 2006 Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1139. 
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six months for a possible deceased kidney to become available. Ghods and Savaj 2006 
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are further subjected to an assessment by the donor selection panel to assure that 
their consent is voluntary.547  
The Iranian model does not leave any gap for an organ broker or agency to 
intervene. All transplant teams belong to university hospitals, and the government 
pays all the hospital expenses in relation to the kidney transplant.548 After the kidney 
transplant, the government provides the kidney donor with a governmental donor 
award of approximately $1 200, and the kidney recipients are provided with 
immunosuppressive drugs at a subsidised reduced rate.549 Furthermore, the majority 
of kidney donors also receive a rewarding gift (as arranged and defined by the 
DATPA) from the recipient before the kidney transplant. If the recipient is poor, the 
rewarding gift will be sponsored by a charitable organisation, known as the Charity 
Foundation of Special Diseases.550 All kidney donors and recipients need to apply to 
the Association for Supporting Renal Patient (which is also a charity organisation). 
The kidney donor needs to sign a pledge stating that he will not claim any kind of 
monetary reward from the recipient during the laboratory tests and after the kidney 
transplant.551 The kidney recipient also signs a pledge not to compensate the kidney 
donor directly. After the kidney transplant, a number of documents, which include the 
pledges, are submitted to the Charity Foundation for Special Diseases, which will 
then pay the kidney donor a fixed amount.552 
The Iranian model also prevents any transplant tourism. Foreigners are not allowed to 
undergo kidney transplants from living unrelated Iranian kidney donors, nor are they 
permitted to volunteer as kidney donors to unrelated Iranian recipients.553 
Unfortunately, Iran has no national transplant registry (as previously mentioned, 
neither does South Africa) to report the short- and long-term results of all kidney 
                                            
547  From 1986 to 2000, the donor selection panel consisted of nephrologists, transplant surgeons 
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transplants. However, the fact that the Iranian model has eliminated the transplant 
waiting list in Iran says enough.  
6.3.2. Ethical issues pertaining to the Iranian model. 
6.3.2.1 Arguments supporting the Iranian model 
Many issues that are usually associated with paid kidney donations have been 
prevented by the Iranian model. One of biggest problems (namely the intervening of 
an organ broker or organ agency) has been eliminated by the existence of the 
DATPA, and because the government pays for all hospital expenses in relation to the 
kidney transplants.554 The main criticism that is usually raised concerning paid organ 
donations is that if payment for kidneys is legalised then only the rich will be able to 
afford a kidney while the poor will have to go without. The elimination of the kidney 
transplant waiting list in Iran benefits the rich and the poor. Everyone in Iran has 
equal access to all transplant facilities, and if a recipient is too poor to provide the 
kidney donor with a rewarding gift, then it is awarded by a charitable organisation.555 
The Iranian model had no influence whatsoever on the deceased-donor programme 
that was established in 2000. Between 2004 and 2005, there was a 12% increase 
regarding the programme, and there are a number of reasons for the slow increase – 
such as infrastructural deficiencies and cultural barriers.556  
One of the most important and ethical influences that the Iranian model has is the 
elimination of coercive living related donors. Because of the Iranian culture, coercive 
living related donors are very common. A kidney donation done by a volunteer is 
much more ethically acceptable than a living related donation done with some degree 
of family pressure or emotional coercion.557 Furthermore, the many illegal and 
commercial transplants before 1988 were eliminated by the Iranian model. Prior to 
the model, many kidney recipients that needed a living unrelated kidney donor 
travelled to India where they received paid kidney transplants that could have a 
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number of negative implications.558 It could be deduced that the most important 
influence of the Iranian model is the many patients whose death and suffering have 
been prevented. 
6.3.2.2 Arguments against the Iranian model 
According to the critics of the Iranian model, there are a number of ethical issues that 
should be taken into account. The critic’s first and main concern is that the $1 200 
supplied by the government is a fixed amount and is not enough to satisfy the 
majority of kidney donors. The amount supplied by the government, however, is not 
the only gift the kidney donor receives; he also receives the additional rewarding gift 
from the recipient or from a charitable organisation if the recipient is financially 
needy.559 The critics still feel that this is not enough and that, just as war-injured 
veterans in each society receive legal and social items of benefits, the same should 
be offered to kidney donors. By providing financial incentive and social benefits by the 
government and eliminating the rewarding gifts, the Iranian model will function as a 
non-directed paid kidney donation programme.560 The possible response to this is 
that the Iranian model was not adopted to upgrade the socio-economic class of the 
kidney donors, but rather to save the lives of dying patients with end-stage renal 
failure.561  
The issue is also raised that the increased supply of donor kidneys may cause a 
lowering of the strict clinical selection criteria for kidney transplantation.562 The 
concern with the increased supply is that the medical practitioner may recommend 
transplantation sooner than would usually be advised.563 Further ethical issues that 
exist are that public education and the establishment of an Iranian donor registry is 
necessary.564 In the author’s opinion, all the ethical issues pertaining to the Iranian 
                                            
558  Ghods and Savaj 2006 Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1141. 
559  Baghari 2006 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 279. 
560  Ghods and Savaj 2006 Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1141. 
561  Ghods AJ, Savaj S and Khosravani P “Adverse effect of a controlled living unrelated donor 
renal transplant program on living related and cadaveric kidney donation” 2001 (33) Transplant 
Proceedings 2627. 
562  Baghari 2006 Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 277. 
563  Baghari 2006 Kennedy institute of Ethics Journal 277. 
564  Ghods 2002 Nephrology Dialysis Transplantation 223. 
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model should not be considered as ethical issues, but rather as improvements that 
can be made to the Iranian model. None of these issues are serious ethical issues. 
The Iranian model may involve payment for a kidney, but all aspects of the model are 
strictly enforced by the various transplant teams and the Iranian Society of Organ 
Transplantations.565 Other strategies that are often cited by various opponents of paid 
organ donations, such as presumed consent, non-heart-beating deceased donors 
and ABO incompatible paired exchange kidney transplants, do not have the potential 
to eliminate or even alleviate the renal waiting lists, but the Iranian model could 
accomplish this.566 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
If South Africa should ever legalise the selling of donor kidneys, the Iranian model will 
be the perfect model to incorporate. South Africa and Iran are both developing 
countries with a lot of rural areas and illiterate persons. The only difference between 
these two countries is that Iran does not have a constitution or any human rights 
instruments. If the selling of donor kidneys could be regarded as constitutionally 
acceptable, as discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation, then the South African 
government could be obliged to supply the kidney donor with an awarding gift as 
pertaining to the Iranian model. The kidney recipient could also provide the kidney 
donor with an additional gift. If the kidney donor cannot afford this gift, there could be 
charitable organisations that could supply these awarding gifts.  
In South Africa a DATPA could also be established to locate suitable living unrelated 
kidney donors and to accommodate any volunteers that wish to donate their kidneys, 
and this association could also be subjected to strictly enforced ethical control. This 
type of model in South Africa could also eliminate the majority of illegal organ trading, 
which is steadily increasing in South Africa. If such a model is adopted in South 
Africa, the poor will also stand a chance to receive a donor kidney. More patients will 
receive kidney transplants, thus leading to more lives being saved and a decrease in 
the number of patients that receive renal dialysis will take place; consequently, giving 
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more patients the chance to receive renal dialysis and live long enough to receive a 
donor kidney.  
If the constitution and bioethical perspectives are truly so focused on the full patient 
autonomy (thus the right to self-determination in the constitution) and informed 
consent, then a model such as the Iranian model should be allowed, as this model 
gives the potential kidney donor the choice to do with his kidney as he likes and the 
right to receive an awarding gift for his choice. 
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
“Law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and when they fail in this 
purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social 
progress.”567 
At this very moment, approximately 21 000 people in South Africa are waiting.568 
Some of them are waiting for a life-saving call that a viable kidney has finally become 
available. Others are waiting while they receive their renal dialysis, hoping and 
praying that they are one of the lucky few who will survive this ordeal. Those 
remaining have accepted their fate and have to make peace with the fact that they 
will become yet another statistic. Of the 21 000, only more or less 5 000 will be 
fortunate enough to receive any treatment whatsoever; thus renal dialysis or a kidney 
transplant. Of that 5 000, only 250 people will receive kidney transplants this year.569 
The others will be left hoping and waiting in vain... 
Although the world of medicine has seen miraculous developments in the past few 
decades within the sphere of organ transplantation, the law has failed to develop in 
accordance with these developments. However, the abovementioned harrowing 
statistics need not be our reality. Instituting legislation to legalise and regulate the 
process of remuneration for kidney donations could conceivably solve a problem that 
seems insurmountable at this moment. The aim of this research was to examine 
whether the legalisation of the remuneration for kidney transplants could be regarded 
as constitutionally acceptable. 
In order to establish this, the relevant provisions of the Constitution were examined. 
As was mentioned in chapter 2, the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic of 
South Africa, and any legislation that is irreconcilable with it is invalid to the extent of 
                                            
567  Martin Luther King, as quoted in his letter from Birmingham Jail. Dinar 
http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html (Date of use: 4 June 2012). 
568  The South African Dialysis and Transplant Registry estimates that about 21 000 South 
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use: 4 June 2012). 
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kidney transplants, and only 119 of these were of living kidney donations. Organ Donor 
Foundation http://www.odf.org (Date of use: 4 June 2012). 
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the conflict. A number of sections in the Constitution were analysed, namely the right 
to life, human dignity, self-determination, privacy and healthcare. The right to life and 
human dignity are regarded as the most important fundamental human rights in the 
Constitution. These two rights are interconnected due to the fact that human dignity 
cannot exist without life, and a life worth living includes being treated in a dignified 
manner. The author is of opinion that a person receiving renal dialysis does not live a 
life worth living. His life consists of endless pain and suffering, which leads to a 
significant decrease in his quality of life, which leads to an infringement of his right to 
human dignity. Therefore, the right to human dignity and renal dialysis cannot exist in 
one space. Furthermore, the author contested why, in the Makwanyane case, cruel 
and inhumane treatment of a prisoner was regarded as constitutionally unacceptable, 
but yet it is regarded as acceptable to treat an end-stage renal failure patient in the 
exact same manner while the option of saving him of his agony exists.  
The Constitution grants everybody the right to self-determination, which includes the 
right to make decisions over one’s own body. Thus, if a person is not allowed to 
receive remuneration for his kidney donation, his right to self-determination is 
infringed. A person should be granted the choice to decide if he would like to be 
remunerated or not. If a person could be remunerated for his kidney donation, his 
right to privacy will not be affected, seeing that his identity could still remain 
anonymous. Everyone is granted the right to access to healthcare, and in section 
27(2) the obligation is imposed on the state to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of this 
right. The state is not realising the right of access to healthcare pertaining to end-
stage renal failure patients. The state merely pleads poverty and it is regarded as 
acceptable. Yet, if the state can afford renal dialysis, it would be able to afford kidney 
transplants, seeing that as mentioned in this dissertation the cost of a kidney 
transplant is in fact lower than keeping a patient on renal dialysis. The state should 
provide the kidney recipient with the alternative option of obtaining a kidney from a 
kidney donor who is remunerated by the state.  
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After careful examination of the relevant sections of the Constitution, it was found that 
there should be no objections against the legal payment of a kidney donor. However, 
the payment of a kidney donor as discussed in chapter 3 is prohibited in the 
regulatory framework pertaining to kidney transplants – namely the National Health 
Act. Nonetheless, the National Health Act is moving in the right direction by 
attempting to improve the current shortage of kidney by providing the kidney donor 
with a reimbursement for the reasonable costs incurred by him. Yet, there is no 
indication of what is meant by this remuneration, what the amount will be and who will 
be liable for the payment of the amount.  
Due to South Africa’s lack of constitutional guidance and case law regarding the 
remuneration of a kidney donor, the author sought guidance from international law, 
and found that Singapore’s procedure of remuneration would be the perfect example 
to follow due to their cultural and religious similarities to South Africa. The author is of 
the opinion that the South African legislator should rather have taken an extra step 
and allowed the sales of kidneys in a regulated manner. In this case, South Africa 
could follow the example of the Iran’s paid and regulated living unrelated kidney 
donors model. The author is of opinion that this model could easily be implemented in 
South Africa. The most important element of this model is that the payment must be 
regulated and monitored by an ethical committee. 
This research further endeavoured to highlight the various arguments against and in 
favour of kidney sales. Any controversial matter will always garner widely differing 
opinions. It should be borne in mind that, giving people the option of selling their 
kidneys does not force them to do so. They still have the choice of selling or not. In 
the author’s opinion there may be a disagreement regarding whether kidney sales 
should be allowed or not. Nevertheless, there is no disagreement when it comes to 
the shortage of kidneys in South Africa and the world. Instead of arguing whether 
kidney sales should be allowed or not people should rather focus their attention on 
finding a solution for the dire need of available donor kidneys.  
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Due to the controversial nature of the subject matter – arguments pertaining to kidney 
sales – this research sought to examine whether kidney transplants could be 
regarded as bioethically acceptable. It was found that, measured against the four 
principles of bioethics, namely autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice, 
kidney transplants and even the payment for kidney donors could be regarded as 
bioethically acceptable. It should, however, be borne in mind that this is only the 
author’s opinion. A person’s opinion could differ according to how much importance 
he allocates to one moral principle when it is in conflict with another principle – such 
as in the case of the principles of non-maleficence and beneficence. 
From this research it could easily be deduced that the agony of 21 000 people waiting 
for kidneys could easily be relieved if the dire need for donor kidneys were to be 
addressed in a constitutionally acceptable manner. The lack of legislative 
development is the only obstacle standing in the way of those desperate for salvation. 
The self-same law which is supposed to protect these people is in actual fact the 
problem and not the solution, as it is withholding them from their only option to 
prolong their lives – a viable donor kidney. One is already given the option to save a 
life by donating a donor kidney. One should also be allowed to choose whether to 
save a life and be remunerated for the deed. It should be emphasised once again 
that if kidney sales are legalised, a person still has the choice whether he would like 
to sell or donate. Nevertheless, people should be granted this option in a modern 
constitutional society. The author is strongly of the opinion that the legalisation of 
kidney sales in a constitutionally acceptable manner will improve the current shortage 
of donor kidneys in South Africa. Furthermore, it will give hope to the thousands of 
patients who are waiting on a miracle. It would be reprehensible if the shortfall of 
legislative development is the only reason why South Africa is suffering from such an 
acute shortage of donor kidneys. 
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